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Prometheus Unbound: Accepting a Mythless




In the Greek tragedy, Zeus bound Prometheus to a precipice
and commanded an eagle to devour the defiant protagonist's
liver during the day.' According to myth, the liver would fully
rejuvenate each night so that the torture could begin anew at
dawn.2 The Nineteenth Century poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley, has
Prometheus bewail his own agony:
Almighty, had I deigned to share the shame
Of thine ill tyranny, and hung not here
Nailed to this wall of eagle-baffling mountain,
Black, wintry, dead, unmeasured; without herb,
Insect, or beast, or shape or sound of life.
Ah me! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever!
No change, no pause, no hope! Yet I endure.
I ask the Earth, have not the mountains felt?
I ask yon Heaven, the all-beholding Sun,
Has it not seen? The sea, in storm or calm,
Heaven's ever-changing Shadow, spread below,
Have its deaf waves not heard my agony?
Ah me! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever!3
t Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., 1985, Uni-
versity of Miami; Ph.D., 1980, University of Michigan; M-A., 1976, University of Michi-
gan; B-, 1975, Beloit College. I would like to dedicate this article to a superb human
being, my friend, Art Furia. I am also most grateful to my research assistants, Deby
Raccina, Renee Duff and Kelly Muga. I would also like to thank Jack Denaro, Bruce
Winick and Beth Weitzner, all of whom were generous with their time and their
thoughts.
1. Prometheus appears in HESIOD, THE THEOGONY 68 (Norman 0. Brown trans.,
1953) ("Cunning Prometheus he bound with unbreakable and painful chains and drove a
stake through his middle. And he turned on him a long-winged eagle, which ate his im-
mortal liver-, by night the liver grew as much again as the long-winged bird had eaten in
the whole day."). According to the translator, portions of this section are not part of the
original poem. See also Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, in SEvEN FAmous GREEK PLAYS 1
(Whitney J. Oates et al. eds. & Paul More trans., Modern Library 1950).
2. HESIOD, supra note 1, at 68.
3. Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, in ENGLISH RoivANTIc WRrrERs 983
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Shelley has indeed captured what the Greeks saw as the
quintessence of severe punishment-namely, redundancy. In
fact, the same awareness resides in the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Constitution.4 As a rule of finality, which ensues from a
fear of governmental oppression,5 the Clause prevents an effec-
tually deific prosecution from sentencing an already acquitted or
convicted individual to the seemingly endless pain of
reprosecution.
Before the decisions in United States v. Halper, Austin v.
United States and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, when the same offense gave rise to separate criminal
and civil forfeiture proceedings, the individual target could not
really argue entitlement to the finality of double jeopardy pro-
tection.6 As such, the government could freely seize the property
of claimants who had already been acquitted or convicted of the
very conduct giving rise to the forfeiture. 7 Alternatively, the gov-
ernment could pursue the civil forfeiture first and regardless of
the outcome, seek a criminal conviction of the same claimant for
(1967).
4. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V
5. See infra Part IA
6. The combined effect of three recent Supreme Court decisions, United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602 (1993) and Depart-
ment of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994), was to make double
jeopardy protection available to a claimant facing civil in rem forfeiture before or after a
criminal proceeding. See infra Part II.
7. Before Halper, the Supreme Court had rejected double jeopardy challenges to
civil actions seeking sanctions for violations that were the subject of prior criminal pro-
ceedings. See generally Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1931) (In civil action to
collect a tax deficiency and statutory penalty after defendant's acquittal for tax evasion,
the Court said that the "acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by
the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the crim-
inal proceeding was based has long been settled."); Various Items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause is
inapplicable to forfeiture proceeding where corporation had been convicted of criminal vi-
olations); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 US. 537, 549 (1943) (a civil qui tam
action against contractors that engaged in bid rigging after the defendants had been
criminally convicted did not violate double jeopardy clause); Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148, 152 (1956) (explaining that the statutory penalty liquidated dam-
ages and therefore, the action is civil). See also United States v. Ward, 448 US. 242, 248
(1980) (where the Court adopted a two-tiered test to determine whether a statute im-
poses a civil or criminal penalty); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
US. 354 (1984) (Court, applying Ward test, determined that Double Jeopardy Clause did
not preclude forfeiture of property after the defendant was acquitted of the related crimi-
nal charges). See generally discussion infra Part I.C.
Fall 1996] CIVIL IN REM FORFEITURE 657
the very offense at issue in the civil suit."
As this article will show, the historical inapplicability of
constitutional provisions to civil forfeiture, the process by which
the government confiscates property through an in rem action,
is especially troubling for many reasons. Because civil forfeiture
features so prominently in federal law and is highly profitable,
the government's use of the congenial forfeiture mechanism is
widespread.9 Also, as one commentator has explained, one of the
things that makes "[c]ivil forfeiture . . . especially attractive to
law enforcement agencies ... [is that] success demands very lit-
tle in the way of proof or connection to actual wrongdoing."10
While there are at least one hundred different statutes au-
thorizing civil forfeiture in a variety of criminal contexts," the
8. See supra note 6 (decisions deeming double jeopardy principles to be inapplicable
to civil sanctions did not hinge on whether they preceded or followed criminal punish-
ment). See also infra note 119.
9. See generally T. Michelle Ator, Note, 17 U. Amu. LrrrLE Rocm L.J. 95 (1994); Ale-
jandro Caffarelli, Ci6il Forfeiture Hits Home: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Lot
5, Fox Grove, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1447 (1995); William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil
Drug Forfeiture Statutes: Analysis and Recommendations, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1087 (1994);
Joy Chatman, Note, Losing the Battle, But Not the War: The Future Use of Civil Forfei-
ture By Law Enforcement Agencies After Austin v. United States, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 739
(1994); Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick and Profitable Also be Fair?
Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles On the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1 (1994);
Rebecca Frank Dallet, Taking the Ammunition Away From the "War on Drugs: A Double
Jeopardy Bar to 21 US.C. § 881 After Austin v. United States, 44 CASE W. REs. L. Rev.
235 (1993); M. Lynette Eaddy, How Much Is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the Exces-
sive Fines Clause After Austin v. United States, 45 FLA. L. REv. 709 (1993); Anthony J.
Franze, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of "The Innocent
Owner", 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 369 (1994); Scott A. Hauert, An Examination of the Na-
ture, Scope, and Extent of Statutory Civil Forfeiture, 20 U. DAYTON L. Rev. 159 (1994);
Steven L. Kessler, For Want of a Nail: Forfeiture and the Bill of Rights, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
Rev. 205 (1994); Michael J. Munn, The Aftermath of Austin v. United States: When Is
Civil Forfeiture An Excessive Fine?, 1994 UTAH L. Rev. 1255; Douglas S. Reinhart, Apply-
ing the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States: Excessive-
ness and Proportionality, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235 (1994); James B. Speta, Narrowing
the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection & the Eighth
Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1990); Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liber-
ties, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 95 (1994); Cynthia Sherrill Wood, Asset Forfeiture and the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause: An Epilogue to Austin v. United States, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1357 (1994).
10. Taifa, supra note 9, at 98. See also infra Part I.B.
11. Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1109-10, has summarized this as follows:
Many of these are directed at per se contraband, like unregistered dynamite,
sawed-off shotguns, pornographic films, dying swine, the bacon, and magazines
devoted to bestiality. Others are directed at derivative contraband, such as bald
eagle eggs, whales, video-games that violate copyrights, smuggled potatoes,
prison-made whips, Mayan temples, and untaxed whiskey. Other forfeitable
items include vehicles used to import aliens; firearms used to kill animals in
658 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
civil drug forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881, is often dubbed the
"centerpiece."2 Under § 881, the government, by combining the
conveyance, asset and real property forfeiture provisions, can
sometimes seize all of an individual's property.13 In fact, this ex-
pansive breadth and the absence of the very procedural protec-
tions, which are afforded criminal defendants, have prompted
§ 881 critics to describe it as "[t]he H-Bomb in the war on
drugs,"14 which is "making civil liberties a casualty,"15 as a
"house of horrors"16 or as a device in which the government has
"seemingly unfettered authority."17
national parks; vessels and gear used to poach halibut, seals and salmon;
equipment used to counterfeit currency or coinage; vessels unloaded without a
permit; vessels outfitted for smuggling; and containers, records, conveyances,
manufacturing equipment, and real property used in drug violations. The pro-
ceeds of racketeering activity are forfeitable under RICO. A bank account con-
sisting only partly of proceeds of illegal activity has been judged to be forfeita-
ble in its entirety.
(footnotes omitted).
12. David J. Taube, White Collar Crime Procedural Issues: Civil Forfeiture, 30 AM.
Cran. L. Rav. 1025, 1026-27 (1993).
13. See Franze, supra note 9, at 385 ("Forfeiture under section 881 clearly encom-
passes a broad array of property ... "). W. David George explains in Finally, An Eye for
An Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the Punishment Fit the Crime in Austin v. United
States, 46 BAYLOR L. Rav. 509, 509 (1994):
Because § 881 allows the forfeiture of any asset used in a drug transaction,
forfeitures have the potential of being excessive, in the sense that the punish-
ment is not proportional to the crime. For example, an expensive yacht was
seized by the government when one marijuana cigarette was found on board.
(footnotes omitted).
See also Speta, supra note 9, at 166-67 ("By combining the conveyance, asset and real
property forfeiture provisions, the government, under section 881, can threaten to seize
all of a person's property.") (footnote omitted).
14. Dallet, supra note 9, at 235-36 (The H-bomb in the war on drugs is the federal
civil drug forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881, which may be brought without securing a
criminal conviction and which provides little procedural protection to defendants.") (foot-
notes omitted).
15. Id. at 237.
16. Note, 104 I-hRv. L. REV. 1139 (1991).
17. Kessler, supra note 9, at 205. As Kessler explains, "greed" is indeed a motivat-
ing factor behind the frequent use of forfeiture:
Since 1985, the federal government has pocketed more than $3.2 billion in for-
feited assets. In its current inventory, the federal government has more than
31,698 pieces of property, real and personal, worth an estimated $1.9 billion.
From the business of the mechanic who repaired the drug dealer's cars to the
$50,000 house occupied by the welfare wife and seven-year old daughter while
hubby/daddy serves a life sentence, forfeiture has become, well, routine.
Id. at 205-06. See also Cheh, supra note 9, at 3 ("(Alccording to figures provided by the
Justice Department's Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, net deposits in the Asset For-
feiture Fund grew from $93.7 million in 1986 to $643.6 million, $531 million, and $555.7
million in 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively."). As Cheh points out, forfeitures are
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Because in civil forfeiture provisions, such as § 881, there is
a heightened potential for governmental abuse18 and because the
Constitution, especially the Double Jeopardy Clause, serves to
protect the accused against governmental overreaching, 9 it is
lamentably ironic that history has withheld from the forfeiture
claimant such constitutional safeguards in the very arena in
which they are most needed. Specifically, with respect to the
Double Jeopardy Clause, courts have created certain mythic no-
tions about forfeiture and used them to keep the Constitution at
a distance. 20 This article's main purpose is to explore not only
the archaic forfeiture myths and their fledgling replacements,
but also the United States Supreme Court's recent disturbing
resurrection and apotheosis of the old myths. Within these con-
tours, I advocate the acceptance of a mythless concept of civil in
rem forfeiture, which would make the Double Jeopardy Clause
available to a claimant whose alleged offense has given rise to
both a criminal prosecution and a separate civil forfeiture
action.
Part I of this article delves into the policies behind the
Double Jeopardy Clause and emphasizes not only its role as the
protector of an accused's interest in finality, but also its aim to
prevent undue governmental harassment. In this context, I sug-
gest that the Double Jeopardy Clause by itself is not devoid of
myths. Specifically, courts have treated the Clause as containing
a separate prohibition of multiple punishments for the same of-
fense and also have interpreted that component as permitting
the imposition of multiple punishments in a single proceeding as
long as the "legislature specifically authorize[d the] cumulative
punishment."2 1
"highly profitable [because] . .. [in most forfeiture regimes, law enforcement agencies
may sell what they seize and keep the proceeds." Id.
18. See generally discussion in Cheh, supra note 9; Dallet, supra note 9; Eaddy
supra note 9; Franze, supra note 9; Hauert, supra note 9; Kessler, supra note 9; Munn,
supra note 9; Stacy J. Pollock, Note, Proportionality In Civil Forfeiture: Toward A Reme-
dial Solution 62 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 456 (1994); Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How
the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process 45 U. MIMII L.
Rev. 911 (1991); Speta, supra note 9; Taifa, supra note 9.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See Piety, supra note 18, at 924 ("Because the entire civil forfeiture doctrine is
made up of legal fictions that if applied in a logically consistent manner provide no in-
ternal check on the governmenVs power to employ forfeiture, its application is virtually
unbounded."). See also infra Part I.C.
21. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) ("Where... a legislature specif-
ically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes . . . the prosecutor may
seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes
in a single trial."). See also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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What I preliminarily suggest in Part I is that the isolation
of a separate successive punishments' bar is not only mythic, but
also quite detrimental because its effect is to undermine the
Double Jeopardy Clause's underlying principle of finality and
condone governmental overreaching. Further, I suggest that def-
erence to the legislature in the situation where multiple punish-
ments issue in a single proceeding is similarly mythic and nox-
ious. In essence, such deference constitutes an unwarranted
legislative exemption from the constraints of a clause which was
specifically designed to curb governmental oppression.
Part I also summarizes the evolution of civil in rem forfei-
ture into powerful law enforcement weaponry. Here I describe
forfeiture as not just punishment, but punishment meted out in
an arena in which rules and procedures effectually conspire to
cripple the accused and empower the already seemingly omnipo-
tent government. It is also here that I stress the antinomy that
although such civil forfeiture proceedings can present and even
magnify the very ills that the Double Jeopardy Clause was de-
signed to check, courts have created several forfeiture myths to
ward off such a critical constitutional protection. Basically, as I
suggest, courts, relying on the "civil" and "remedial" labels af-
fixed to such forfeiture and on the personification myth of the
guilty property, have deemed the Double Jeopardy Clause to be
inapplicable.
Part II focuses on the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in United States v. Halper 2, Austin v. United States23 and
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch24 and shows
how these cases at least temporarily brought about the demise
of the longstanding forfeiture myths upon which courts have re-
lied to deprive such civil claimants of double jeopardy protec-
tion. In this part, I also point out that the Kurth Ranch Court
had at least implicitly begun to dispel one of the hoary myths
about the Double Jeopardy Clause itself-that is, the interpreta-
tion of that Clause as having a separate successive punishments'
prohibition.
Part IIH moves into certain federal appellate court decisions
in the wake of Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch. What is per-
plexing about these decisions is that although the Supreme
Court had cleared the way for a realistic understanding of civil
in rem forfeiture, several federal appellate courts nevertheless
resisted such precedent and progress and strained to create re-
22. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
23. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
24. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
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placement myths to serve as new grounds for rejecting double
jeopardy challenges to successive related criminal and civil
proceedings.
Specifically in Part III, I discuss how the Second,
25 Sixth26
and Eleventh Circuits27 concocted a fictive view of the separate
civil and criminal proceedings as comprising or conceivably com-
prising a "single, coordinated prosecution," which thus does not
trigger double jeopardy protection. 28 The Fifth Circuit, on the
other hand, spun the just as flimsy theory that all civil forfei-
ture is not punitive and as such, does not always implicate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.29 In connection with this discussion, I
show how both the non-separation and non-punitive myths con-
travened Supreme Court precedent and also, in effect, thwarted
the salutary policies behind the double jeopardy bar.
Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit decision 0 and dicta in a
Seventh Circuit case, 31 which come closest to embracing a
mythless approach to civil in rem forfeiture. That is, both courts
apparently concluded that all forfeiture is punitive and that the
parallel civil and criminal proceedings are always separate. Sig-
nificantly, what the Ninth and Seventh Circuits shared is an
understanding that the effect of the Supreme Court's Halper,
Austin and Kurth Ranch trilogy was to mandate the inclusion of
forfeiture in the criminal indictment itself if the government
wishes to pursue both a criminal sentence and a forfeiture pen-
alty based on the same offense.
It is here in Part IV that I suggest that these courts,
through ratification of what I call a mandatory joinder rule,32
25. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092
(1994). Accord United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996).
26. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762
(1996), rev'd 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
27. United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
28. In Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575, the Sixth Circuit concluded that although the parallel
criminal and civil cases before it were separate, such consecutive proceedings were not
always separate. See also discussion infra Part MA2.
29. United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994). Accord Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
$184,505.01 In US. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Salinas, 65
F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 1995).
30. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opin-
ion amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Ci. 1995), cert. granted sub nom.,
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), reu'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Accord
United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
31. United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Ci. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669
(1994).
32. Id. at 1464 ("The United States would do well to seek imprisonment, fines, and
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were the ones that properly abided by the Supreme Court prece-
dent and promoted a procedure which, in effect, most approxi-
mates the affording of double jeopardy protection for forfeiture
claimants. Also, in this Part, I criticize what were the govern-
ment's efforts to twist the Blockburger analysis3 3 into a tool for
the circumvention of the dictates of the Double Jeopardy Clause
and suggest that acquiescing in such contentions would not only
be disingenuous but inconsistent with the reasoning of Supreme
Court decisions.
Part V is essentially a critique of the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in United States v. Ursery and United States v.
$405,089.23 United States Currency34 in which the Supreme
Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable
to civil in rem forfeitures because such proceedings do not im-
pose "punishment" and are not criminal. As I will show, the
Court in that decision has not just resurrected, but actually apo-
theosized the detrimental myths it eradicated in the Halper,
Austin and Kurth Ranch cases. In the Ursery and $405,089 US.
Currency decision, however, the Court not only ignored its own
precedent but also shattered the sacred core of double jeopardy
protection.
In the conclusion, I suggest that perhaps the best approach
to the problem is the relatively mythless approach of the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits and that that approach did not even go far
enough. What I advance is that the Supreme Court in the Ur-
sery and $405,089 U.S. Currency cases should have bestowed
double jeopardy protection on the forfeiture claimants that en-
dure both forfeiture proceedings and a criminal prosecution. In
effect, the Court should have set forth what is effectually a
mandatory joinder rule. That is, the Court should have activated
the finality principle in the Double Jeopardy Clause by harmo-
forfeiture in one proceeding."). See also United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33
F.3d at 1222, ("If, in such cases, the government wishes to obtain forfeiture and to im-
pose other forms of criminal punishment, it 'will have to rely to a much greater extent
on criminal forfeiture.'") (quoting 1 DAviD B. SMrH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FOR-
FEITURE CASES, 12-131 to 12-132 (1993)). Accord United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75
F.3d at 1487.
33. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme Court set
forth a test to determine when a second proceeding is barred by double jeopardy. The
Court held that there is no double jeopardy bar when the statutes under which a
defendant is tried each require "proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Id.
at 304. See also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (reaffirming the "same-
elements" test of Blockburger). See generally discussion infra Part IV.C.
34. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), rev'g United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995)
and United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
662 [Vol. 44
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nizing the successive-punishments-prohibition with the Clause
as a whole. This would have entailed the Court's explicit ac-
knowledgement of what Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent
in Kurth Ranch-that "the Double Jeopardy Clause's ban on
successive criminal prosecutions . . .make[s] surplusage of any
distinct protection against additional punishment imposed in a
successive prosecution since the prosecution itself would be
barred.3 5
In the conclusion, I also suggest that the Ursery and
$405,089.23 US. Currency cases were a missed opportunity. The
Court should have questioned what has traditionally been the
special treatment of multiple punishments that are imposed in a
single proceeding. In so doing, the Court should have recognized
that real constitutional protection involves the abrogation of
that special legislative deference in the situation in which multi-
ple punishments issue in a single proceeding. At the end of the
article, I revisit Prometheus, the emblem of redundant pain, and
flesh out the conceit by equating mythless concepts of civil for-
feiture and double jeopardy protection with -a Prometheus
"unbound."36
I. MYTHic FORFEITURE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amnendment,
which guarantees that no person "shall . . .be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,"37 has
venerable origins. While some legal historians trace the double
jeopardy prohibition to Greek and Roman times,38 it was surely
35. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 801 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. See infra note 788.
37. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Double jeopardy protection applies not only to "life or
limb," but also to prison sentences and criminal fines. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S.
137, 155 (1977). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends double
jeopardy protections to state prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96
(1969).
38. See JAY A- SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SocIAL
PoLICY 2-4 (1969) ("The principle found final expression in the Digest of Justinian as the
precept that 'the governor should not permit the same person to be again accused of a
crime of which he had been acquitted. Criminal procedure was quite unlike modern
state-directed prosecutions, since, according to the Roman jurist Paulus, 'after a public
acquittal a defendant could again be prosecuted by his informer within thirty days, but
after that time this cannot be done."). See also Charles L. Cantrell, Double Jeopardy
and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 24 S. TEx. L. REV.
735, 747-48 (1983); Bernard J. Gilday, Jr. & Stephen E.,Gillen, Jeopardy-Meandering
Through Mandates and Maneuvers, 6 N. KY. L. R~v. 245, 245-46 (1979); Peter J. Hen-
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well entrenched in the English common law.39 In the Seven-
teenth Century, Lord Coke defined double jeopardy as the com-
bination of three related common law pleas: autrefois acquit, au-
trefois convict and pardon.40 Later, Sir William Blackstone said
that it was the "universal maxim of the common law of England
that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than
once for the same offence."41
Despite its prominence in the English common law, the
original thirteen colonies did not hasten to constitutionalize
double jeopardy protection.42 At the time of the First Congress,
only New Hampshire had a double jeopardy prohibition in its
constitution. 3 In the course of the ratification proceedings, how-
ning, Precedents In A Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double
Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 7 (1993); George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (1988); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Double Jeopardy-A Historical Perspective-Successive Conviction For A Crime By
Two Sovereignties 5 N.Y.L.F. 393, 393 (1959).
39. See MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-15 (1969) (discussing history of
double jeopardy in English Law). According to Friedland, it was:
[tlhe controversy between Henry II and Archbishop Thomas A. Becket-and
Henry's concession in 1176 following Becket's murder-that clerks convicted in
the ecclesiastical courts were exempt from further punishment in the King's
courts probably was primarily responsible for bringing about the adoption of
the concept of double jeopardy in the common law.
Id. at 5. See also SIGLER, supra note 38, at 1-16.
40. See Gilday & Gillen, supra note 38, at 246 (According to Lord Coke, double jeop-
ardy protection consisted of a combination of "three related common law pleas: (1) au-
trefois acquit (prior acquittal); (2) autrefois convict (prior conviction); and (3) pardon." (ci-
tation omitted)). But see Cantrell, supra note 38, at 754 n.92 ("The 'fundamental' concept
of modern double jeopardy embraces four distinct common law pleas in bar, the pleas of
autrefoits acquit, autrefoits convict, autrefoits attaint and pardon.... The plea of au-
trefoits attaint... was used whenever a defendant had been previously found guilty of a
felony and sentenced to death. The convicted defendant was thus referred to as having
been 'attainted' of a felony by judgment of death."). For a discussion of autrefois acquit
and autrefois convict, see FRIEDLAND, supra note 39, at 94-95.
41. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIES 335-36. See generally SIGLER, supra note
38, at 20 (writing one hundred years after Coke, Blackstone describes former jeopardy
as applying to state prosecutions alone). But see Cantrell, supra note 38, at 759 (arguing
that ".. . Blackstone made no significant contribution to the law of double jeopardy" and
that Sir William Hawkins' Treatise on the Pleas of the Crown in 1724 "appears to be a
more thorough and extensive commentary.").
42. See generally SIGLER, supra note 38, at 21-34 (discussing the evolution of Ameri-
can double jeopardy). See also Cantrell, supra note 38, at 766 (discussing historians' con-
fusion over "the exclusion of double jeopardy protection from most of the revolutionary
constitutions."); Gilday & Gillen, supra note 38, at 246 (discussing how "[t]he common
law double jeopardy protection was not broadly constitutionalized by the original thir-
teen colonies").
43. N.H. CONST. 1784, pt. I, art. XVI. See SIGLER, supra note 38, at 23 (the New
Hampshire Constitution of 1784 stated, "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after an
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ever, Maryland and New York endorsed a double jeopardy addi-
tion to the federal Constitution.44
In response, in 1789 James Madison proposed a clause stat-
ing that "[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of im-
peachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same
offence."4 At least one commentator has attributed the selection
of Blackstone's language over Madison's version to a desire to
clarify that the Double Jeopardy Clause, by forbidding a second
trial regardless of the outcome of the first, protects an individ-
ual's right to finality.4 Significantly, such a theory makes sense
because double jeopardy protection is not concerned with just
the imposition of successive punishments, but actually with the
subjection of individuals to multiple punitive ordeals.47
acquittal, for the same crime or offence."). See also discussion in Cantrell, supra note 38,
at 766; Gilday & Gillen, supra note 38, at 246.
44. Gilday & Gillen, supra note 38, at 246 n.7 (quoting 1 & 2 JONATHAN ELLIrOTT,
THE DEBATES IN SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF Tm FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328,
550 (1876)), state:
The Clause suggested by New York read as follows: 'That no person ought to
be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb, for one and the same offence; nor, un-
less in case of impeachment, be punished more than once for the same offence.'
... The Maryland suggestion read: 'That there shall be .. no appeal from mat-
ter of fact, or second trial after acquittal; but this provision shall not extend to
such cases as may arise in the government of the land or naval forces.
See generally SIGLER, supra note 38, at 27-34 (discussing the Fifth Amendment and
Double Jeopardy).
45. Gilday & Gillen, supra note 38, at 246 n.8 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434
(Gales & Seaton eds., 1789)). See also SIGLER, supra note 38, at 28-33.
46. See Cantrell, supra note 38, at 770 (acknowledging that although "[t]he true in-
tent of the framers may indeed be an exercise in speculation[,]" the founders probably
intended "to erect a 'humane' or humanitarian shield against multiple punishments and
prosecutions."). But see SIGLER, supra note 38, at 30-32 (according to the only recorded
debate on the Double Jeopardy Clause, there was a concern that Madison's original ter-
minology might be construed to defeat the right of a defendant to set aside an erroneous
conviction and demand a new trial). See also Linda S. Eads, Separating Crime From
Punishment. The Constitutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 68 WASHI. U.
L.Q. 929, 933-34 (1990) ("Little historical data exists on the reasons for these changes
other than the objection that, as drafted, the clause could be construed to bar a con-
victed defendant from appealing."); Henning, supra note 38, at 7.
47. See Justice Scalia's dissent in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 801 (1994) (arguing that . . . "the 'no-double-punishments' rule...
[is not] . . . a free standing constitutional prohibition implicit in the Double Jeopardy
Clause ... [but] merely an aspect of the Due Process Clause requirement of legislative
authorization."). See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 39, at 3-4 ("The main rationale of the
rule against double jeopardy is that it prevents the unwarranted harassment of the ac-
cused by multiple prosecutions."). Scholars have emphasized that the finality interest is
the real core of double jeopardy protection. See, eg., Eads, supra note 46, at 953 (dis-
cussing how "an accused's interest in finality" is "a basic justification for double jeopardy
protection."); Henning, supra note 38, at 7 ("[w]here the defendant has been tried before,
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One thing that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids is a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. 48 As one
commentator has elaborated, one underlying reason for this par-
ticular bar is that "guilt should be established by proving the el-
ements of a crime to the satisfaction of a single jury not by capi-
talizing on the increased probability of conviction resulting from
repeated prosecutions before many juries. ' '49 Double jeopardy
also prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. 50 In so doing, it prevents the prosecutor from shop-
ping for the biggest sentence through consecutive prosecutions
before different judges.51
In addition, courts have applied double jeopardy protection
to situations in which multiple punishments are imposed for the
same offense.52 In so doing, courts tend to view the multiple
punishment component as having two distinct attributes. That
is, the imposition of multiple punishments in a single proceed-
ing is permissible as long as "the legislature actually authorized
the cumulative punishment."53 Basically, courts rationalize such
deference to the legislature as ensuing from the notion that
Congress is the branch with the power to define crimes and
punishments. 54
In contrast, multiple punishments in successive proceedings
are plain taboo.55 This is not based just on the belief that multi-
the primary value is protecting the defendant's interest in the finality of the verdict.");
Thomas, supra note 38, at 839 (arguing that verdict finality is the only value behind
double jeopardy protection). See also Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:
Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences 78 Micm. L. REv. 1001, 1033 &
1063 (1980) (arguing that although the finality interest is "essentially more indigenous
to the double jeopardy clause than its... companion values . . . " it can be overridden
by other contrary societal interests). But see Cantrell, supra note 38 (arguing that the
Double Jeopardy Clause significantly serves as a shield against multiple punishments).
48. See United States v. Halper, 490 US. 435, 440 (1989).
49. Notes & Comments, Twice In Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 263, 267 (1965).
50. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
51. See Notes & Comments, supra note 49, at 267.
52. See Halper, 490 US. at 440. In his dissent in Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 799-800,
Justice Scalia traces the belief that there is a multiple-punishments component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to Ex parte Lange, 85 US. (18 Wall) 163 (1874). See also Can-
trell, supra note 38, at 736-39.
53. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) ("Where ... a legislature specif-
ically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes . . . the prosecutor may
seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes
in a single trial.").
54. Id. See also Halper, 490 U.S. at 450-51. See generally Henning, supra note 38, at
8 ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not directly limit the legislature's discretion to
define an act as criminal or to set the sanction to be applied upon a finding of guilt.").
55. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10 ("That the Government seeks the civil penalty
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ple successive punishments pose a risk that the cumulative pen-
alty will exceed what the legislature has authorized, but also on
a fear that dissatisfaction with the first sanction will prompt the
government to seek a second.56
The view of the Double Jeopardy Clause as having such a
separate successive punishments component has the potential to
undermine the bedrock policies behind the Clause. First, the
Double Jeopardy Clause administers to the accused's interest in
finality. In fact, the Supreme Court has elaborated on this facet:
[An idea] that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo American system
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though in-
nocent he may be found guilty57
As the Supreme Court and legal scholars have suggested,
the finality principle in a criminal case has its analogues in res
judicata and other civil law doctrines of finality.58 In this re-
spect, the double jeopardy protection, like its civil kindred,
stands for the somewhat unremarkable proposition that at a
certain point the disruptive ordeal is over.
Second, the double jeopardy finality rule encompasses what
the Supreme Court has suggested-that the deterrence of seri-
ate trials curtails governmental harassment.59 As the Court has
put it, the Clause is cognizant of what "every person acquainted
in a second proceeding is critical in triggering the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."); United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1490 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[Wie must conclude that congressional intent, no matter how clear, cannot bestow con-
stitutional legitimacy upon multiple punishments for the same offense when they are
imposed in multiple proceedings.").
56. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10 ("M[When the Government already has imposed a
criminal penalty and seeks to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the possibility that the Government is seeking
the second punishment because it is dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first
proceeding).
57. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
58. See generally FRIEDLAND, supra note 39, at 89 (discussing how "fries judicata in
criminal matters comprises not one, but a number of overlapping concepts"); Notes &
Comments, supra note 49, at 277 (suggesting that res judicata is the civil law analogue
to double jeopardy). Cf. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916) (Justice
Holmes arguing that criminal defendants should have the same protection as civil liti-
gants because "the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with sol-
emn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt").




with the history of governments must know that state trials
have been employed as a formidable engine in the hands of a
dominant administration."60 As such, inhering in the Clause is
the premise that punishment can issue, not just literally in the
sentence, but in the form of the prosecutorial ordeal itself. Be-
cause criminal prosecutions are unto themselves punitive in
their inevitable shattering of the lives of the accused, the Clause
aims to effectuate a balance between society's need to prosecute
those who break the law and the accused's right to have an end
to that disruption.61
Significantly, the individual's right to finality and the pro-
tection from undue governmental oppression are not unfastened
from our Constitution as a whole. As one scholar has put it:
[Djouble jeopardy is not simply res judicata dressed in prison grey. It
was called forth more by oppression than by crowded calendars. It equal-
izes, in some measure, the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal liti-
gants. It reflects not only our demand for speedy justice, but all of our
civilized caution about criminal law--our respect for a jury verdict and
the presumption of innocence, our aversion to needless punishment, our
distinction between prosecution and persecution.62
Essentially the double jeopardy policies ensue from what I
have before described as the "gnomic awareness that underlies
the overall structure and specific provisions of the United States
Constitution", which is "the equation of unchecked power with
corruption . . ,,63 Specifically, two commentators have aptly
portrayed this as Constitutional Framers that were "virtually
obsessed with a fear-bordering on what some might uncharita-
bly describe as paranoia-of the concentration of political
power." 4
While the double jeopardy protection springs from that con-
stitutionally ubiquitous fear of governmental tyranny,65 its spe-
60. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163, 171 (1874) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Olds, 5 Ky. (1 Litt.) 137, 139 (1827)).
61. See Henning, supra note 38, at 8.
62. Notes & Comments, supra note 49, at 277-78.
63. Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress Impermissibly
Intrudes On Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal
Appellate Courts' Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 1037, 1037 (1993).
64. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991).
65. See Cantrell, supra note 38, at 764-66 (discussing the American break with En-
glish history and tradition as deriving in part from the mistrust of centralized govern-
mental power); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the
Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IowA, L. REv. 323, 325-26 (1986) ("In the
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cific focus, however, has been on the potentially oppressive pros-
ecutor.66 Without the Clause's finality mandate, prosecutors
could drag the accused through a perceived eternity of trials un-
til they find a jury willing to convict. Without the Clause's effec-
tual ban on harassment, prosecutors could put the accused
through a seemingly endless litany of prosecutions until they
land a sentencer with the most satisfying sentence. Absent the
Clause's restrictions, prosecutors could augment . the pain of the
punitive ordeal through relentless redundancy.
One problem is that if there is a separate successive punish-
ments' component to the Double Jeopardy Clause, there is then
a sanctioned prosecutorial opportunity to thwart finality and
thus, badger the accused.6 7 That is, if the prohibition of succes-
sive prosecutions does not subsume the successive punishments
bar, then the government can theoretically subject an acquitted
criminal defendant to a second ordeal that results in the first
punishment. In fact, having a successive punishments compo-
nent as something distinct makes no real sense because its very
existence impliedly condones precisely what the Clause inter-
dicts-namely, oppressive multiple ordeals.
It is similarly problematic that although the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause stems from that same preoccupation with govern-
mental tyranny that pervades the whole Constitution, courts
traditionally interpret the multiple punishments aspect of the
Clause as housing a legislative sanctuary. Despite the fact that
Congress is indeed part of the government and has even been
denominated "the most dangerous branch" of government 68 and
the judiciary is the one more frequently likened to the rightful
United States, virtually everyone agrees that [the double jeopardy] prohibition is an es-
sential part of an individual's protection against governmental tyranny.7).
66. See generally SIGLER, supra note 38, at 155-87 ("The policy issue: the power of
the prosecutor"); Henning, supra note 38, at 8; Cantrell, supra note 38; Cf Whalen v.
United States, 445 U.S. 684, 697 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The only function
the Double Jeopardy Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments [in the
first proceeding] is to prevent the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sen-
tencing court from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch
intended.").
67. See Eads, supra note 46, at 953 (criticizing Halper for distinguishing a "multiple
punishment prong" from the rest of the Clause because it ignores the 'accused's interest
in finality"); See also discussion infra Part H1A2.
68. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1155, 1156 (1992). See also THE FEDERAL-
isT No. 48, at 340 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937) ("[It is agaixst the en-
terprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions.").
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guardian of individual liberties, 69 the double jeopardy paranoia
perplexingly tends to eschew Congress and fix almost myopically
on the judiciary.70
The Double Jeopardy Clause's legislative apotheosis
manifests itself primarily in the multiple punishment area. With
respect to multiple punishments imposed in a single proceeding,
the Clause defers to Congressional power to define a criminal
act and set the punishment.71 As such, the Double Jeopardy
Clause has spawned at least two of its own myths: the first is
that of an existing separate successive punishments bar. The
second is the notion that the legislature is somehow worthy of a
pardon from the limitations that the Constitution imposes on a
government endowed with a tropistic tendency to lean toward
tyranny.
B. Civil In Rem Forfeiture
The concept of asset forfeiture also has venerable origins,
ones which legal historians have dated back to the belief of the
ancient Greeks that objects were guilty of the acts committed
with them.72 The civilization of the Second Century, B.C., con-
victed both animals and inanimate objects of wrongful acts in
the Prytaneum.73 As Oliver Wendell Holmes described it, if an
inanimate object caused the death of a human being, "it was to
be cast beyond the borders," or basically, sent into a specie of
69. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 69-77 (C.B. Macpherson, ed.,
1980) (describing the individual turning to the judiciary for help when the government
becomes oppressive); BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 630 (1945);
Cf JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POTInCAL PROCESS 67 (1980)
("The Supreme Court has been and should be the ultimate guardian of individual lib-
erty"); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 119 (1973) (arguing
that the Framers and Ratifiers "feared Congress and trusted judges.").
70. The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a re-
straint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the
legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the
same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that pun-
ishment in more than one trial.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 US. 161, 165 (1977). See also supra note 66.
71. See supra notes 53-54, 65 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 7-15 (1945); 1 THE
CIVIL LAw 69 (Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932) (discussing forfeiture in Roman law: "If a
quadruped causes injury to anyone, let the owner tender him the estimated amount of
the damage; and if he is unwilling to accept it, the owner shall... surrender the animal
that caused the injury."); Wood, supra note 9, at 1359.
73. HOLMES, supra note 72, at 8.
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exile. 74 That fiction of the guilty object also surfaces in Judeo-
Christian history: in Exodus, Moses delivered the personifying
message that "[wlhen an ox gores a man or a woman to death,
the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten."
75
The English common law adopted the guilty property fiction
in the form of deodand. 76 Under deodand law, the value of the
object that caused the death of the king's subject was forfeited
to the crown.. The king would then provide the money for a
mass for the soul of the dead person or ensure that the deodand
went to charity.
Eventually the religious or eleemosynary purposes disap-
peared and the deodand became a source of crown revenue.77 At
that juncture, the deodand institution was understood more as a
way of penalizing human carelessness. 78 That is, the myth that
the property was the wrongdoer somewhat subordinated itself to
the notion that such forfeiture served to punish the property's
wrongdoing owner.
In England, deodand coexisted with two other forms of for-
feiture: forfeiture of property upon conviction for a felony or
treason and statutory forfeiture.79 Both of these were essentially
punitive. The forfeiture of the property of felons and traitors
rested on the concept of property ownership as being a "right
derived from society" and on the belief that one who breaks soci-
ety's laws should lose the ownership right.80 As such, the con-
victed felons' land escheated to their lord while their personal
property was forfeited to the crown.81 Similarly, convicted trai-
74. Id. Holmes explained:
An untrained intelligence only imperfectly performs the analysis by which ju-
rists carry responsibility back to the beginning of a chain of causation. The ha-
tred for anything giving us pain, which wreaks itself on the manifest cause,
and which leads even civilized men to kick a door when it pinches his finger, is
embodied in the noxae deditio and other kindred doctrines of early Roman Law.
Id. at 11-12.
75. Exodus 21:28 (Revised Standard Version).
76. Deodand derives from the Latin deo dandum, which means "a thing to be given
to God." BLACIOS LAw DICTIONARY 436 (6th ed. 1990). See generally HOLtMS, supra note
72, at 24-25; Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deo-
dands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169 (1973); Hauert, supra note 9, at 162-66; Munn, supra note 9, at 1260-61; Piety,
supra note 18, at 928-35; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993).
77. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611. See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
US. 663, 681 (1974).
78. Austin, 509 US. at 611.
79. Id. at 611-12.
80. Id. at 612.
81. Id. See also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 ("The basis for these forfeitures was
that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's Peace, which was felt to
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tors lost all real and personal property, but it went solely to the
crown.
8 2
Blackstone, in fact, described statutory forfeiture as "pe-
nal."83 While such "forfeitures of offending objects used in viola-
tion of the customs and revenue laws,"8 did rest on the guilty
property fiction, it veritably targeted a culpable owner, who was
being punished for direct or vicarious wrongdoing.85 As an exam-
ple, a violation of the Navigation Acts of 1660, which basically
mandated the shipping of most goods in English vessels, re-
sulted in forfeiture of the ship and the goods.88 Even where the
violation was due to some mariner's act of which the ship owner
was unaware, the result was the same.7 Essentially, the theory
was that the owner should be blamed for entrusting the prop-
erty to the wrongdoer or that the unlawful act should simply be
imputed to the owner.88
Neither deodand nor forfeiture of estate made its way to the
new world.8 9 Before the adoption of the Constitution, the colo-
nies used in rem forfeiture proceedings to seize objects under
the English and local forfeiture statutes.90 After the adoption of
the Constitution, new enactments authorized in rem jurisdiction
over ships and cargos involved in customs offenses.9 1 As the
United States Supreme Court has somewhat recently acknowl-
edged, an "examination of those laws suggests that the First
Congress viewed [such] forfeiture as punishment."2
justify denial of the right to own property").
82. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612. See also Calero-Toledo, 416 US. at 682.
83. Austin, 509 US. at 612 (citing 3,WILuia BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES *261).
84. Calero-Toledo, 416 US. at 682.
85. Austin, 509 US. at 612.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 612-13.
89. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83.
90. Id. at 683.
91. Austin, 509 US. at 613. See also Calero-Toledo, 416 US. at 683; Franze, supra
note 9, at 375 ('These initial federal civil forfeiture statutes served vital national inter-
ests during the early days of our Republic. In times of war, vessel forfeitures were used
to destroy the maritime strength of our enemies. Such provisions were also utilized dur-
ing the Revolutionary War to seize Tory property and later to seize Confederate property
during the Civil War."); Hauert, supra note 9, at 167-70 (discussing the adoption and de-
velopment of forfeiture in the United States before and after the Civil War).
92. Austin, 509 US. at 613. Munn, supra note 9, at 1261-62 explains, however, that
until the Civil War, the guilty property fiction was the basis behind statutory civil forfei-
ture. An Act that Congress passed in 1862, which provided for confiscation of property of
persons involved in the rebellion, was directed not at the property-but the property
owner. Id. According to Munn, after the Civil War, "statutory civil forfeiture again be-
came intertwined with the guilty property fiction." Id. at 1262.
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Most legal historians and scholars agree that forfeiture can
be an extremely harsh and powerful weapon.9 3 In the early
1970's, Congress, wishing to extend forfeiture beyond its typical
use in customs violations and admiralty law, employed it to
combat the spread of drug use and distribution.94 When Con-
gress enacted the civil drug-related forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, it authorized the forfeiture of contraband or
any property used in drug trafficking.95 In 1978, Congress
amended the forfeiture provisions to include proceeds traceable
to drug transactions, which included money and negotiable in-
struments.96 The Senate Report on that particular amendment
described the forfeiture statute as "penal in nature."9 7 In 1984,
Congress again amended the Act, this time to include real prop-
erty.98 In so doing, Congress confirmed that its intent was to use
such provisions as a "powerful deterrent" to the commission of
drug offenses.99
Section 881's capacity to reach such a broad spectrum of
property is not the only thing that empowers it. The rules and
procedures attendant to § 881 forfeiture, which have the effect
of disadvantaging claimants, serve to fortify the device in such a
way that makes it downright oppressive. Basically, § 881 per-
mits the government to obtain an arrest warrant by filing a ver-
ified complaint with the clerk of the court.100 There is thus no
93. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
94. See 1 STEVEN L. KESSLER, CML AND CRIMINAL FoaRErruRm § 1.01 (1994) (dis-
cussing Congress' efforts to combat crime through using forfeiture as an attractive alter-
native to prison). The sponsor of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), Senator Dodd of Connecticut, described it
as "strictly and entirely a law enforcement measure. . . designed to crack down hard on
the narcotics pusher and the illegal diverters of pep pills and goof balls." 116 CONG. REc.
977-78 (1970).
95. See Robin M. Sackett, The Impact of Austin v. United States: Extending Consti-
tutional Protections to Claimants In Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 495, 501 (1994); Wood, supra note 9, at 1361.
96. Sackett, supra note 95, at 501-02.
97. Id. See also Austin, 509 U.S. at 620 (quoting the Joint House-Senate Explana-
tion of Senate Amendment to Titles II and III of the Psychotropic Substances Act of
1978, 124 CoNG. REc. 34671 (1978)).
98. Sackett, supra note 95, at 502.
99. Id.
100. Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1121. Because an early source of our forfeiture law
was admiralty law, many forfeiture statutes include admiralty and customs law proce-
dures. See Franze, supra note 9, at 383. Until somewhat recently, real or personal prop-
erty could be seized without a warrant. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1994). In United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires the government to afford notice and a meaningful opportu-
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requirement of a judicial probable cause determination and in-
stead that initial decision is left in the hands of law enforcers or
prosecutors. 101 Once the marshall serves the warrant, the prop-
erty is seized and all the government really has to do is give
public notice of the forfeiture proceedings. 10 2
Further, the statute itself permits warrantless seizures
under certain circumstances. 10 3 Although the Justice Depart-
ment has implemented a policy forbidding such seizures "until a
neutral and detached magistrate has made an independent find-
ing of probable cause and issued a federal seizure warrant," the
Department excepts property that might be "removed, hidden,
or destroyed before a warrant can be obtained."0 4 Such an ex-
ception, which can conceivably include almost any property that
is not securely fixed to terra firma, can expansively swallow
that self-imposed warrant requirement.0 5
After the seizure itself, § 881 gives the government three
ways of obtaining the forfeiture. The first, summary forfeiture,
is the avenue for confiscating controlled substances and materi-
als used to manufacture drugs. 0 6 Because such items are
deemed to pose a public danger, such forfeiture can proceed
without notice and without a hearing. 07
The second, administrative forfeiture, applies to property
valued at $500,000 or less. 08 It also applies to conveyances used
to transport or store illegal drugs, regardless of the value, as
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
property is forfeitable. 0 9 This administrative process does im-
pose notice requirements on the agency that actually seizes the
nity to be heard before real property can be seized.
101. Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1121.
102. Id.
103. Warrantless seizures are permitted if the seizure of the property is incidental
to the arrest of a person, if the property has been the subject of a prior judgment in
favor of the United States in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding, if there is
probable cause to believe that the property is a threat to public safety, or if there is
probable cause to believe that the property was used to facilitate a drug crime. 21 US.C.
§ 881(b) (1994).
104. ExEcumrm OFFICE FOR AssET FORFEITURE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF JUSTICE AssET FORFEITURE PROGRAM 1992, at 3 (1993).
105. Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1121 ("The Justice Department's self-imposed war-
rant requirement for seizures reflects an effort to comply with the Fourth Amendment,
but the exception for property that is in danger of disappearing swallows the rule.").
106. 21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (1994).
107. See id.
108. Id. § 881(d); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1610 (1994).
109. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1610. See also § 1615.
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property" 0 But if an individual fails to respond to the notifica-
tion within the allotted time frame, the property is automati-
cally forfeited."'
In the third procedure, that of judicial forfeiture, the gov-
ernment must give notice, informing anyone with an interest in
the property of the action." 2 In this judicial proceeding, the gov-
ernment really has an edge. All it must initially do is establish
probable cause to believe that the seized property is subject to
forfeiture."3 The government, in fact, can meet this threshold by
showing a mere reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and this
may be supported by less than prima facie proof."4 While the
government can -rely on circumstantial and hearsay evidence to
demonstrate probable cause, the claimant, however, cannot use
the same sort of evidence in rebuttal.15
Once the government establishes mere probable cause, a pe-
culiar atrocity occurs-that is, the burden shifts to the property
owner. The onus is thus on the owner to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture
or that he or she has an affirmative defense." 6 In this proceed-
ing, the owner who often lacks funds or has no access to such
funds, has no right to a public attorney.117 Also, because such a
110. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1607, 1608.
111. 19 U.S.C. § 1608. If the property owners wish to have a judicial forfeiture, they
may transfer the matter to the United States Attorney's Office by filing a claim and
posting a bond. Id.
112. 19 U.S.C. § 1607. See also David B. Smith, The Civil Forfeiture Case's Critical
Beginning, 35 PRAc. LAw. 57 (1989).
113. 19 U.S.C. § 1615. See generally discussion in Ator, supra note 9; Caffarelli,
supra note 9, at 1452-53; Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1122; Franze, supra note 9, at 383-
85; David Lieber, Eighth Amendment-The Excessive Fines Clause, 84 J. CRim. L. &
CRMINOLOGY 805, 805-06 (1994); Reinhart, supra note 9, at 247-48; Tafa, supra note 9,
at 98-99.
114. See sources cited supra note 113.
115. See generally Caffarelli, supra note 9, at 1453 ("In addition to the lower burden
of proof, civil forfeiture provides the government with many tactical advantages other-
wise unavailable in a criminal proceeding. For example, the government may use hear-
say evidence and a wider range of civil discovery procedures in a civil forfeiture hear-
ing."); Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1122 ("The claimant, however, must proffer evidence
admissible under the rules of evidence. The government can meet its burden of produc-
tion with hearsay, for the probable cause standard in forfeiture proceedings is the stan-
dard used to test search warrants.'). See also Franze, supra note 9, at 384.
116. See sources cited supra note 113.
117. See Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602, 607 (1993). Cf United States v. Par-
cel 2 at Highway 13/5, 747 F. Supp. 641, 648 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (citing United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1990)) ("In Noriega, the learned trial judge found
that the use of the forfeiture statute had not only deprived defendant, as a practical
matter, of the opportunity to contest the government's pretrial restraint of his assets but
had also deprived him of assets needed to retain the counsel guaranteed him by the
676 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
forfeiture action is in rem and can proceed even if the property
owner is dead or out of reach, there is frequently a default
forfeiture. 118
Until Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, the government
could freely choose to pursue forfeiture before, during or after
the criminal prosecution. 119 The post-conviction civil forfeiture,
Sixth Amendment."), rev'd, 946 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1991). See also Cheh, supra note 9, at
2 ("The owner shoulders the burden of proving the property's 'innocence.' To make this
showing, the owner not only must pay the costs and expenses associated with a legal
proceeding, he usually must do without his property in the meantime even as the gov-
ernment dallies.") (footnotes omitted); Piety, supra note 18, at 921-23 ("[T]he doctrine of
civil forfeiture has turned into a legal juggernaut, crushing every due process claim
thrown in its path: the privilege against self-incrimination, the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, the right to trial by jury, the right to a verdict rendered only
after a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to be free from being twice
charged with the same offense, the right to be free from government seizures of property
absent probable cause, and the right to counsel of choice.") (footnotes omitted); Wood,
supra note 9, at 1376 ("[I]f the government seeks forfeiture of a large amount of the
defendant's assets under the theory of facilitation or proceeds, it is entirely possible that
the defendant will not be able to afford to hire an attorney. Moreover, since it is a civil
case, he cannot receive appointed counsel.").
118. See, eg., In re One 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1319 (4th Ci. 1989)
(civil forfeiture does not terminate upon death of property owner). See also Pollock,
supra note 18, at 469 ("[Blecause the proceeding is in rem, punishment can be achieved
even if the wrongdoer is a fugitive."); Wood, supra note 9, at 1373 (In a judicial proceed-
ing, "the owner must intervene by filing a claim and paying a bond equal to ten percent
of the amount of the property. The owner must file this claim within twenty days of the
government's notice of commencement of forfeiture action. If she does not, the property
is forfeited by default."); Cheh, supra note 9, at 3 describes the pressures on a property
owner facing civil forfeiture:
The resolute and well-heeled owner can persist but, if he is somehow involved
in wrongdoing, he also risks losing his privilege against self-incrimination. Any
testimony in defense of the property can be used against him in a later crimi-
nal trial. Moreover, he faces pressure-and the greater the value of the prop-
erty, the greater the pressure-to sacrifice the property in return for a "deal"
with prosecutors to avoid criminal charges.
(footnotes omitted).
119. Subsection (i) of § 881 allows only the government to seek a stay of civil forfei-
ture proceedings pending related criminal proceedings. See generally Chatman, supra
note 9, at 746 ("[C]ivil forfeiture proceedings may precede or follow a criminal conviction;
the mere fact that the government chooses to initiate a civil action does not mean that
the property owner does not face criminal charges in conjunction with the activity pro-
voking the civil forfeiture action.") (footnote omitted); Franze, supra note 9, at 382 and
n.71 ("In fact, the property owned by a person acquitted of a criminal narcotics offense
may still be subject to civil forfeiture . . . . As stated in one of the earliest forfeiture
cases: '[T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law to be, that the
proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal pro-
ceeding in personam"'") (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827)); Steven
H. McClain, Running the Guantlet: An Assessment of the Double Jeopardy Implications
of Criminally Prosecuting Drug Offenders and Pursuing Civil Forfeiture of Related Assets
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6) & (7), 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 941, 942-43 (1995) ("Civil
Fall 1996] CIVIL IN REM FORFEITURE 677
of course, bestowed some considerable advantages on the gov-
ernment. Basically, the government could use the criminal con-
viction to simplify its effort to obtain a summary judgment in its
favor in the civil suit.20
In addition, one of the relatively few defenses for claimants
under § 881 is that of the innocent owner. 21 Theoretically this
defense gives claimants a way to defeat forfeiture by establish-
ing that the illegal activity was committed "without [their]
knowledge or consent.' 22 While the innocent owner defense's
utility is questionable at best, where such an owner has already
been criminally convicted of the offense involved in the forfei-
ture, the proof of criminal mens rea effectually obliterates an in-
nocence assertion in a subsequent civil proceeding.2 3
forfeiture can be pursued before, during or after criminal prosecution."); Wood, supra
note 9, at 1376 ("[Tlhe civil nature of the proceeding means that the forfeiture action
can be brought even if the defendant has been acquitted of criminal charges, thus giving
the government a second turn at bat").
120. McClain, supra note 119, at 943. See also Carpenter, supra note 9, at 1125
(pointing out that when the government obtains a stay of civil forfeiture proceedings
pending the related criminal proceedings, it "can prevent a claimant from taking advan-
tage of civil discovery rules to learn about the government's criminal case and thus de-
feating the policies behind limited criminal discovery."). In U.S. v. Lot 5, 23 F.3d 359
(11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995), the claimant herself requested a
stay on the ground that the government planned to indict her. She specifically argued
"that a stay would have preserved her right to due process of law and her privilege
against self-incrimination? Id. at 364. Her dilemma was whether to "remain silent and
allow the forfeiture, or testify against the forfeitability of her property and expose her-
self to incriminating admissions that could be used in a subsequent criminal trial
against her." Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the stay.
121. 21 US.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(6) & (a)(7) (1994). See also Austin, 509 U.S. at 617-
21.
122. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(6) & (a)(7). See also Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct.
994, 996 (1996) in which the United States Supreme Court purportedly adhered to "a
long and unbroken line of cases [that hold] that an owner's interest in property may be
forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did
not know that it was to be put to such use."
123. Although lack of knowledge is equated with lack of actual knowledge, an
owner, who is deemed to have remained willfully blind to the illegal use of his or her
property, fails to prove lack of knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. 121 Nostrend Ave.,
760 F. Supp. 1015, 1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (lack of knowledge means lack of willful blind-
ness to facilitate purpose behind forfeiture statute); United States v. 1977 Porsche Car-
rera 911, 748 F. Supp. 1180, 1185-86 (W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1991)
(attorney failed to meet standard by taking no steps to ensure that vehicle given as pay-
ment of fee was not an instrumentality of the charged crime). But see United States v.
Sonny Cook Motors, 819 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1993) ("If Cook had the obliga-
tion, either as a parent or as a landlord, to do everything reasonably necessary to assure
that his real property was not used illegally by his son and tenant, he also met that ob-
ligation, that is, unless the forfeiture laws are to be stretched beyond their logical limits
and are construed to require an owner to guarantee that his real property will not be
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Pursuing the related civil forfeiture action in the wake of a
criminal acquittal is also a good deal for the government. In
such a situation, the forfeiture proceeding becomes a second
chance at victory, only this time in the form of the confiscation
of the acquittee's property. Specifically, the government's failure
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal context
neither precludes the government from establishing the mere
probable cause for civil forfeiture nor ensures that the claimant
will meet his or her preponderance-of-the-evidence burden.2 4 As
such, forfeiture provisions, like § 881, actually provide the gov-
ernment with an incentive to separate and stagger the criminal
and civil proceedings.
C. Civil In Rem Forfeiture as Double Jeopardy: The
Traditional Myths
Courts typically give three somewhat intertwined reasons
for finding double jeopardy protection to be unavailable to civil
in rem forfeiture claimants.
First, before the Supreme Court's Halper decision, the dis-
tinction between the labels "civil" and "criminal" essentially con-
trolled the analysis.125 That is, because forfeiture proceedings
were denominatedly "civil," the Supreme Court rejected the
double jeopardy defense to actions in which the government
sought civil sanctions for offenses that had been the subject of
prior criminal proceedings. 6
In this respect, Helvering v. Mitchell27 was a seminal case.
In Mitchell, a civil suit to collect a tax deficiency plus a statu-
put to any illegal use, direct or indirect. This court has expressly refused to go so fan");
See generally Michael D. Dautrich, The 'Innocent Owner' Defense In Civil Drug Forfeit-
ures After.United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue: Still An Uphill Battle for Third-
Party Claimants, 3 WIDENER J. PUBL. L. 995 (1994) (exploring ways to alleviate the un-
due burdens of demonstrating innocence); Franze, supra note 9, at 371 ("The protection
afforded to owners by the innocent owner defense is questionable, however, because two
problems surround the defense: (1) chronic inconsistent judicial interpretation; and (2)
the unforeseen repercussions of the Supreme Court decision United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Avenue [113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993)].). See also McClain, supra note 119, at 966-67
(discussing justification for finding that criminal narcotics offenses are not lesser in-
cluded offense of civil forfeiture, which is that criminal statutes require criminal mens
rea while civil statutes do not).
124. See supra note 116.
125. See United States v. Halper, 490 US. 435 (1985); see also infra Part 1.A
126. See generally Cheh, supra note 9, at 11-14 (discussing how the significance of
the civil/criminal label is limited); Piety, supra note 18, at 943-46 (civil/criminal
distinction).
127. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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tory penalty after the defendant's acquittal for tax evasion, the
Supreme Court determined "[t]hat acquittal on a criminal
charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, reme-
dial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the
criminal proceeding was based ... !"128 The Court emphasized
that what was determinative of whether a proceeding was crimi-
nal was Congress' intent that the sanction constitute
punishment. 2 9
After Mitchell, the Supreme Court decided in United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess that a civil qui tam suit for damages from
contractors that engaged in bid rigging for which the defendants
had been criminally convicted did not violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. 30 The Hess Court relied on the statutory construc-
tion approach of Mitchell to decide whether the statute was civil
or criminal'131 It concluded that the "remedy [did] not lose the
quality of a civil action" even though more than the "precise
amount" of damages was awarded and even though the award
had the effect of punishment. 3 2
Subsequently, the Supreme Court dealt with the civil-
criminal distinction in a two-tiered test. Under United States v.
Ward, the initial question is "whether Congress, in establishing
the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or im-
pliedly a preference for one label or the other." 33 Then, if Con-
gress had actually labeled the penalty as civil, unless there is
the "clearest proof" that the provision is so punitive in purpose
or effect, it is indeed conclusively civil. 3 4
In fact, the Ward test figured centrally in the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Fire-
arms that double jeopardy did not prevent the forfeiture of prop-
erty after the defendant was acquitted of the related criminal
charges. 35 In concluding that Congress intended the forfeiture
proceedings to be civil, the Court said that "[ulnless the forfei-
ture sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceed-
ing is essentially criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy
128. Id. at 397.
129. Id.
130. 317 US. 537 (1943).
131. Id. at 549.
132. Id. at 550; See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 US. 148 (1956) (re-
jecting defendants' double jeopardy claim and relying on Mitchell in a case involving a
civil sanction following a prior criminal conviction).
133. 448 US. 242, 248 (1980).
134. Id. at 248-49 (quoting Flemming v. Nester, 363 US. 603, 617 (1960)).
135. 465 US. 354 (1984).
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Clause is not applicable."13 As such, before Halper, the Congres-
sional nomenclature of "civil" or "criminal" was the presiding
dictator.
Second, before Halper, the "remedial" label, often treated as
somewhat interchangeable with "civil," was another determina-
tive factor.137 This was the gist of the Supreme Court's discus-
sion in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, which con-
tained the explanation that "forfeiture is intended to aid in the
enforcement of tariff regulations."13 What the Court in One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones said was that "[forfeiture] prevents forbid-
den merchandise from circulating the United States .... [I]n
other contexts we have recognized that such purposes character-
ize remedial rather than punitive sanctions."139 Courts, however,
have not only used the "remedial" adjective to describe the
seizure of dangerous items or contraband, but have also simi-
larly likened forfeiture penalties to a tax or a type of "liquidated
damages" or a form of governmentally imposed compensatory
damages. 14
Third, before the Austin decision, the guilty property fiction
also sporadically paraded as an excuse for denying property
owners certain constitutional protections.141 Because civil in rem
forfeiture was indeed in rem, that meant that the property had
committed and was being charged with the wrongdoing.142 In
fact, the language in one of the classic cases, Dobbins Distillery
v. United States,1' exemplifies such a mind set.
In Dobbins Distillery, the Supreme Court approved the for-
feiture of a distillery leased to an operator who defrauded reve-
nue officers by concealing and altering sales records. 44 The
Court stressed that "the offence.., is attached primarily to the
distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection
with the same, without any regard whatsoever to the personal
136. Id. at 362 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938)).
137. See generally Hauert, supra note 9, at 183 (remedial forfeiture); Piety, supra
note 18, at 946-63 (civil forfeiture justified as remedial).
138. 409 US. 232, 237 (1972).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. See also Hauert, supra note 9, at 183; Piety, supra note 18, at 954-59.
141. See generally Ator, supra note 9, at 101-19; Hauert, supra note 9, at 159-60;
Kessler, supra note 9, at 207; Piety, supra note 18, at 917-20, 967-73; Pollock, supra
note 18, at 462-63. See also Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998-99 (1996) (address-
ing cases which allow an owner's interest in property to be forfeited even though the
owner did not know that the property was to be put to an illegal use).
142. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
143. 96 US. 395 (1877).
144. Id. at 403-04.
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misconduct or responsibility of the owner...."14
In Various Items Of Personal Property v. United States, 146
the guilty property myth became the centerpiece in the Supreme
Court's rejection of double jeopardy protection for a civil forfei-
ture claimant. In Various Items, the distilling corporation had to
forfeit a distillery, warehouse and denaturing plant because of a
violation of the law. 47 In fact, the corporation had been con-
victed of the criminal offenses before commencement of the for-
feiture proceeding and the Government even admitted that the
conviction was predicated upon "the transactions set forth...
as a basis for the forfeiture."'4 In rejecting the corporation's
double jeopardy argument, the Court said:
[This] forfeiture proceeding... is in rem. It is the property which is pro-
ceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and con-
demned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient.
In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded
against, convicted, and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punish-
ment for the criminal offense. 149
Such language in Various Items captures the mind set: be-
cause the guilty property myth fictively casts the property own-
ers as non-defendants, courts tended not to recognize that such
owners needed the Constitutional protections afforded human
beings who are criminally accused. 15
Until Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, courts accepted that
there was no constitutional impediment to the government's
pursuance of civil confiscation of a defendant's property before
or after the predicate criminal proceeding. Because such forfei-
ture was civil or remedial and putatively lodged against the cul-
145. Id. at 401. See also Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510
(1921) (discussing the analogy between the law of deodand and "ascribing to the prop-
erty a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong); United States
v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) ("The vessel which commits the ag-
gression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfei-
ture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner."); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827) ("The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing.f). See
generally Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. at 998-99.
146. 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
147. Id. at 578.
148. Id. at 579.
149. Id. at 581.
150. But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (compulsory production of
private papers for use in a proceeding to forfeit property violates the Fourth Amendment
and the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); see also United States v. Ursery,
116 S. Ct. 2135, 2154-55 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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pable res, such a separate proceeding did not even have a
whisper of a double jeopardy problem.
The myths that traditionally warded off double jeopardy
protection for the forfeiture claimants, however, were in reality
toxic. In allowing multiple punitive proceedings, these myths ef-
fectually thwarted finality and encouraged potential
prosecutorial harassment in what has to be one of the most in-
herently governmentally oppressive arenas-that of forfeiture.151
In truth, forfeiture is precisely the context in which Constitu-
tional protections are not just needed-but absolutely essential.
This is true because the rules, procedures and expansive clench
of forfeiture provisions enfeeble the accused and simultaneously
fortify the government gladiators. In so doing, the forfeiture
mechanism augments an already outrageous power disparity.
Also, because forfeiture can swoop down on such a vast ar-
ray of property, individuals that had already been punished and
were also often unrepresented can lose all or what little they
have left. In practical effect, this will not infrequently mean
that when and if the forfeiture losers emerge from prison, they
must begin or try to begin again-but do so without all or most
of their worldly possessions. In this respect, the punishment of
forfeiture is not just multiple, but seemingly eternal.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE TRADITIONAL FoRFErruRE MYTHS AFTER
Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch
The decisions in United States v. Halper,152 Austin v. United
States'53 and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch 54 really have the combined effect of eradicating the tradi-
tional myths that made certain constitutional protections un-
available to civil forfeiture claimants.
A. United States v. Halper" The Overthrow of the "Civil" and
'Remedial" Tyrants and the Detrimental Myopic Fixation on
Multiple Punishments
1. The Halper Decision. Halper, the manager of New York
Medical Laboratories, submitted sixty-five separate false claims
for reimbursement to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater
New York, a fiscal intermediary for medicare. 55 Blue Cross over-
151. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
152. 490 US. 435 (1989).
153. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
154. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
155. Halper, 490 US. at 437. Halper mischaracterized the medical services and de-
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paid a total of $585 and then passed these overcharges along to
the federal government. 56 Consequently, the government in-
dicted Halper on sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false-
claims statute. 57 After Halper's conviction on all counts plus six-
teen counts of mail fraud, the district judge sentenced Halper to
imprisonment for two years and fined him $5,000.158
Based on the facts established in the criminal case, the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the govern-
ment in its subsequent civil suit against Halper under the Fed-
eral False Claims Act. 59 The problem was that the supposed
remedial provision of the False Claims Act exposed Halper to a
statutory penalty of more than $130,000.160 The district court
was of the view that a penalty this large on top of Halper's
criminal punishment would violate the double jeopardy clause.
Specifically, the district court concluded that the authorized re-
covery of more than $130,000 bore no "rational relation" to the
sum of the government's $585 actual loss plus its costs in inves-
tigating and prosecuting Halper's false claims. 61 Thus, the dis-
trict court interpreted the statutory penalty as discretionary and
approximated an amount of $16,000 as reimbursement to the
government. 62
Later, when the government moved for reconsideration, the
district court confessed error in its finding that the $2,000 stat-
utory penalty was not mandatory for each count. 63 The court
nevertheless adhered to its view that the statutorily authorized
penalty, which was more than 220 times greater than the gov-
manded reimbursement at the rate of $12 per claim when New City was really only en-
titled to $3 per claim. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (-18 U.S.C. § 287 prohibits 'mak[ing] or present[ing] ... any claim upon or
against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to
be false, fictitious or fraudulent.' ").
158. Id.
159. It is a violation of the False Claims Amendment Act of 1986 for "[amny person.
(2) [to] knowingly make[], use[], or caused to be made or used, a false record or state-
ment to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved." 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994).
160. One who violates the False Claims Amendment Act of 1986 is "liable to the
United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the
amount of damages the Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs
of the civil action!' 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994). The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, increased the civil penalty to "not less than $5,000
and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government
sustains because of the act of that person" and "the costs of a civil action brought to re-
cover any such penalty or damages." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994).
161. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
162. Id. at 534.
163. United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852, 853-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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ernment's measurable loss, qualified as punishment under the
double jeopardy clause.164 After deeming the Act unconstitu-
tional as applied to Halper, the district court entered an
amended judgment, which limited the government's recovery to
double damages of $1,170 and the costs of the civil action. 65
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court agreed
with the district court that "the disparity between its approxi-
mation of the Government's costs and Halper's $130,000 liability
is sufficiently disproportionate that the sanction constitutes a
second punishment in violation of double jeopardy."166 However,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to give the government
an opportunity to present the district court with evidence of its
actual costs arising from Halper's conduct and to seek an adjust-
ment of the amount. 67
The Supreme Court concluded that "under the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a
criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribu-
tion." 68 Because the parties did not dispute that the criminal
proceeding against Halper resulted in punishment and that the
civil and criminal proceedings concerned the same conduct, the
issue in Halper was quite narrow. The Court's real focus was
thus on the question of whether the civil False Claims Act pen-
alty amounted to a second "punishment."169
In arguing no punishment, the government relied primarily
on the three Supreme Court cases, Helvering v. Mitchell,70
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess' 7' and Rex Trailer Co. v.
United States,1 2 and contended that a penalty assessed in a
civil proceeding could not trigger the double jeopardy bar.173 The
Supreme Court, however, felt that the government had "over-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 855.
166. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989) (Kennedy, J, concurring).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 448-49.
169. Id. at 441.
170. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
171. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
172. 350 U.S. 148 (1956). See supra note 132.
173. Halper, 490 US. at 441. The government also relied on United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242 (1980) for the proposition that "whether a proceeding or penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction, and that Congress clearly intended the
proceedings and penalty at issue here to be civil in nature" Id. See also supra text ac-
companying notes 133-134.
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read the holdings" of those cases and that the cases did not
"foreclose the possibility that in a particular case a civil penalty
authorized by the Act may be so extreme and so divorced from
the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute
punishment."174
Specifically, in all three of the government's cases, the Su-
preme Court had fixed on the statute itself. The Mitchell deci-
sion, which the Court felt was "at most of tangential signifi-
cance," stood for the proposition that whether a statutory
sanction is criminal in nature is a question of statutory con-
struction. 17 5 Similarly, in Hess, the Court rejected the double
jeopardy argument by reference to the statute, which, in its
view, was purely remedial and "designed to 'protect the govern-
ment from financial loss[.]' '176 Also, in Rex Trailer, the measure
of recovery under the statute was not "so unreasonable or exces-
sive" as to constitute a second criminal punishment.7 7 As such,
the Halper Court saw these cases as a collective endorsement of
"rough remedial justice" 17
In Halper, the government also argued that punishment can
ensue only in criminal proceedings and that statutory construc-
tion is what determines whether proceedings are criminal or
civil. 17 9 Although the Court agreed that "recourse to statutory
language, structure and intent is appropriate in identifying the
inherent nature of a proceeding," it stressed that courts can
identify a double jeopardy violation only by analyzing the sanc-
tions imposed on the individual. 80 This, according to the Court,
is because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects "humane inter-
ests," which are "intrinsically personal."181
The Halper Court distinctly disposed of the autocratic reign
of the proverbial labels, "criminal" and "civil." It instead defined
a civil or criminal sanction as punitive "when the sanction as
applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment,"
or "the twin aims of retribution and deterrence."182 Acknowledg-
ing that the punishment inquiry is not always an "exact pur-
suit," the Court left to trial courts the discretion to make the de-
174. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42.
175. Id. at 443.
176. Id. at 444 (quoting Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-49).
177. Id. at 446 (quoting Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 154).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 441.
180. Id. at 447.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 448.
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termination.1 3 This determination may often amount to nothing
more than "an approximation."T M
The Halper Court also defined the options that its decision
left open for the government. The Court said that the govern-
ment can still seek the full civil penalty against a defendant
who had not been previously punished for the same conduct. 8 5
This course was available to the government even if the civil
sanction was indeed punitive. 86 Also, the government could seek
and obtain both the full civil penalty and the full range of statu-
torily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding. 87
Such joinder, as the Court opined, would ensure that the total
punishment did not exceed what the statute authorized. 8
2. The Real Impact of the Halper Decision. Beneath the
surface, the Halper analysis is somewhat self-enervating. Al-
though the Halper Court had a pragmatic approach to civil pen-
alties in two respects, its framing of the double jeopardy issue
as one involving purely successive punishments dilutes the very
constitutional right that the Court purports to recognize.
First, the Halper Court toppled what had been the long-
-standing supremacy of the legislative labels, "civil" and "crimi-
nal," and stated that "[they] are not of paramount impor-
tance."189 Further, the Court abandoned the once controlling
legislative intent analysis and instead required a judicial assess-
ment of the actual impact the civil sanction has on an individ-
ual who has already been criminally punished for the same of-
fense. Consequently, with respect to a potential multiple
punishment situation, courts must make a threshold determina-
tion of whether the particular sanction at issue performs the pu-
nitive function of retribution and deterrence. 90 In fact, even if a
183. Id. at 449.
184. Id. at 449-50.
185. Id. at 450.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion in Halper in which he
stressed that the "rule permits the imposition in the ordinary case of at least a fixed
penalty roughly proportionate to the damage caused or a reasonably liquidated amount,
plus double damages." Id. at 452-53. He, however, agreed with the Court that in the
case before them "the controlling circumstance is whether the civil penalty imposed in
the second proceeding bears any rational relation to the damages suffered by the Gov-
ernment." Id. at 453.
189. Id. at 447. See also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) ("[Tihe labels af-
fixed either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed.., are not controlling and will
not be allowed to defeat the applicable protections of federal constitutional law.").
190. Halper, 490 US. at 448. See also Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
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remedial purpose concurs with such retributive or deterrent
goals, the sanction nevertheless amounts to punishment.191
Second, the Halper Court receded from the proposition that
the double jeopardy clause does not bar a civil proceeding be-
cause civil is essentially synonymous with "remedial."192 Basi-
cally, the Halper Court acknowledged that where a civil penalty,
imposed in a proceeding against a defendant that has already
sustained a criminal punishment, "bears no rational relation to
the goal of compensating the Government for its loss," then that
civil penalty can not be deemed remedial. 93
While the Halper Court's usurpation of the "civil" and "re-
medial" despots paves the way for bestowing constitutional pro-
tections on certain individuals subjected to civil punishment, the
Court's myopic perspective on the Double Jeopardy problem ulti-
mately enfeebles the Court's accomplishments. What is particu-
larly detrimental is the Court's fixation on the successive pun-
ishments' component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 94 When
the Court almost reflexively isolated the constitutional violation
at issue as one of successive punishments, it in essence contra-
dicted its own proclamation that "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil'
[were] not of paramount importance."195 That is, if a designated
"civil" penalty can be the same as a criminal "punishment," then
it is surely not a nonsequitorial stretch to connect a successive
punitive civil proceeding to a "second prosecution." 96 As such,
the demise of dogged deference to legislative labels, "civil" and
"criminal," in the sphere of penalties, should surely seep into
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 796 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[under Halper,] the defend-
ant must first show the absence of a rational relationship between the amount of the
sanction and the government's nonpunitive objectives; the burden then shifts to the gov-
ernment to justify the sanction with reference to the particular case.").
191. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
192. Id. at 448-49.
193. Id. at 449.
194. See Eads, supra note 46, at 953 ("[T]he Halper Court clearly distinguished for
the first time the 'multiple punishment' prong of double jeopardy protection from the
other prongs of the clause--subsequent criminal actions filed after conviction or acquit-
tal-and concluded that only the 'multiple punishment' prong applies to the govern-
ment's use of certain civil sanctions."). But see Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 799 (attributing "the belief that there is a multiple-
punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause ... to Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1874)") and discussion infra Part I.C.2-3.
195. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
196. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963). See also Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. at 805 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (acknowledging that "a few of the Supreme




the characterization of the proceedings themselves and accentu-
ate the real congeneracy of punitive civil proceedings and crimi-
nal prosecutions. 197
Also, the Halper Court's treatment of the issue before it as
one of separate multiple punishments has the effect of disman-
tling the Double Jeopardy Clause. When the Court clarified how
the government can avoid violating that supposedly separate
"multiple punishment" provision, it effectively, gutted the
Clause by excising its core finality protection. The Court stated
that its decision did not "preclude[] the Government from seek-
ing the full civil penalty against a defendant who previously has
not been punished for the same conduct, even if the civil sanc-
tion imposed is punitive."198 Read literally, such language con-
dones the imposition of civil punishment on a defendant who
was already acquitted in the parallel criminal case.199 Such a
construction of the Double Jeopardy Clause allows for redun-
dant punitive ordeals, which engenders the very undue expense
and mental anguish that the Clause aims to temper.200
In contrasting the effect of multiple punishments imposed
in a single proceeding with successive punishments in separate
proceedings, the Halper Court explained:
[W]hen the Government already has imposed a criminal penalty and
seeks to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the possibility that the govern-
ment is seeking the second punishment because it is dissatisfied with the
sanction obtained in the first proceeding.20 1
Interestingly, the Court failed to acknowledge that its own
decision allows the government to pursue a ploy not substan-
tially different from what the purported successive punishments
bar proscribes. Under Halper, the "dissatisfied" government, af-
ter failing to obtain a criminal conviction, can nevertheless seek
punishment in the putatively "civil" counterpart. As such, after
Halper, the avenues apparently still available to the government
197. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784 (describing civil tax proceeding as "the func-
tional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy
a second time 'for the same offence.' "). See also discussion infra Part H.C.
198. Halper, 490 US. at 450.
199. See generally Eads, supra note 46, at 953 ("Conceptually under traditional
double jeopardy analysis, an accused individual who is acquitted has as much interest in
not facing another punishment ordeal as one who is convicted, and if the civil sanction is
punishment, an acquitted individual has as much interest in avoiding it as a convicted
one.").
200. See supra Part I-A
201. Halper, 490 US. at 451 n.10.
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are even somewhat defiant of the objectives behind what is the
supposed separate cumulative punishments' taboo.202
Also, after isolating the purported "multiple punishments"
component as "the one at issue" and in extolling it as having
"deep roots in our history and jurisprudence,"20 3 the Court para-
doxically exiled the prohibition from the historical and jurispru-
dential roots of not just the Double Jeopardy Clause, but also
the whole Constitution. What, of course, undergirds the Consti-
tution is that understood ligature between unchecked power and
oppressive corruption.2 4 The Double Jeopardy Clause's finality
principle aspires to be an antidote to potential governmental
overreaching and to mitigate what is inherent in criminal pro-
ceedings-namely, the coincidence of grossly unequal combat-
ants.20 5 The Halper Court, by authorizing-not multiple punish-
ments-but multiple punitive ordeals, ratified a tactic for
prosecutorial overreaching and for augmenting the disturbing
disparity in power.
In short, the Court in Halper paid lip service to double jeop-
ardy protection as something to be praised as "intrinsically per-
sonal" and as safeguarding "humane interests." 20 6 In fact, as the
Halper Court apparently saw it, even the once deific legislative
captions of "civil" and "remedial" must yield to the constraints of
the Clause.20 7 Perplexingly, however, through its obsession with
the supposed multiple punishments prong, the Court effectually
derogated that sacrosanct "intrinsically personal" right to final-
ity.208 It also slighted that equally important related "humane
202. See Eads, supra note 46, at 953 (arguing that "[tihe Halper Court ignored [the]
finality interest by applying only the 'multiple punishmenV prong of double jeopardy to
civil sanctions.").
203. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
204. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
206. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. See generally Eads, supra note 46, at 953-54 (criticiz-
ing the Halper Court for distinguishing the Double Jeopardy Clause from other constitu-
tional guarantees by suggesting that the "humane interests" of the Clause are 'intrinsi-
cally personal" and arguing that there is almost no historical or judicial precedent for
such a "rarified classification").
207. See generally James M. Curley, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 75 B.U. L. REv. 505, 512 (1995) ("By formulating the new
nondeferential rational relationship test, the Halper Court rejected the statutory con-
struction test and began the intrusion of double jeopardy analysis into the territory of
civil proceedings."); Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Jus-
tice and Prohibited Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989), 65 WASH. L. Rav. 437, 446-47 (1990)
(discussing how Halper affects legislatures by "restricting their power to determine civil
sanctions unilaterally).
208. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
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interest" an accused has in not being further diminished before
the ostensibly awesome conglomerate of prosecutorial resources.
B. Austin v. United States: The Overthrow of the Guilty
Property Fiction and Acknowledgement that Forfeiture is
Punishment Per Se
1. The Austin Decision. The Austin case began with an in-
dictment for violation of South Dakota's drug laws.20 9 After Aus-
tin pleaded guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with intent
to distribute, the state court sentenced Austin to seven years in
prison.2 10 Subsequently, the United States commenced an in rem
action in federal court seeking forfeiture of Austin's mobile home
and auto body shop.211
In the affidavits in support of the government's motion for
summary judgment, the police officer tried to connect the mobile
home and the body shop with the illegal conduct: "Austin met
Keith Engebretson at Austin's body shop on June 13, 1990, and
agreed to sell cocaine to Engebretson. Austin left the shop, went
to his mobile home, and returned to the shop with two grams of
cocaine, which he sold to Engebretson." 2 2 Also, the affiant said
that a search of the body shop and mobile home revealed "small
amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a .22 caliber revolver, drug
paraphernalia, and approximately $4,700 in cash."213
When Austin opposed the government's motion by arguing
that the forfeiture of his home and business would violate the
Eighth Amendment,214 the district court found in favor of the
government and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.215 Because of an
apparent conflict between the Eighth and Second Circuits over
the application of the Eighth Amendment to in rem civil forfeit-
ures, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.216
The Supreme Court preliminarily focused on Browning-
Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,217 which was the only
case in which it had considered the Eighth Amendments Exces-
209. Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602, 604 (1993).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 604-05. The forfeiture provisions were 21 US.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).
See also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
212. Austin, 509 US. at 605.
213. Id.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
215. United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992).
216. Austin, 509 US. at 606.
217. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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sive Fines Clause. What the Browning-Ferris Court honed in on
was what the Eighth Amendment had in common with its an-
cestor, § 10 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was the
aim to prevent the government from abusing its power to pun-
ish.218 Consequently, the Browning-Ferris Court concluded that
"the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those
fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government."219
The Austin Court, however, felt that in Browning-Ferris, it
had not reached the question of whether the Excessive Fines
Clause applies only to criminal cases. 220 This gap in Browning-
Ferris was significant because the government, in seeking to ex-
tricate forfeiture from Eighth Amendment protection, urged the
following historical perspective on the Court:
[Any claim that the government's conduct in a civil proceeding is limited
by the Eighth Amendment generally, or by the Excessive Fines Clause in
particular, must fail unless the challenged governmental action, despite
its label, would have been recognized as a criminal punishment at the
time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.Y1
As a fall-back, the government contended that the only way
the Eighth Amendment could apply to a civil proceeding was if
that proceeding was "so punitive that it must be considered
criminal."222
In rejecting the government's theories, the Supreme Court
distinguished the Eighth Amendment from the Fifth and the
Sixth Amendments, both of which were indeed limited to crimi-
nal cases.22 3As the Court emphasized, the Eighth Amendment
had neither an express limitation to criminal cases nor a history
that confined it as such.2 24
The Austin Court then explored the basic purpose of the
Eighth Amendment, which was to limit the government's power
218. Id. at 266-67.
219. Id. at 268.
220. Austin, 509 U.S. at 609.
221. Id.
222. Id. The government relied on Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963) and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
223. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607.
224. Id. at 607-10. The Court noted that while the original version of Section 10 of
the English Bill of Rights that was introduced in the House of Commons had language
restricting its application to criminal cases, that restriction only applied to the excessive
bail clause. As such, the "absence of any similar restriction in the other two clauses sug-
gests that they were not limited to criminal cases" Id. at 609. In fact, in the final draft,
even that one reference to criminal cases in the bail clause was omitted. Id.
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to punish.22 Reiterating the language of the Halper decision, the
Court said that "the notion-of punishment, as we commonly un-
derstand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the
criminal law."226 The Court thus chiseled the question down to
whether forfeiture is punishment-not whether it had a civil or
criminal label.
For the Court, answering the real question entailed a back-
ward glance to the time of ratification of the Eighth Amendment
and consideration of whether "forfeiture was understood at least
in part as punishment" at that time.22 7 As the Court concluded,
all three English forms of forfeiture-deodand, forfeiture upon
conviction for a felony or treason and statutory forfeiture-were
indeed punitive.2 Further, as the Court pointed out, the First
Congress that enacted the laws that subjected ships and cargo
involved in customs offenses to seizure also viewed forfeiture as
punishment.229 In fact, in one such Act, Congress specifically rel-
egated the forfeiture of goods and the vessel to the punishment
provisions. 30
In addition, the Supreme Court construed its own decisions
as characterizing statutory in rem forfeiture as punitive.
Amongst these were the cases in which the Supreme Court re-
jected the innocent owner as a common law defense to forfei-
ture.21 The Austin Court read such decisions, including Calero-
Toledo, as predicated on the theory that because the owners
were negligent in allowing others to misuse their property, such
owners were being punished.2 32 The Court even recognized that
the notion of forfeiture as punitive had endured in spite of the
age-old forfeiture fiction "that the thing is primarily considered
the offender."2 3
To bolster its reading of the innocent owner cases as recog-
nition of the punitive nature of forfeiture, the Court referred to
225. Id. at 609.
226. Id. at 610 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 611. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
229. Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
230. The Austin Court is referring to the Act of July 31, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 39.,
which provided that "goods could not be unloaded except during the day and with a per-
mit." Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
231. The Court referred to Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974); J W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 US. 505 (1921); Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 96 US. 395 (1878); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 US.
(2 How.) 210 (1844) and The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). See also Bennis v.
Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
232. Austin, 509 US. at 611.
233. Id. at 615. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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the "more recent cases [that] have expressly reserved the ques-
tion whether the fiction could be employed to forfeit the prop-
erty of a truly innocent owner."23 4 As the Austin Court saw it,
such cases have language suggesting that true innocence on the
part of the owner could raise serious constitutional issues and
this had to have ensued from "an assumption that forfeiture
serves in part to punish."3 5
After its historical analysis, the Court considered whether
forfeiture under the statutes before it are presently considered
punishment. While the Court "[found] nothing in these provi-
sions or their legislative history to contradict the historical un-
derstanding of forfeiture as punishment[,]" it noted that the pro-
visions involved in Austin actually had an express "innocent
owner" defense.26 By excusing the "innocent," and thus fixing on
the culpable, the provisions "look more like punishment . .
than those actually involved in drug trafficking.
237
Finally, the Court rejected the government's invitation to
categorize drug trafficking forfeiture as remedial. As the Court
noted, while forfeiture of contraband can"have the remedial ef-
fect of removing dangerous or illegal items from society, there
was nothing inherently criminal or illegal about the actual res-
the mobile home and body shop-in the Austin case.23 8 Also, the
Court dismissed the government's position that forfeiture is re-
medial because the assets serve as "a reasonable form of liqui-
dated damages."29 One problem, according to the Court, was the
"dramatic variations" in the value of the forfeitable property.24
As the Court pointed out, even if forfeiture statutes have some
remedial goals, the fact that they also serve to punish makes
them unequivocally punitive.
241
234. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90; Goldsmith-
Grant Co., 254 US. at 512).
235. Id. After Austin, however, the Supreme Court said in Bennis v. Michigan, 116
S. Ct. 994, 999 n.5 (1996) that in Austin, it had observed that J. W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant
Co. v. United States, 254 US. 505 (1921) "'expressly reserved the question whether the
[guilty-property] fiction could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent
owner'" and remarked that the Austin "observation [was] quite mistaken."
236. Austin, 509 US. at 618 (citing 21 US.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) and (a)(7)). See supra
notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
237. Austin, 509 US. at 619.
238. Id. at 621-22.
239. Id. at 619 (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972)). But see Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996) ("[Fiorfeiture also
serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose"). See also supra notes
137-40 and accompanying text.
240. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
241. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, said that he
693Fall 1996]
694 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
2. The Real Effect of the Austin Decision. What the Halper
Court envisioned was a case-by-case analysis to ensure that a
potentially punitive civil judgment imposed on an already crimi-
nally punished defendant was rationally related to the goal of
making the government whole. 242 The Halper decision thus con-
templated an individual accounting of the government's dam-
ages and costs to determine whether the civil penalty consti-
tutes a second punishment. The Austin decision, however,
eliminated the necessity for such an ad hoc inquiry with respect
to civil in rem forfeiture.24
Austin stands for the proposition that all forfeiture is pun-
ishment. Such a per se rule flows from the Court's reliance on a
"would have reserved the question without engaging in the misleading discussion of cul-
pability." Id. at 626. He, however, would conclude that "the in rem forfeiture in this case
is a fine" because the statute, "in contrast to the traditional in rem forfeiture, requires
that the owner not be innocent-that he have some degree of culpability for the 'guilty'
property" and because there is no "consideration of compensating for loss, since the
value of the property is irrelevant to whether it is forfeited." Id. Justice Kennedy, with
whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined, also concurred and explained
that he was "not convinced that all in rem forfeitures were on account of the owner's
blameworthy conduct" and that "[siome impositions of in rem forfeiture may have been
designed either to remove property that was itself causing injury... or to give the court
jurisdiction over an asset that it could control in order to make injured parties whole."
Id. at 629. He also indicated that he would reserve the question of whether in rem for-
feitures are always punitive. Id.
242. Matthew H. Lembke in Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Ap-
plying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United States v.
Halper, 76 VA. L. REv. 1251, 1266-67 (1990), explains that the Halper Court's approach
is not clearly ad hoc, but somewhat confusing:
On the one hand, Halper emphasizes the need for a case-by-case analysis to
determine whether a 'measure of recovery... [is] so unreasonable or excessive'
that it transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty. On the other hand, enigmatic dictum in Halper suggests that, in cer-
tain circumstances, the question of whether the sanction is punishment or not
can be resolved by reference to the legislative purpose behind the sanction.
(footnotes omitted); see also Hall, supra note 207, at 448 (discussing how courts must ap-
ply the Halper rule on a case-by-case basis).
243. Kessler, supra note 9, at 215 describes the effect of Austin in combination with
Halper as follows:
The Austin court relied heavily upon Halper to reach its result. If civil forfei-
ture now constitutes punishment, and double jeopardy bars a subsequent pros-
ecution, to paraphrase Edward G. Robinson, Mother of Mercy, is this the end
of Civil Forfeiture? To quote another cult figure, Garth, from Wayne's World,
Not!
(footnotes omitted). See also McClain, supra note 119, at 976-83 (arguing that Austin
supports the view that all forfeiture is punishment). After Austin, however, the Supreme
Court appeared to recede somewhat from the per se punitive approach. In Bennis v.
Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996), for example, the Court said that "forfeiture also
serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose."
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broad historical analysis and its examination of decisions re-
jecting the common law "innocent owner" defense. In fact, al-
most all of the reasons that lead the Austin Court to deem the
forfeiture provisions at issue to be punitive will logically pertain
to any and all forfeiture schemes.2 "
In reviewing the three kinds of forfeiture extant in England
at the time of the Eighth Amendment's ratification, the Austin
Court stressed that each imposed punishment. 24 Also, forfei-
ture's punitive character, as the Austin Court opined, immi-
grated to the United States.2 4 In the process of following this
historical path and tracking the Supreme Court's treatment of
the common law innocent owner defense, the Austin Court extir-
pated the guilty property myth. It essentially viewed the guilty
property language as a shortcut encapsulation of the notion that
it is "the owner [who] has been negligent in allowing his prop-
erty to be misused and that [it is the owner who] is properly
punished for that negligence."247
The Austin Court also concluded that it had never used the
guilty property fiction as a justification of forfeiture where the
owner was truly innocent or "had done all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the unlawful use of his property."24 In
244. See generally McClain, supra note 119, at 976-77 (explaining that the Austin
Court "based its decision on the 'historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment,
the clear focus of §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) on the culpability of the owner, and the evi-
dence that Congress understood those provisions as serving to deter and to punish[,]'...
[and because] [t]hese three factors equally apply to section 881(a)(6),... it should there-
fore follow that the section does indeed inflict punishment."). But see Ator, supra note 9
(arguing that Austin may be limited to situations where the property subject to forfei-
ture was used to facilitate a crime and may not apply to proceeds forfeiture); Daniel P.
Buckley, A Proposed Measure for Excessiveness After Austin v. United States Put a Twist
on the Forfeiture Laws, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 621, 630 (1993/94) (arguing that forfeiture of
proceeds is not punishment). See also United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994); discussion infra at Part IlI.B.
245. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611. With respect to the deodand, when the forfeited object
became a source of crown revenue, the institution became more perceivedly one that
punished a property owner for carelessness. As the Austin Court acknowledged, the
whole thrust of forfeiture of estate was to punish felons and traitors. Id. at 612. Further,
according to the Austin Court, the English forfeiture statutes, like the Navigation Acts
of 1660, aimed to penalize negligence. Id.
246. Id. at 613-14. The First Congress that passed laws subjecting ships and cargos
involved in customs offenses to forfeiture viewed it as punishment. Id. at 613. In fact, in
the Act of July 31, 1789, Congress put the forfeiture of the goods and vessel into the
punishment category. Id
247. Id.
248. Id. at 616. But see Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (holding that the
Constitution does not protect wife's interest against forfeiture by the government even
though she did not know that her car would be used in an illegal activity that would
subject it to forfeiture).
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fact, the Austin Court construed its more recent decisions, the
ones expressly reserving the question of the truly innocent
owner, as founded on the assumption that forfeiture does indeed
function as punishment.249 Further, according to the Court, the
alternate justification of forfeiture of an innocent owner's prop-
erty-that of holding an owner vicariously accountable for the
wrongs of others-is similarly premised on the concept of a
blameworthy owner.250
The reasoning in Austin can not be honestly confined to just
the § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) forfeitures at issue.251 Even where the
Austin Court honed in on the statutory provisions, it found that
they corroborated the conclusions that the Court had already
reached through the predominantly historical analysis. 25 2 In par-
ticular, the Court pointed out that although § 881 differs from
traditional forfeiture statutes by containing an innocent owner
defense, that aspect alone is not what makes the provisions pu-
nitive-but actually more punitive because they stress the
owner's culpability25 3 Further, the Court indicated that the fact
that Congress actually tied the forfeiture to the commission of
the drug offenses solidifies what is already their innately puni-
tive character.24
In addition, the Austin Court furthered what the Halper
Court inaugurated-the overthrow of the very tyrannical "civil"
and "remedial" labels that kept constitutional protections away
from the forfeiture domain. In so doing, the Court reiterated
what it said in Halper, that "'It]he notion of punishment, as we
commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the
civil and the criminal law."255 It also rejected the government's
position that the civil provisions are remedial because they re-
move the "instruments" of the drug trade from the community
249. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617. But see Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5 (Court receded
from its view that it had "expressly reserved the question whether the [guilty property]
fiction could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner.").
250. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
251. See supra notes 235-37. See also Austin, 509 US. at 629 (Justice Kennedy, with
whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment, would "reserve the question whether in rem forfeitures always
amount to intended punishment. . ."). Such a concurrence, of course, suggests that the
Austin Court did not reserve and thus, reached the conclusion that such forfeitures al-
ways amount to punishment.
252. See supra notes 235-37.
253. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617. See also Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (statutory innocent
owner defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is punitive in motive) (citing
Austin, 509 U.S. at 616-19).
254. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
255. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 US. 435, 447-48 (1989)).
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and serve as governmental compensation.256
Although there is language in Austin admitting that "the
forfeiture of contraband itself may be characterized as remedial
because it removes dangerous illegal items from society," the
Court did not go so far as to suggest that some forfeitures are
non-punitive. 257 By underscoring the fact that "forfeiture stat-
utes historically have been understood as serving not simply re-
medial goals but also those of punishment and deterrence,"258
the Court deemed forfeiture to be at least a remedial and puni-
tive admixture, which thus means that it is punishment.
C. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch: The
Incipient Overthrow of the Myopic Fixation on Multiple
Punishments and Endorsement of an Understanding of
Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings as Separate Per Se
1. The Kurth Ranch Decision. The focus in Kurth Ranch
was on Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act, which imposed a
tax "on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs" and pro-
vided that such a tax was to be "collected only after any state or
federal fines or forfeitures have been satisfied."259 Under the Act,
the amount of tax could be ten percent of what the Montana De-
partment of Revenue determined was the market value of the
drugs or a specified amount depending on the type of drug,
whichever was greater.260
The Montana Department of Revenue required taxpayers to
file a return within seventy-two hours of their arrest.261 The rule
stated that "'[ait the time of arrest law enforcement personnel
shall complete the dangerous drug information report as re-
quired by the department and afford the taxpayer an opportu-
nity to sign it.' "262 If the taxpayer, however, refused to sign, the
rule required the law enforcement officers to file it
themselves. 26 3
About two weeks after the Drug Tax Act went into effect,
Montana law enforcement officers raided the Kurth farm, ar-
rested the Kurths and confiscated marijuana plants and para-
256. Austin, 509 US. at 620.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 622 n.14.
259. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 770 (1994)
(citing MoNT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111(1), (3) (1987)).
260. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111(2)(a)-(b)(vi).
261. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 773 (citing MoNT. ADMIN. R 42.34.102(3) (1988)).




phernalia.26 In one of the several proceedings that ensued from
the raid, the State charged various members of the Kurth fam-
ily with conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to sell or, in the
alternative, possession of drugs with the intent to sell.265 After
each defendant entered into a plea agreement, the court sen-
tenced two family members to prison and imposed suspended or
deferred sentences on the others.2 66
In a second proceeding, the county attorney sought forfei-
ture of cash and equipment that the Kurth family used in the
marijuana operation.26 7 Because the law enforcement officers de-
stroyed the drugs after inventory, the drugs were not part of
this proceeding.268 Ultimately the Kurth family settled that ac-
tion by agreeing to forfeit cash and various other items. 269
In a third proceeding, the Montana Department of Revenue,
acting under the aegis of the new Drug Tax Act, attempted to
collect about $900,000 in taxes on the marijuana and hash prod-
ucts.270 Although the Kurths initially contested the assessment,
their subsequent petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 auto-
matically stayed the collection proceedings.271
In the fourth case in bankruptcy court, the Kurths not only
objected to the Department's proof of claim for the unpaid drug
taxes, but challenged the constitutionality of the Drug Tax Act
itself272 The bankruptcy court determined that most of the as-
sessment was invalid as a matter of state law.27 3 It concluded
that although the Act authorized a portion of the assessment, it
was nevertheless unconstitutional. 27 4 The court, relying on
Halper, saw the assessment, which served to deter and punish,
as amounting to double jeopardy.275
The district court agreed with the bankruptcy judge.27 6 Al-
though the Ninth Circuit affired, it based its conclusion prima-
rily on the State's failure to present evidence justifying the
264. Id. at 774.





270. Id. at 774.
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tax.277 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Ninth
Circuit decision conflicted with a Montana Supreme Court
decision.278
After initially acknowledging that Halper did not answer
the question before it--"whether Montana's tax should be char-
acterized as punishment"-the Supreme Court emphasized that
it had never before found a tax to violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.279 The Court, however, looked back at its decision in
Helvering v. Mitchell, 280 in which it apparently assumed that a
Revenue Act provision could trigger double jeopardy protection
if it intended to punish.
Further, the Kurth Ranch Court reiterated that "'there
comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a
mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punish-
ment.'" 281 The Court, however, stressed that neither a "high rate
of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose" can automatically
make a tax punitive.282 The Court recognized that the tax before
it had such punitive attributes: namely, that a large part of the
assessment was more than eight times the drug's market value
and that the legislature aimed to deter the possession of
marijuana.283
For the Court, however, there were other features of the Act
that really set the drug tax apart from most taxes. First, the im-
position of the tax was based on the commission of a crime and,
in fact, the Department exacts the tax "only after the taxpayer
has been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the
tax obligation in the first place."284 In this vein, the Court distin-
277. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 511 U.S. 767 (1993).
The Ninth Circuit, understanding that the central inquiry under Halper was whether
the imposed sanction was rationally related to damages that the government had actu-
ally suffered, deemed the Kurths entitled to an individual accounting to determine if the
sanction constitutes an impermissible second punishment. Because, however, the State
had refused to offer the requisite evidence, the Ninth Circuit found the tax to be uncon-
stitutional as applied to the Kurths.
278. Sorensen v. State Dep't of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992).
279. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 578-79.
280. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). Helvering involved a Revenue Act provision which re-
quired the taxpayer to pay an additional 50% of the total amount of any deficiency due
to a fraudulent intent to evade the tax. The Court found this tax was remedial, not pu-
nitive. Id. at 398-405. See supra notes 127-29, 137 and accompanying text.




284. Id. at 780.
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guished taxes on illegal activities from "mixed motive taxes that
governments impose to deter a disfavored activity and to raise
money."285 With respect to cigarette taxes, an example of the
"mixed motive" genus, the Court explained:
[B]ecause the product's benefits-such as creating employment, satisfy-
ing consumer demand, and providing tax revenues-are regarded as out-
weighing the harm, that government will allow the manufacture, sale,
and use of cigarettes as long as the manufacturers, sellers and smokers
pay high taxes that reduce consumption and increase government
revenue.2
The Court pointed out that the justifications behind the
"mixed motive" tax disappear when the law forbids the taxed ac-
tivity altogether.287 That is, "the legitimate revenue-raising pur-
pose that might support such a tax could be equally well served
by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction."288
Second, the Drug Tax, which purports to be a property tax,
had an anomalous attribute: that the state imposes it on goods
that the taxpayer neither owns nor possesses. In fact, in the
Kurth Ranch situation, the State destroyed the contraband
before the assessment.28 9 As the Court saw it, "[a] tax on 'pos-
session' of goods that no longer exist and that the taxpayer
never lawfully possessed has an unmistakable punitive
character." 90
In concluding that the drug tax proceeding was the "func-
tional equivalent of successive criminal prosecution that placed
the Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offense,'" the
Court deemed the Halper test for civil penalties to be inapplica-
ble to tax statutes.291 As the Court put it, "Halper's method of
determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive 'sim-
ply does not work in the case of a tax statute.' "292
285. Id. at 782.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. Further, the Kurth RanchCourt deemed it "significant that the same sover-
eign that criminalized the activity also imposed the tax." Id. at 782 n.22. The Court con-
trasted the situation before it with those cases, like United States v. Constantine, 296
US. 287 (1935), which involved taxes prohibited by other sovereigns, and said that those
cases were ones "confirming that the unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its
taxation." Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 782 n.22.
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2. The Dissenting Opinions. Justice Scalia, with whom Jus-
tice Thomas joined, issued a dissenting opinion, which is espe-
cially significant because it criticized the Court's overall perspec-
tive on the Double Jeopardy Clause itself. 93 According to Justice
Scalia, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not separately prohibit
multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecutions.294 Scalia
essentially traced the supposed separate multiple punishment
component to the decision in Ex Parte Lange.295
In Lange, after the defendant was convicted of stealing mail
bags from the post office, the trial court sentenced him to prison
and imposed a fine.296 The Supreme Court, in issuing a writ of
habeas corpus, deemed the sentence to be in excess of statutory
authorization.297 Although the Lange decision rested not exclu-
sively on the Double Jeopardy Clause but also on common law
and Due Process principles, later courts tended to cite Lange as
a double jeopardy case.298 What Scalia pointed out is that al-
though the Lange progeny recited the dictum that "the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects against both successive prosecutions
and successive punishments for the same criminal offense,"
299
such "repetition . . .does not turn [such dictum] into a hold-
ing."3 0 While Justice Scalia had admittedly joined the Court's
unanimous decision in Halper, his difficulty in actually applying
Halper to Montana's Drug Tax Act was what apparently caused
him to doubt the very existence of a "multiple-punishments
component."3 01
According to Justice Scalia, the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishments.
302
Basically, "multiplicity qua multiplicity, however, is restricted
only by the Double Jeopardy Clause's requirement that there be
no successive criminal prosecution."303 Otherwise, in Scalia's
view, it is the Due Process Clause that "keeps punishment
within the bounds established by the legislature and the Cruel
293. Id. at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294. Id.
295. 85 US. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
296. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 799.
297. Id.
298. Justice Scalia cites North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) as an ex-
ample of a case in which the Court treated Lange as if it were an exclusively double
jeopardy case. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 799.
299. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 800.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 802-03.
302. Id. at 804-05.
303. Id. at 805.
Fall 19 9 6 701
702 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses [that]
place substantive limits upon what those legislated bounds may
be."304
Scalia would thus conclude that Montana's tax proceeding
does not constitute a second criminal prosecution. Also, because
the Montana legislature authorized the imposition of the taxes
on top of the criminal penalties, there was no Due Process
violation.305
3. The Real Effect of the Kurth Ranch Decision. The Kurth
Ranch decision impacts on Halper in at least two significant
ways. First, it bolsters what was incipient in Halper, the concept
of the related civil proceedings as separate from the companion
criminal prosecution. In Halper, the Supreme Court clarified
that its decision does not prevent the government from seeking
a civil and criminal penalty in a "single proceeding."3 6 Scrutiniz-
ing the procedural posture of the Halper case itself, of course,
should dispel even a conjecture that a separate civil proceeding
304. Id. at 803.
305. Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissenting, agreed with the Court's rejection of
the "Halper mode of analysis," which, in his opinion, "simply does not fit in the case of a
tax statute." Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 785. Unlike the penalty in Halper, which "enabled
the Government to recover more than an approximation of its costs... the purpose of a
tax statute is not [reimbursement for] costs..., but is instead to either raise revenue,
deter conduct, or both." Id. at 786. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not disagree
with the Court's conclusion that a tax could conceivably be punishment as it had simi-
larly found in United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), he disagreed that the
Constantine factors were present in the Montana Drug Tax situation:
I do not find the conditioning of the tax on criminal conduct and arrest to be
fatal to this tax's validity; this characteristic simply reflects the reality of tax-
ing an illegal enterprise. Furthermore, the rate of taxation clearly supports pe-
titioners here .... First, unlike the situation in Constantine, no tax or fee is
otherwise collected from individuals engaged in the illicit drug business. Thus,
an entire business goes without taxation. Second, the Montana tax is not dis-
proportionate as the additional excise tax in Constantine.
Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 790. According to Rehnquist, the Court's conclusion was not
only inconsistent with the purpose and effect of the Montana statute, but also with the
Court's previous decisions. Id. at 791. Also, in his view, "[w]hen compared to similar
types of 'sin' taxes on items such as alcohol and cigarettes, [Montana's] figures are not
so high as to be deemed arbitrary or shocking." Id.
In a separate dissent, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court "that Montana's drug
tax is not exempt from scrutiny under the Double Jeopardy Clause," but disagreed with
its conclusion that such a drug is always punitive. Id. at 793. Specifically, Justice
O'Connor would remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with Halper.
O'Connor stressed that the bifurcated approach in Halper is the correct one because it
honors "[t]he presumption of constitutionality to which every state statute is entitled...
. Id. at 796.
306. United States v. Halper, 490 US. 435, 450 (1989).
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is not really separate from the related criminal action. That is,
in Halper, the government first charged Halper with violating
the criminal false-claims statute and even obtained the convic-
tion.30 7 Afterwards, the government commenced the civil False
Claims Act suit, which the Halper Court unequivocally viewed
not only as a separate proceeding, but as one that potentially
resulted in a second separate punishment.308
While there is hardly a basis for distinguishing the decid-
edly separate parallel proceedings in Halper from the normative
procedural posture of civil in rem forfeiture actions that trail or
precede criminal proceedings, the very language in Kurth Ranch
should totally block any attempt to portray such separate ac-
tions as fused. In Kurth Ranch, the Court, albeit in dictum, said
that the raid on the Kurth farm "gave rise to four separate legal
proceedings," one of which was a civil forfeiture action to confis-
cate the cash and equipment used in the marijuana business. 30 9
Also, in what is definitely not dictum, the Kurth Ranch Court
described the Montana Drug Tax proceeding as separate. 310 The
Court, in fact, delineated one option Montana had but did not
pursue as that of "assess[ing] the tax in the same proceeding
that resulted in [the taxpayer's] conviction."311
Second, the language in the Kurth Ranch decision comes
close to extinguishing the problems that the Halper Court
spawned through its myopic fixation on the supposed separate
multiple-punishments component of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. As discussed above, the Halper Court formulated the is-
sue as presenting an unadulterated "multiple punishments"
problem and in so doing, left open an avenue for the govern-
ment to seek a separate civil penalty against an already acquit-
ted individual. 312 Consequently, although the Halper Court
deemed the protection against "multiple punishments for the
same offense" to be such a sacred aspect of the Double Jeopardy
Clause,313 it actually exiled that supposed aspect from the
Clause's core--the protection of the individual's right to finality
307. Id. at 435.
308. Id. at 449-51.
309. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 771-72 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 772-73 (the Montana Drug Tax proceeding was one of the four "separate
legal proceedings").
311. Id at 778 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 US. 359, 368-69 (1983)) (emphasis
added). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
312. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440-41. See also discussion supra Part H1A2.
313. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (calling the protection of such 'humane interests" an




and the curtailing of inordinate prosecutorial overreaching.314
Although Justice Scalia appeared to object to what he
faulted as the Kurth Ranch Court's adherence to the notion that
"there is a multiple-punishments component to the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause,"3 15 his dissent and the Court's opinion do not
greatly diverge on that particular issue. One of the things that
Justice Scalia found problematic with a separate "no-double-
punishments-rule" is that the "Clause's ban on successive crimi-
nal prosecutions would make surplusage of any distinct protec-
tion against additional punishment imposed in a successive pros-
ecution since the prosecution itself would be barred."316 While
the Kurth Ranch Court did indeed begin with that familiar in-
cantation that the "Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense"3 17 and even pur-
ported to hang its decision on that special separate hook, it im-
plicitly recognized what Scalia indicated-that the Clause's pre-
clusion of a second prosecution subsumes the multiple
punishment ban. In fact, the Court stated point blank that "the
proceeding Montana initiated to collect a tax on the possession
of drugs was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal
prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time for
the same offence."318 Such language, in fact, almost mirrors what
Scalia posited as the "Clause's ban on successive prosecutions..
mak[ing] surplusage of any distinct protection against addi-
tional punishment imposed in a successive prosecution."31 9
By automatically shifting its ken from the "multiple punish-
ments" question to an apparent multiple prosecution retort, the
Kurth Ranch Court had, in effect, begun to rehabilitate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. That is, if the civil proceeding is in-
deed the "functional equivalent of a ... criminal prosecution,"320
then the government can not, by seeking to impose a civil pen-
alty on an acquittee, harassingly subject such an individual to
duplicate ordeals.32 1 Because under the reasoning of Kurth
Ranch a civil penalty "must be imposed during the first prosecu-
tion or not at all,"322 the Clause does what it is designed to do-
namely, accord the accused some meaningful closure.
314. See discussion supra Part I.A.
315. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 798-99.
316. Id. at 801.
317. Id. at 769 n.1.
318. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at 801.
320. Id. at 784.
321. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text and discussion supra Part IIA.2.
322. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 784.
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III. THE BIRTH OF NEW FORFEITURE MYTHS IN THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE COURTS
Ironically, although the Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch de-
cisions should have ushered in an era of mythless civil in rem
forfeiture with double jeopardy protection, several circuit courts
created surrogate myths to fend off the necessary constitutional
protection.
A. The Myth of Non-Separation
The Second, 323 Sixth324 and Eleventh Circuits3 25 concocted a
way to avoid the application of double jeopardy by mythically
portraying the separate civil and criminal proceedings as not
necessarily separate. In essence, they strained to find that
under certain circumstances, the parallel civil and criminal pro-
ceedings can somehow meld into a single prosecution.
1. The Second Circuit's Approach: United States v. Millan.
In Millan, after the Drug Enforcement Administration investi-
gated what it believed was an organization involved in the dis-
tribution of heroin, the United States magistrate issued arrest
warrants for over forty individuals, including the Bottones. 326  On
the same day, the magistrate issued seizure warrants for assets,
which were alleged to be facilitators of or proceeds from the ille-
gal activity.327 Such assets included "Auction Cars," which was a
used car business. 328
About two weeks later, the government named the Bottones
in an initial grand jury indictment, accusing them, among other
things, of participation in a conspiracy to distribute "'massive
amounts of heroin.'" 329 That indictment also contained a crimi-
nal forfeiture count. 330 Shortly thereafter, the district court is-
sued a post-indictment restraining order to prevent the Bottones
323. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092
(1994). In United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed the Millan court's approach.
324. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
325. United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
326. Millan, 2 F.3d at 18.
327. Id. The seizure was pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
328. Millan, 2 F.3d at 18.
329. Id. The indictment accused them of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A) and 846 (1988).
330. Millan, 2 F.3d at 18. The criminal forfeiture count was included pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) and (a)(2).
705Fall 1996]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
from transferring or dissipating the properties subject to crimi-
nal forfeiture.331
Subsequently, however, at a pretrial conference the Bot-
tones represented that they lacked the funds to pay their attor-
neys.33 2 Rather than moving to obtain the release of such funds
for attorneys' fees, the Bottones embarked on settlement negoti-
ations with respect to the assets involved in the civil seizure
and the criminal restraining order.333
While such negotiations were underway, Alfred Bottone, Jr.
filed an administrative claim to challenge the government's
seizure of Auction Cars.3 34 The government responded by lodging
an in rem civil forfeiture complaint against those assets and by
incorporating by reference the indictment into the complaint.335
Only Alfred Bottone Jr. answered the complaint.336
Almost a year later, the grand jury issued a superseding in-
dictment, which alleged in part that the Bottones and others
had obtained property in excess of $100 million from the narcot-
ics activity.3 37 The government not only charged the Bottones
and others with joint and several liability for the forfeiture of
the property, but also indicated that it intended to satisfy any
forfeiture liability with the Bottones' "'substitute property.' 338
In so doing, the government disclosed its resolution to go after
property that was not directly implicated in the narcotics
conspiracy.
The Bottones eventually entered into a stipulation with the
government.3 39 Under the stipulation, the government agreed to
release cash and other assets to the Bottones for their attorneys'
fees.34° The Bottones, in turn, agreed to forfeit other assets to
the* government and renounce any claim associated with certain
other properties. 341 Under the stipulation, the government dis-
331. Millan, 2 F.3d at 18. This was done pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A).
332. Millan, 2 F.3d at 18.
333. Id. at 18-19. Under United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc), the Bottones could have sought a pretrial hearing to obtain the release of funds
for attorneys' fees.




338. Id. The government aimed to do this pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) "even
though said property was not directly implicated in the narcotics conspiracy." Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. The forfeited properties included "$236,804.48 in bank deposits, two parcels
of real estate, and two business interests." Id.
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missed the civil suit.342
Before the criminal trial commenced, the Bottones, relying
on the Supreme Court's Halper decision, sought to dismiss the
superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds.3 43 In deny-
ing the motion, the district court gave the following reasons:
(1) the civil and criminal prosecutions constitute a single proceeding; (2)
the value of the seized property was not 'overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate' to the value of the illegal narcotics giving rise to the criminal indict-
ment; and (3) the defendants were estopped from making this assertion
because they voluntarily entered in the stipulation.M
On appeal in the Second Circuit, the Bottones argued that
the civil settlement acted as punishment under the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, which thus barred the criminal prosecution. 35 The
Second Circuit, obviating the need to reach the punishment is-
sue, concluded that the government's employment of a "single
proceeding to prosecute the Bottones" did not trigger Double
Jeopardy protection.34
The Second Circuit supposedly grabbed at the language in
Halper that "the decision did not prevent the Government from
seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full
range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same
proceeding."3 47 From there, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
civil forfeiture action "was part of a single coordinated prosecu-
tion"348 and elaborated:
In the instant case warrants for the civil seizures and criminal arrests
were issued on the same day, by the same judge, based on the same affi-
davit by the DEA agent. In addition, the stipulation agreed to by the
parties involved not only the seized properties of the civil suit, but also
properties named in the criminal indictment that were under restraining
order. Furthermore, the civil complaint incorporated the criminal indict-
ment. Finally, the Bottones were aware of the criminal charges against
them when they entered into the Stipulation. 49
The court also rejected what the Bottones' had empha-
sized-namely, the government's separate filing of the civil and
criminal actions and the fact that each action had its own
342. Id. at 18.









docket numbers.350 The court, essentially relegated such details
to the category of mere federal "procedure" and said that courts
must instead "look past the procedural requirements and ex-
amine the essence of the actions at hand."35 1 According to the
Second Circuit, the analysis boiled down to "when, how and why
the civil and criminal actions were initiated." 52 Under that sup-
posed when-how-and-why-test, the Second Circuit concluded
that the civil and criminal cases comprised a unitary action.353
The Second Circuit, moreover, acknowledged one of the
Halper Court's concerns-that "the government might act abu-
sively by seeking a second punishment when it is dissatisfied
with the punishment levied in the first action."35 4 The Second
Circuit, however, brushed that concern aside by depicting the
situation before it as one involving "contemporaneous . . . and
not consecutive" civil and criminal actions.3 55 As such, the court
decided that the situation before it simply did not implicate any
constitutional provisions that would inhibit the government's
use of "the full range of statutorily authorized penalties .... .356
2. The Sixth Circuit's Approach: United States v. Ursery. In
Ursery, the police searched the Ursery home and seized 142 ma-
rijuana plants.357 In the Ursery residence, the police found an
ammunition case with two plastic bags filled with marijuana
seeds, two loaded firearms, a box with ten plastic bags contain-
ing marijuana seeds, marijuana stems and stalks and a
growlight.3 58
Subsequently, the government instituted a civil action
against Ursery and his wife in which it sought forfeiture of the
Ursery residence.359 Ultimately, after the Urserys and the gov-
ernment entered into a settlement in which the Urserys agreed
to pay the government $13,250, the consent judgment issued





354. Id. (citing Halper, 490 US. at 451 n.10).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 21.
357. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 570 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
358. Id.
359. Id. The government brought the action pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1994)).360. Ursery, 59 .3d at 570.
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While the civil forfeiture action was pending, the govern-
ment indicted Ursery for manufacture of marijuana. 61 After the
jury returned a guilty verdict, Ursery filed post trial motions in
which he sought a dismissal on double jeopardy grounds. 36 2 The
district court rejected the double jeopardy argument and the
Sixth Circuit entertained de novo review of the issue.363
Before immersing itself in the double jeopardy analysis, the
Sixth Circuit expressed its disagreement with the district court's
conclusion that the consent judgment or settlement of the forfei-
ture action precluded double jeopardy protection.3 " Specifically,
the Sixth Circuit analogized the consent judgment to a guilty
plea in a criminal case and relied on the basic principle that
'jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement
upon the court's acceptance of the plea agreement."365
After concluding that jeopardy attached when the forfeiture
judgment was entered against Ursery," the Sixth Circuit em-
barked on a tripartite inquiry, which began with the question of
whether the civil forfeiture in the case constitutes "punish-
ment."36 6 The court's affirmative answer derived from its inter-
pretation of Halper plus Austin, which, according to the Sixth
Circuit, equated "any civil forfeiture under [§] 21 U.S.C.
361. Id. The manufacture of marijuana was alleged to be a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(aX1).
362. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 570.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 571. The Ursery Court also rejected the government's contention that Ur-
sery had waived his double jeopardy claim by failing to raise it prior to trial in compli-
ance with the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1). Id. Since the district court
had deemed Ursery's double jeopardy argument was not waived, the court concluded
that it could review the issue as one passed upon below. Id. It also found that Ursery
had shown cause for not raising the double jeopardy issue prior to trial because the Aus-
tin decision, which clarified its position, was decided a mere two days before the com-
mencement of Ursery's trial. Id.
365. Id. at 572. The court elaborated as follows:
The fact that there has been no trial in which a jury is sworn or the court
hears evidence does not preclude jeopardy from attaching to a plea entered
pursuant to a plea agreement. Similarly, the fact that there has been no trial
in a civil forfeiture proceeding does not preclude the attachment of jeopardy to
a forfeiture judgment. Jeopardy attaches in a nontrial forfeiture proceeding
when the court accepts the stipulation of forfeiture and enters the judgment of
forfeiture.
Id. See infra note 548 and accompanying text. The Ursery court also distinguished the
case before it from United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir. 1994) in which the
"party claiming double jeopardy was not a party to the forfeiture proceeding, and thus
was never at risk of having a forfeiture judgment entered against him Ursery, 59 F.3d
at 572. See also discussion infra Part IV.2.
366. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 572.
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881(a)(7) [with] punishment for double jeopardy purposes."36 7
Second, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the civil forfei-
ture and criminal conviction constituted punishment for the
same offense and turned to the seminal Blockburger test.368 In
that regard, the government, in what was really an attempt to
resuscitate the guilty property forfeiture fiction, 69 argued that
because the "criminal prosecution requires proof that a person,
the defendant, committed the crime, while the forfeiture re-
quires proof that the property subject to forfeiture has been in-
volved in the commission of a criminal violation[,] . . . each of-
fense requires an element that the other does not. ' 370 In
rejecting the fiction, the court, emphasizing that the "forfeiture
necessarily requires proof of the criminal offense," said:
Even though the standard of proof is more easily met in the civil action,
the fact remains that the government cannot confiscate Ursery's resi-
dence without a showing that he was manufacturing marijuana. The
criminal offense is in essence subsumed by the forfeiture statute and
thus does not require an element of proof that is not required by the for-
feiture action.371
Third, the court considered what it viewed as a pivotal
question after Halper-whether the civil forfeiture and criminal
prosecution were really separate. Although viewing the parallel
proceedings before it as separate, the Sixth Circuit expressly re-
jected the Ninth Circuit decision "that parallel civil forfeiture
and criminal proceedings will always violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause" and instead subscribed to an ad hoc assessment of
separateness:
[W]e also find it unnecessary to fully adopt the Ninth Circuit's view in
this case. It is merely our view that in so far as the existence of a 'single,
coordinated proceeding' could arguably satisfy the requirements of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, as suggested by the Second and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, the facts in this case fail to reveal a single coordinated
proceeding.372
367. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
368. Id. (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) and United States
v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993)). See also discussion infra Part 1V.C.
369. See discussion infra Part IVC.
370. Ursery, 59 E3d at 573.
371. Id. at 574.
372. Id. at 575 (emphasis added). See also discussion of Ninth Circuit decision,
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion
amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom.,
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), infra Parts
IVAl and .B.
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The court believed that there was no indication in the re-
cord before it that the government intended to treat the civil
forfeiture and criminal prosecution as one proceeding.37 3 Specifi-
cally, as the court deemed crucial, there was no communicative
bridge between the government attorneys who handled the for-
feiture action and those prosecuting the criminal case.31 4 Also,
as the court said, "[t]he civil forfeiture proceeding and the crimi-
nal proceeding were instituted four months apart, presided over
by different district judges and resolved by separate
judgments."375
Further, the Sixth Circuit scrutinized the actual procedural
posture in Millan upon which the Second Circuit based its con-
clusion that the civil forfeiture suit and the criminal prosecution
constituted a single proceeding.376 As the Ursery Court saw it,
the only common denominator between the situation before it
and the one in Millan was the defendants' awareness of the
criminal charges against them at the time they settled the for-
feiture matter.377
Also, in Ursery the government tried to use the Eleventh
Circuit case, 18755 N. Bay Rd., to bolster its theory that the
civil and criminal proceedings should be treated as "single" even
though they began and ended on different dates.37 8 The Sixth
Circuit, however, rejected that contention without discussion.
When the government in Ursery likewise sought to avail itself of
the rationale, that "[a]s in Millan, there is no problem here that
the government acted abusively by seeking a second punishment
because of dissatisfaction with the punishment levied in the
first action[,]" the Sixth Circuit in a similarly succinct manner
branded that putative abuse factor as not "dispositive."37 9
373. Ursery, 59 E3d at 575.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 574-75.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. Judge Milburn, dissenting, believed that the case "involve[d] a sufficiently
coordinated proceeding to fall under the holdings in United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17
(2d Cir. 1993) and United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 18755 N.
Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994)" because "it [did] not present the potential for
government abuse of process." Id. at 577-78. Judge Milburn also expressed the view that
Millan and 18755 N. Bay Rd. were still good law after the subsequent decision in Kurth
Ranch, which "dealt... exclusively with the tax assessment." Id- at 578. Further, Judge
Milburn disagreed with the court's conclusion that the civil forfeiture action and the
defendants criminal prosecution were based on the same offense because "the criminal
indictment charged defendant only with the manufacture of a controlled substance dur-
ing [one year]" and the civil forfeiture action "relat[ed] solely to processing and distribu-
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3. The Eleventh Circuit's Approach: United States v. 18755
N. Bay Rd. In 18755 N. Bay Rd., the forfeiture action arose out
of the government's investigation of alleged gambling at the De-
lio home.380 Pursuant to a search warrant, the government
seized gambling records, poker tables, poker chips, decks of
cards and cash.38 ' The government eventually indicted not just
Emilio Delio, but other individuals who apparently served as op-
erators, card dealers, cashiers and bookkeepers for the game.38 2
The government, however, did not indict Yolanda Delio and her
daughter, Maria, although both women allegedly cooked and
served food to the clientele.38 3
Emilio and Yolanda Delio, who owned the property as te-
nants by the entireties, answered the government's forfeiture
complaint.384 They denied that the property was used for a gam-
bling business385 and Yolanda Delio also lodged an "innocent
owner" defense, an issue which she later abandoned on
appeal.38 6
The trial court denied the government's initial motion for
summary judgment.38 7 But then after Emilio Delio was convicted
of all counts of conducting an illegal gambling operation, the
government renewed its summary judgment motion. s8  The sec-
ond motion, relying on the conviction for the issue of probable
cause, based itself on the identical record upon which the trial
court had denied the original motion.38 9 The United States mag-
istrate granted summary judgment in favor of the government
and the district court ordered forfeiture of the real property.390
tion activities in [other] years.. ." Id at 579.
380. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d at 1495.
381. Id. at 1494.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1494-95.
385. Id. at 1495 n.1. Gambling business is defined in 18 US.C. § 1955(b) (1994) as
follows:
(1) 'illegal gambling business' means a gambling business which--(i) is a viola-
tion of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted; (ii)
involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct,
or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in substan-
tially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross
revenue of $2,000 in any single day.
386. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d at 1495. See discussion supra notes 121-23 and ac-
companying text.
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On appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, Emilio Delio alone ar-
gued that his being subjected to two punishments for the same
gambling offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.391 Al-
though Delio relied on both the Halper and Austin decisions, the
Eleventh Circuit locked onto the language in Halper that the de-
cision does not "'prevent the Government from seeking and ob-
taining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statuto-
rily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding.' "392
In rejecting Delio's position, the Eleventh Circuit simply
concluded that the government's "simultaneous pursuit . . . of
criminal and civil sanctions . . . falls within the contours of a
single, coordinated prosecution."393 In so doing, the court aligned
itself with the Second Circuit's decision in Millan and said that
with respect to the Delios, the government did not "act[] abu-
sively by seeking a second punishment because of dissatisfaction
with the punishment levied in the first action."394 Also, the Elev-
enth Circuit interpreted the test in Halper to be whether the
legislature actually authorized cumulative punishment for a sin-
gle course of conduct.395
4. The Myth of Non-Separation. The Second, Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits basically inaugurated the mythic notion that
separate parallel civil in rem forfeiture actions and criminal
prosecutions can be treated as a fused amalgam.396
In Millan, the Second Circuit impliedly created a multi-
391. Id. On appeal, Yolanda Delio also argued that the trial court erred in applying
collateral estoppel and that there existed disputed factual issues to overcome the grant-
ing of the government's motion for summary judgment. Id. The Eleventh Circuit agreed
and hteld] that Mrs. Delio [was] not bound by the factual determinations made in con-
nection with her husband's criminal trial" Id. at 1496. The court pointed out, moreover,
that even the concept that the property is the guilty party does not "deny the rights of a
claimant who seeks to introduce evidence of disputed facts," id., and concluded that the
district court erroneously "foreclosed Yolanda Delio's opportunity to present her position
that the poker game at her home did not possess the attributes of a well-established,
well-organized, large scale gambling operation." Id. at 1497. The other appellants argued
violations of the state constitutional protection of the Florida homestead provision and
the federal protection against excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1495.
Although the Eleventh Circuit rejected the first point and found that the forfeiture ac-
tion preempted the Florida homestead law, it agreed with the second and concluded that
"the forfeiture of [the] home, of an arguable value of $150,000, [was] an imposition of a
disproportionate penalty" Id. at 1498.




396. In United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit al-
igned itself with this approach.
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factor test.397 What the court indicated was that the parallel pro-
ceedings would be considered single where the same judge is-
sues warrants for the civil seizures and criminal arrests on the
same day and where such issuance is based on the same DEA
agent affidavit. Also, where the civil complaint incorporates the
criminal indictment and where the property owners are aware of
the criminal charges against them when they resolve the forfei-
ture matter, "the civil and criminal actions will be treated as
different prongs of a single prosecution."38 Further, under Mil-
lan, it will help the government defeat a double jeopardy chal-
lenge where the forfeiture stipulation deals with not just the
seized properties in the civil suit, but also with those enumer-
ated in the criminal indictment.3 99
Perplexingly, the Millan court said that the factor that the
civil and criminal actions were filed separately with each having
its own separate docket number did not make the actions sepa-
rate. To the Second Circuit, the separate filing and docket num-
bers amounted to mere procedural niceties, which the court
stamped "irrelevant."40 In so doing, the court confounded logic.
That is, what does make sense is conversely the conclusion that
the required separate filing and separate docket numbers consti-
tute not a "technicality,"4 1 but instead an implicit procedural
definition of the civil and criminal actions as being indeed
separate.
Also, the Millan decision sits upon two arbitrary procedural
categories: those that matter and those that don't. While the
requisites of separate filing and separate docketing are classified
397. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
398. Id. The Tenth Circuit, criticizing Millan, noted that "the authority for Millan's
distinction between 'proceeding' and 'prosecution' consists entirely of one sentence from
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 US. 493 (1984)" and that "Johnson did not involve multiple pro-
ceedings." United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1487 (10th Cir. 1996). The
Tenth Circuit thus concluded that "Johnson is a very thin reed on which to perch the
proposition that a single 'prosecution' may comprise multiple proceedings without violat-
ing double jeopardy." Id.
399. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20. In United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d at 386, the court
opined that a "single coordinated prosecution.. . does not require that the government
provide cross-references between the indictment and the civil complaint, or that the
same judge preside over both cases, or that there should be a common judgment." In-
stead, according to the Eighth Circuit, the inquiry rests on "some common-sense ques-
tions: whether the government initiated its parallel actions at, or very close to, the same
time, and whether there is some evidence of coordination of the two matters that con-
nects them in an obvious way." Id. The court found that the cases before it met the defi-
nition of a "single coordinated prosecution." Id.
400. Smith, 75 F.3d at 384.
401. Id. at 385.
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as somehow irrelevant, other procedural aspects-such as the
same judge's contemporaneous issuance of the arrest and
seizure warrants and the fact that there is one supporting DEA
agent affidavit-are forced into the determinative class. Such a
division, however, is transparently absurd. In fact, if the Second
Circuit had truly believed what it said-that a gauging of
whether the actions are single or separate entails an examina-
tion of their "essence" and a determination of "when, how and
why the civil and criminal actions [are] initiated"4 2-then
surely all factors would be welcomed into the calculus.
Also, the Second Circuit apparently founded its conclusion
that the forfeiture and the prosecution were prongs of a unitary
proceeding on its view of the issuance of the warrants "as part
of a coordinated effort to put an end to an extensive narcotics
conspiracy."4 3 The fact that this can be quoted as the purple
passage in the Millan decision is unfortunate because almost
any parallel civil forfeiture suit and criminal prosecution consti-
tute a unit. That is because most arrests that give rise to both
civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings can be depicted as some
"coordinated effort to put an end to . . . [some] extensive ...
conspiracy."404
Further, in Millan, the Second Circuit harped on the Halper
concern that "the government might act abusively by seeking a
second punishment when it is dissatisfied with the punishment
levied in the first action."4°5 The Second Circuit, however, ex-
pressed the view that the situation before it did not present
such a danger of prosecutorial abuse because the civil and crimi-
nal cases "were contemporaneous and not consecutive."40 6
The Millan reasoning is problematic not just because it pro-
pels us into a silly circularity, but also because of the court's os-
tensible view of commencement as interchangeable with disposi-
tion. After all, one avenue that the Halper Court at least
encouraged was joinder. According to the Halper Court, when
the government seeks and obtains the full civil and criminal
penalties in the same proceeding, it can be ensured that the to-
402. Id.
403. Millan, 2 F.3d at 19.
404. Id. The Eighth Circuit test in Smith, 75 F.3d at 386, is similarly broad. That
is, all that needs to be shown is that "the government initiated its parallel actions at, or
very close to, the same time, . . . and [that] there is some evidence of coordination of the
two matters that connects them in an obvious way." Id. (emphasis added).





tal punishment is statutorily authorized.407 This putative safe-
guard exists not because of the contemporaneous commencement
of the supposed civil and criminal "prongs," but really because of
their contemporaneous disposition. Theoretically, the contermi-
nous issuance of the civil and criminal penalties enables courts
to see and evaluate the punishment as a conglomerate. Conse-
quently, what the Millan court felt was so important-that the
parallel actions started at the same time-does not, of course,
guarantee the occurrence of what might really be important-
the simultaneous disposition, which the Halper Court elevated
to a protective measure. Also, obviously the fact that the cases
start at the same time does not alleviate what the Halper Court
feared-that the government would seek a second punishment
out of dissatisfaction with the first.408
The Second Circuit additionally found something in the re-
cord that it believed exonerated the government of an abuse ac-
cusation. The court somehow intuited from the record that "the
government intended to pursue all available civil and criminal
remedies, regardless of the individual outcome of any of these
claims."409 All the record in Millan, however, could have re-
vealed was that the same judge issued the warrants for the civil
seizures and criminal arrests on the same day and based them
on the same DEA agent affidavit. The facts surrounding the
cases' inceptions do not and can not disclose the government's
intended strategy or provide an assurance the government will
not obtain a stay of or even decline to pursue one of the two ac-
tions. Thus, the Millan record, no more than probably almost
any record, revealed a governmental intent to "pursue all availa-
ble civil and criminal remedies."410
Basically, if the civil and criminal actions in Millan could be
treated as unitary compatriots, then almost any situation in
which there is both a civil forfeiture and a criminal prosecution
can pass the test. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's approach in
18755 N. Bay Rd. makes this hypothesis into a caricatured
reality.
In 18755 N. Bay Rd., there was not even a simultaneous
commencement. The government instituted the in rem civil for-
feiture in October of 1990 and issued the indictment in March of
407. Halper, 490 US. at 450.
408. Id. at 451 n.10.
409. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20-21.
410. Id. at 21. Cf United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1488 (10th
Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhe government's good faith does not make two proceedings a single
jeopardy.").
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1991. 411 Two months after the defendant was convicted in Octo-
ber of 1991, the government renewed its motion for summary
judgment in the civil suit, which the district court granted.412
The Eleventh Circuit glibly recited that the circumstances
before it presented one of "simultaneous pursuit by the govern-
ment of criminal and civil sanctions... [and as] fall[ing] within
the contours of a single, coordinated prosecution."413 But really
the only thing in 18755 N. Bay Rd. that can fairly be considered
"single" and "coordinated" is the government's investigation of
the poker games, which gave rise to both cases. After that inves-
tigation, each action went its own merry way.
As such, we can fairly read 18755 N. Bay Rd. as standing
for the proposition that when the civil forfeiture and criminal
prosecution arise out of one investigation, then both actions will
be deemed "single" and "coordinated." Such a holding, of course,
has to kill off just about every double jeopardy defense in such
situations where defendants face parallel civil forfeiture and
criminal proceedings. 4 4 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit rea-
soning defied what had to be the combined impact of the Su-
preme Court's Halper and Austin decisions.415
The decision in 18755 N. Bay Rd. is problematic in still an-
other way-namely, its purported emphasis on the absence of
governmental abuse as a weighty factor. The Eleventh Circuit
said that "[a]s in Millan,... there was no problem.., that the
government acted abusively by seeking a second punishment be-
cause of dissatisfaction with the punishment levied in the first
action."41 6 If, however, we understand the mandate of Halper
plus Austin to the government when it wishes to seek both for-
feiture and a conviction as one of inclusion of the forfeiture in
the criminal proceeding itself, then the Eleventh Circuit effectu-
ally suborned disrespect for binding precedent.
The combined effect of Halper plus Austin is a joinder re-
quirement and what implicitly underlies it is the association be-
tween governmental abuse and the very tactic of staggering the
411. United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1494 (11th Cir. 1994).
412. Id. at 1495.
413. Id. at 1499.
414. Cf Ellen S. Zimiles, Do Halper And Austin Put Civil Forfeiture In Double Jeop-
ardy? 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 189, 197 (1994) ("Such holdings [18755 N. Bay Rd. and Mil-
lan] demonstrate appreciation by the courts of Congress' intent to give the government
an arsenal of weapons to combat certain crimes.").
415. The Kurth Ranch decision postdated the Eleventh Circuit decision and consti-
tutes an arguable overruling of both Millan and 18755 N. Bay. Rd. But see United States
v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting that view).
416. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d at 1499.
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separate criminal and civil proceedings. 417 By way of example, if
the government proceeds with the civil forfeiture action after
the criminal conviction, the government has, by facilitating the
possibility of a swift forfeiture summary judgment, gained an
advantage. If, however, the government pursues the forfeiture
after an acquittal, it has also advantageously given itself a sec-
ond chance to punish the accused. Also, putting the forfeiture
first enables the government to use the criminal prosecution as
Damoclean sword to prod claimants into relinquishing their
property.418 What the Halper decision in conjunction with Austin
accomplished, however, was the recasting of such advantageous
governmental positioning as not a mere euphemistic "strategy,"
but as an outright "abuse," one which "heightens rather than di-
minishes the concern that the government is forcing an individ-
ual to 'run the gauntlet' more than once."419
Although in Ursery, the Sixth Circuit reached the right bot-
tom-line conclusion that the civil forfeiture proceeding and the
criminal prosecution before it were separate, the route to that
distinction is just as tortured as the ones in Millan and 18755
N. Bay Rd. In the course of approving the "Second and Eleventh
Circuit's efforts to consider the parallel proceedings as one pros-
ecution,"420 the Ursery court, in effect, published a recipe for the
government to follow in order to circumvent the double jeopardy
rule.
According to the Ursery recipe, the government should at
least try to mimic the Millan posture by using one affidavit to
get the same judge to issue warrants for the civil seizures and
criminal arrests on the same day.42 1 Also, as the Ursery court
saw it, the government should make sure that the individual is
aware of the criminal charges. 422 Further, the government
417. See generally United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 .3d 1211, 1216-
17 (9th Cir. 1994) and discussion infra Part N.
418. See Cheh, supra note 9, at 3 (The property owner "faces pressure-and the
greater the value of the property, the greater the pressure-to sacrifice the property in
return for a 'deal' with prosecutors to avoid criminal charges") (footnotes omitted).
419. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Green v. United States,
355 US. 184, 190 (1957)). See also United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470,
1488 (10th Cin 1996) (-"ne practice of instituting multiple proceedings against a single
defendant, which the government benignly terms a 'coordinated law-enforcement effort,'
has as much or more capacity to harass and exhaust the defendant than does a post hoc
decision to retry him.").
420. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
421. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Ursery, 59 F.3d at
574 (quoting Millan with approval).
422. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20. See also Ursery, 59 F.3d at 574-75 (quoting Millan with
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should actually incorporate the criminal indictment into the civil
complaint and in the event of a forfeiture stipulation, should
make sure that "it involves not only the seized properties of the
civil suit, but also properties named in the indictment."42 In ad-
dition to the Millan ingredients, the court in Ursery sprinkled in
a few of its own by suggesting that parallel proceedings will be
more amenable to treatment as single and coordinated where
the government prosecutors communicate with the government
attorneys handling the civil forfeiture action.424 In sum, such a
strategy, best encapsulated by the buzz words of "simultaneity,
incorporation and communication," became after Ursery a new
manipulative prosecutorial modus operandi, which could enable
the government to have a second bite when it finds the first to
be unsavory.
In Ursery, the government, trying to defend itself with what
the Eleventh Circuit stressed as a deciding factor, argued that it
was not abusing the process by seeking a second punishment
out of dissatisfaction with the first. The Sixth Circuit, however,
did more than impliedly condone what is, in truth, a form of
governmental abuse, but even handed the government the win-
ning formula for abusing the accused without running awry of
the Constitution.
In creating a forfeiture myth of non-separation out of the
ashes of the old myths, the Second, Eleventh and Sixth Circuits
hatched a harpy to menace not only the accused, but the district
courts under their aegis. 425 The effect of these decisions was to
force such federal trial courts to blindly acquiesce in the fictive
welding together of two separate proceedings, and in that pro-
cess ignore the separate docket numbers and the separate dispo-
sitions. Also, adhering to the new myths had to have been espe-
cially unsettling in light of the inconsistency between that
approach and the Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions.426
approval).
423. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20. See also Ursery, 59 F.3d at 574 (quoting Millan with ap-
proval). In United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir 1996), although the Eighth
Circuit said that [a] single, coordinated prosecution ... does not require that the govern-
ment provide cross-references between the indictment and the civil complaint.. .," it in-
deed considered the fact that "the affidavit attached to the civil forfeiture complaint [at
issue] made reference to the incidents for which [the claimant] was indicted."
424. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575.
425. See, eg., United States v. 13143 S.W. 15th Lane, 872 F. Supp. 968, 972 (S.D.
Fla. 1994) (despite the logic of the Ninth Circuit in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the court
felt bound by the Eleventh Circuit's decision).
426. See generally United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1487 (10th Cir.
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As discussed above, in Halper, there were unquestionably
two parallel criminal and civil suits. After the defendant was
sentenced to prison and fined in the criminal action, the district
court entered summary judgment in the government's favor in
the civil case.427 There, of course, should be no doubt that the
Halper Court viewed the criminal and civil cases as separate. In
describing what the government conceded, the Halper Court em-
phasized that "Halper already has been punished as a result of
his prior criminal proceeding," and "that the instant proceeding
and the prior proceeding concern the same conduct."428 Further,
when the Halper Court delineated the choices left open to the
government, the Court characterized the parallel civil and crimi-
nal actions before it as falling squarely into the separate-and
not single-configuration. That is, the case before it was the one
in which the government "impose[d] a criminal penalty upon [a
defendant] . .. and then . . . [brought] a separate civil action
based on the same conduct."429 In fact, the reason the Court re-
manded the case was because it epitomized that separate pro-
ceedings' posture, the one which obligated the government to ac-
count for its actual costs arising from the wrongful conduct.
It should be somewhat significant that of the three initial
federal appellate courts to address the "single coordinated prose-
cution" issue, only the Sixth Circuit had the benefit of the Kurth
Ranch decision.430 The Sixth Circuit, in fact, delved into Kurth
Ranch and said that Kurth Ranch justified its own conclusion
that the "civil forfeiture proceeding and the criminal prosecution
[in the case before it] were two separate proceedings for pur-
poses of double jeopardy."4 1 Although the Kurth Ranch decision
comported with what the Ursery Court actually decided, it was
diametrically opposed to the Ursery court's rejection of a per se
separate proceedings' approach.432 In fact, if we look at it with
1996); McClain, supra note 119, at 960-63 (discussing the Second and Eleventh Circuits'
contravention of controlling precedent).
427. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 438 (1989).
428. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
429. Id- at 451 (emphasis added).
430. But see Ursery, 59 F.3d at 578 (Milburn, J., dissenting) (asserting that Kurth
Ranch would not necessarily change the results in Millan and 18755 N. Bay Rd.). Ac-
cord United States v. Smith, 75 F3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1996).
431. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 576 n.6.
432. See generally McClain, supra note 119, at 960-63 (discussing how "viewing civil
and criminal proceedings as a single proceeding" does not comport with Kurth Ranch).
McClain also suggests that '[s]ection 881 itself implies that civil forfeiture is indepen-
dent of criminal prosecution by providing that the 'filing of an indictment or information
alleging a (criminal) violation.. . related to a civil forfeiture proceeding... shall, upon
motion ... stay the civil forfeiture proceeding.'" Id. at 959 (quoting 21 US.C. § 881(i)
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real honesty, we should say that Kurth Ranch overruled Ursery,
Millan and 18755 N. Bay Rd.433
As discussed above, in Kurth Ranch, the Kurths pleaded
guilty to the drug charges and had sentences imposed. After
that, in a separate proceeding, the state revenue department
sought to collect the tax imposed on the possession and storage
of the drugs.434 The Supreme Court made it crystal clear that it
viewed this parallel civil proceeding as separate from the crimi-
nal case. Also, there is dictum in Kurth Ranch in which the
Court explained that the raid on the family farm "gave rise to
four separate legal proceedings" and that the forfeiture suit was
one such separate proceeding.435
Even more broadly, the Kurth Ranch Court clarified that
"Montana no doubt could collect its tax on the possession of ma-
rijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished the tax-
payer for the same offenses, or, indeed, if it assessed the tax in
the same proceeding that resulted 'in his conviction."436 What
that language indicates is that the Court equated the separate-
ness of the cases with the fact that the penalties issue
separately.
Definitely, the procedural postures in Millan and 18755 N.
Bay Rd. fit the Kurth Ranch Court's conception of what
amounts to separation. Although in Millan the same judge is-
sued warrants for the civil seizures and criminal arrests on the
same day, the actions were filed separately with their own
docket numbers and each moved along on its own time track.'37
In January of 1993, the Millan defendants entered into a stipu-
lation which resulted in a forfeiture of certain properties and a
dismissal of the civil suit.38 The criminal trial, however, was to
commence more than a month after the disposition of the civil
action.43 9 As such, in Millan there surely was not what Kurth
Ranch appears to require-that the civil penalty be imposed in
the same proceeding that results in the conviction.
In 18755 N. Bay Rd., the civil and criminal suits were exag-
geratedly asunder. In that case, the criminal proceeding was
over and done when the government used the conviction to sum-
(1994)).
433. But see Ursery, 59 F.3d at 578 (Milburn, J., dissenting).
434. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 773.
435. Id. at 771-72.
436. Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
437. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
438. Id. at 18.
439. Id. at 19 ("On February 23, 1993, before the start of the criminal trial, the Bot-
tones filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. .).
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marily dispose of the civil forfeiture suit.44° Again, such a proce-
dural posture, consisting of in tandem proceedings, is not the si-
multaneous disposition that Kurth Ranch requires.
Not only, however, did the myth of non-separation contra-
vene Halper and Kurth Ranch and demand what the dissent in
Ursery proclaimed was an "inevitabl[y] difficult[] ... case-by-
case comparison," 441 but it was also inimical to the core of
double jeopardy protection-namely, the safeguarding of the
defendant's right to finality.442 Such an ad hoc approach can
force a defendant, who has already been hit with one penalty at
the end of one ordeal, to endure still another ordeal and then
consequently another punishment.
B. The Myth of Non-Punishment
The Fifth Circuit created a second myth that not all civil
forfeiture is punitive.44
1. The Fifth Circuit Approach: United States v. Tilley. In
Tilley, there was a complaint for civil forfeiture in rem against
certain personal and real property pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(6) and 881(a)(7). 444 Later, the government charged the
defendants with various drug crimes. Because four of the de-
fendants had entered into a stipulated forfeiture agreement with
the United States, the district court entered a final judgment of
440. United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1993).
441. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 577.
442. See generally supra Part I.A.
443. The Third and Sixth and Seventh Circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion in United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573
(1994), that forfeiture of drug proceeds under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) is not punishment.
United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th Ci. 1995); Smith v. United States, 76 F3d 879 (7th
Ci. 1996).
In Salinas, Judge Welford's concurrence suggested that the decision might present
some practical problems in light of the Courts prior Ursery decision:
In [Ursery] . .. we held that the forfeiture of property used to facilitate the
drug trade under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) was punishment within the meaning of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, if the government had sought forfei-
ture of Salinas' automobile on the grounds that he used the car to carry nar-
cotics from Texas to Michigan, Ursery might have barred this criminal prosecu-
tion. Thus, after Ursery and our decision today, double jeopardy protection will
often depend on which theory the government utilizes to justify the civil
forfeiture.
Salinas, 65 F.3d at 554.
444. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297.
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forfeiture with respect to the personal property.45 The district
court, however, stayed the forfeiture proceedings with respect to
two homes pending the outcome of the criminal trial."6 Subse-
quently, the district court denied the defendants' motion to dis-
miss the indictment on the basis of double jeopardy and the de-
fendants appealed."7
The Fifth Circuit saw the case as hinging almost entirely
upon whether the prior civil forfeiture proceeding imposed pun-
ishment. After explaining that the Halper method "focuses on
the relationship between the amount of the civil sanction and
the amount required to serve the remedial purpose of reimburs-
ing the costs incurred by the government and society as a result
of the wrongful conduct," the court attempted to contrast the
proceeds forfeiture in the case before it from the fine imposed in
Halper.44 First, the Tilley court said that the forfeiture at issue
was "not so excessive as to render the relationship between the
amount of the forfeiture and the resulting costs to the govern-
ment and society irrational."" 9 Second, the court stressed that
the Halper case did not involve crime proceeds.4 0
In treating drug proceeds forfeiture as unique, the Fifth
Circuit found sources approximating the revenue from illegal
drug sales at $80 to $100 billion per year.41 The costs to the
government and society, however, were about $60 to $120 billion
per year.452 From there, the court concluded that the proceeds
and costs on a national level were not "'overwhelmingly dispro-
portionate.' "43 After reviewing the national statistics, the court
simply opined that there was also a "rough proportionality" be-
tween the sanction and the governmental and societal costs in
the actual case before it. 45 In fact, the court expressed the view
that a forfeiture of even all of the drug sales proceeds would not
be excessive.455
Further, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Austin deci-
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. The district court ruled before the Supreme Court decided Austin. Id. at
297 n.3.
448. Id. at 298.
449. Id. at 299.
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sion did not change its analysis. 5 6 In fact, the Tilley court read
Austin quite narrowly. According to the court, the Austin reason-
ing applied just to forfeitures of conveyances and real estate,
which, as the court elaborated, are basically different:
[Such forfeitures] have no correlation to, or proportionality with, the
costs incurred by the government and society because of the large and
unpredictable variances in the values of real estate and conveyances in
comparison to the harm inflicted upon government and society by the
criminal act. Unlike the real estate forfeiture statute that can result in
the confiscation of the most modest mobile home or the stateliest man-
sion, the forfeiture of drug proceeds will always be directly proportional
to the amount of drugs sold.47
As such, the Fifth Circuit simply lifted the forfeiture of drug
proceeds out of the Austin terrain.
Finally, the Tilley court theorized that the forfeiture of drug
proceeds can never be punishment. 5  In so doing, the court re-
ferred to Blackstone's concept of "'property . . [as] a right de-
rived from society which one lost [through forfeiture] by violat-
ing society's laws"59 But, according to the court, when property
comes from unlawful activities, the owner loses nothing to which
he ever had an entitlement.40 The court thus basically likened
drug proceeds' forfeiture "to the seizure of proceeds from the
robbery of a federal bank ...."41 Consequently, because the
court concluded that the forfeiture of illegal proceeds "places the
party in the lawfully protected financial status quo that he en-
joyed prior to launching his illegal scheme," the provision is not
punitive.42
456. Id. at 299-300.
457. Id. at 300.
458. Id.
459. Id. (citing 4 WxmuL BLAcKsToNE, ComtENTAsi Es *382). See also Salinas, 65
F.3d at 554 (In adopting the Tley view, the court reasoned that drug proceeds' forfei-
ture is different because "one never acquires a property right to proceeds, which include
not only cash but also property secured with the proceeds of illegal activity."). Cf United
States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir 1994) (In a civil RICO forfeiture where
claimant had been convicted on criminal racketeering charges, the court said that pro-
ceeds forfeiture "cannot be considered punishment.... as it simply parts the owner from
the fruits of the criminal activity."); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 .3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(In a civil SEC action to force a convicted defendant to disgorge profits from illegal trad-
ing, the court deemed it to not be punishment because it "merely places that party in
the lawfully protected financial status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal
scheme.").
460. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
461. Id.
462. Id. In United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth
Circuit indicated that the only determinative issue is whether the civil forfeiture at is-
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2. The Myth of Non-Punishment. First, the Tilley decision
was internally repugnant. 463 While the Fifth Circuit purported
to read Halper as requiring an ad hoc examination of "the sanc-
tion 'as applied in the individual case'" to determine whether it
"'serve[s] the goals of punishment,'"464 the court actually dealt
with the punishment issue in quite a non-individual way.
In Halper, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that
because the defendant's crimes netted him $585 in excess pay-
ments from the government and the government's costs with re-
spect to that defendant were about $16,000, the additional pen-
alty of $130,000 could indeed be punitive.465 The Tilley court,
however, was not wholly focused on the individual factors, but
more on the ostensibly sensationalist statistics that reveal that
"illegal drug sales produce approximately $80 to $100 billion per
year while exacting $60 to $120 billion per year in costs to the
government."466 From this "national" vantage point, the court
shifted somewhat precipitously to its more pin-pointed state-
ment that there exists "a rough proportionality between the
$650,000 sanction and the resulting governmental and societal
costs" in the case sub judice.467
sue amounts to punishment. In Arreola-Ramos, the time frame for contesting the forfei-
ture had expired and Arreola had neither entered an appearance nor contested the for-
feiture. Consequently, title to the funds vested in the government. About six weeks later,
Arreola sought dismissal of the indictment against him on the basis of double jeopardy.
The district court denied the motion and in so doing, reasoned that because Arreola was
not a party to the civil forfeiture, such proceedings could not place him in jeopardy. See
also infra text accompanying note 561. In its affirmance, however, the Fifth Circuit sug-
gested that the real and perhaps only focal point is the issue of punishment:
[I]f the pending criminal trial in this case were to result in a conviction, Arre-
ola would be subject[] to punishment. And it follows that if the prior civil for-
feiture proceeding, which was predicated on the same drug trafficking offenses
as charged in the indictment, constituted a 'punishment,' the Double Jeopardy
Clause would bar the pending criminal trial.
Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d at 192.
463. The Fifth Circuit also apparently contradicted its own precedent. In Weed v.
United States, 863 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1989), the very three judges that decided Til-
ley concluded that the forfeiture of proceeds under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) "cannot seriously
be considered anything other than an economic penalty for drug trafficking."
464. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 298. In United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345, 348-49 (5th Cir.
1995), the Fifth Circuit recognized that "[the Austin Court specifically rejected a case-
by-case approach to the punishment determination for § 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7)" and dis-
tinguished Tilley, which dealt with § 881(a)(6) "to which the logic of Austin does not
apply"
465. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 439 (1989).
466. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 299.
467. Id.
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In a sense, the Tilley court's approach was reminiscent of
the sort of study that might comprise some groundwork for the
enactment of a statutory amount or formula for forfeiture of the
proceeds from drug sales which would automatically pass a
Halper proportionality test. The Tilley approach did not, how-
ever, really conform to the requisites of the individualized as-
sessment that the Halper Court ordered when it remanded the
Halper case for the determination of the government's actual
costs and for an application of the rational relation test to the
actual circumstances before it.
Internal repugnancy, however, was not the only defect in
the Tilley opinion. Another glitch was the opinion's disharmony
with Austin.468 In Austin, the Supreme Court determined that
§ 881 conveyances and real estate forfeitures are, by their very
nature, punitive.49 The Tilley court's attempt to except the for-
feiture of drug proceeds from the Austin reasoning failed for nu-
merous reasons, the most rudimentary one, of course, being the
actual breadth of the analysis in Austin. That is, the Austin rea-
sons conformed quite comfortably to the § 881(a)(6) forfeiture at
issue in Tilley.470
As discussed above, the Austin Court came to the punitive
nature of the specific forfeiture provisions at issue after review-
ing forfeiture history.471 Through this backward glance at the
forfeitures existing in England at the time of the ratification of
the Eighth Amendment, the Court extracted a common denomi-
nator-namely, their punitive character. Also, after reviewing
early American statutory forfeiture, the Austin Court recognized
that such proceedings basically "follow the same pattern"-a de-
cidedly punitive one.472
The Court in Austin formulated its holding through the
guilty property fiction, which similarly rests upon a punitive
concept that resides in all types of forfeiture. In addition, the
468. See United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion
amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom.,
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). See also dis-
cussion infra Part IVB; Kessler, supra note 9, at 219 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's re-
jection of Tilley); McClain, supra note 119, at 976-79 (arguing that § 881(a)(6) forfeiture
is punishment after Austin). In Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1010 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) and Ursery, however, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to view
Austin quite narrowly-as a decision dealing solely with the excessive fines' clause.
469. See generally discussion infra Part II.B.1.2.
470. See McClain, supra note 119, at 977.
471. See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text.
472. Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602, 614-15 (1993).
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Austin Court's summation "that forfeiture generally and statu-
tory in rem forfeiture in particular... have been understood, at
least in part, as punishment" 473 endowed the decision with suffi-
cient girth to immure all forfeiture mechanisms. As such, the
Austin train of thought did not legitimately provide a basis for
what the Tilley court did-namely, except drug proceeds forfei-
ture from the genre of punitive provisions.
The Austin Court also focused on the specific provisions,
§ 881(a)(4) and §881(a)(7), and "f[ound] nothing in [them] or
their legislative history to contradict the historical understand-
ing of forfeiture as punishment."474 Contrary to the Tiley court's
opinion, therefore, a comparable analysis performed on the drug
proceeds forfeiture provision in § 881(a)(6) should arrive at the
same conclusion as did the Austin Court. The Austin Court,
stressing that § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) have express innocent
owner defenses, said that they "serve to focus the provisions on
the culpability of the owner in a way that makes them look
more like punishment, not less."475 Because § 881(a)(6) at issue
in Tilley also contains an innocent owner defense, such forfei-
ture is and should be deemed just as punitive.476
The Congressional intent behind § 881(a)(6) further under-
mines the Tilley decision. Specifically, Congress believed that
the "penal nature of forfeiture statutes" and the "substantial
connection between the property and the underlying activity"
warranted the 1978 § 881(a)(6) amendment.477 In fact, the Aus-
tin Court pointed to that exact Congressional note in analyzing
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), which implicitly link these provisions to
their also "punitive" § 881(a)(6).478 Of course, what this indicates
is that Congress, as the Austin Court saw it, intended
§ 881(a)(6) to be something not sui generis, but instead more of
a prototype of punitive forfeiture.479
473. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
474. Id. at 619.
475. Id. See also Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996) (quoting Austin,
509 U.S. at 620 (1993) (statutory innocent owner defense "is additional evidence that the
statute itself is 'punitive' in motive.")).
476. See 21 US.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994) ("[Nlo property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission es-
tablished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner."). See also United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470,
1486 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221
(9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
477. See McClain, supra note 119, at 977.
478. Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602, 620-21 (1993).




Also, the Tilley court's approach can not really square with
the very reason the Austin Court departed from the Halper re-
quirement of a "particularized assessment" approach. 480 The
Austin Court noted that § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) forfeitures were
punitive on their face because of the "dramatic variations in the
value of [the forfeitable] property."48 Contrary to the Tilley view,
the same could be said of drug proceeds forfeiture.482
Further, in rejecting the ad hoc Halper method, the Austin
Court suggested that even when there exists an albeit "coinci-
dental" proportionality between the government's costs and the
amount of the sanction, the forfeiture is nevertheless punitive.4 3
The Austin Court attributed this to the historical notion that
forfeiture serves "not simply remedial goals but also those of
punishment and deterrence."484 Such reasoning congeals with
the concept that the United States Supreme Court espoused in
United States v. Ward, that "the 'forfeiture' of property... [is] a
penalty that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sus-
tained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law."485 Conse-
quently, even if the Tilley court were correct that drug proceeds
have a uniquely proportional relationship between the proceeds
amount and the governmental costs, that supposed aspect would
not transform such forfeiture into something non-punitive.
Under a fair reading of Austin, forfeiture is always a penalty be-
cause its very proclivity is to lack that requisite proportionality.
The Tilley court's view that forfeiture "will always be di-
rectly proportional to the amount of drugs sold,"48 was skewed
for still more reasons. The plain language of § 881(a)(6) permits
forfeiture of "things of value" not just "furnished," but "intended
to be furnished... in exchange for a controlled substance" and
of "moneys, negotiable instruments and securities," not just
"used" but "intended to be used to facilitate any violation of [the]
Drug Proceeds are also forfeitable under the criminal forfeiture statute. 21
U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). If the forfeiture of drug proceeds under 881(a)(6) were held
not to be punishment, and if the civil and criminal labels are indeed not dis-
positive of the double jeopardy issue, there would be no principled way to avoid
applying Tilley's reasoning to 853(a)(1).
480. Halper, 490 US. at 448.
481. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
482. See McClain, supra note 119, at 977-78 (asserting that "the amount of proceeds
forfeited via § 881(a)(6) varies dramatically with and has no rational relation to the
amount of the government's actual costs.").
483. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n.14.
484. Id.
485. 448 US. 242, 254 (1980).
486. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
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subchapter."487 Such properties, statutorily entitled as "in-
tended," are, at best, embryonically tainted. They have not yet
emerged as viable proceeds and thus, are not necessarily "di-
rectly proportional to the amount of drugs sold." 8
In its discussion, the Tilley court repeated the Blackstonian
bromide that "'property was a right derived from society which
one lost [through forfeiture] by violating society's laws! "489 From
there, the court extrapolated that with respect to drug proceeds
forfeiture, "the forfeiting party loses nothing to which the law
ever entitled him 490 Here too the very language of § 881(a)(6)
defuses what has become a Blackstone platitude. If the conduct
that casts property as non-property is a violation of society's
laws, then that pivotal event has not occurred with respect to
the § 881(a)(6) property categorized as "intended." Also, if we
abide by the Tilley premise that loss of something that the law
never entitled the owner to possess is not punitive, then the loss
of the "intended" something to which the owner is still techni-
cally entitled is deterrent, retributive and thus, by very defini-
tion-punitive.
Further, the Tilley court's exemption of drug proceeds forfei-
ture could not honestly survive the Kurth Ranch decision. The
Tilley court explained that loss of the proceeds was not punitive
because the possessor "never invested honest labor or other law-
fully derived property to obtain the subsequently forfeited pro-
ceeds."491 The court elaborated that such an owner "ha[d] no rea-
sonable expectation that the law will protect, condone or even
allow, [the] continued possession of such proceeds because they
have their very genesis in illegal activity."492
Much of that Tilley language could likewise encompass the
drug tax at issue in Kurth Ranch. After all, Montana imposed a
civil penalty on the "possession and storage" of items, which also
487. 21 US.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994) (emphasis added). See also $405,089.23 U.S. Cur-
rency, 33 F.3d at 1221 and discussion infra Part IV.B. See also McClain, supra note 119,
at 978-80.
488. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added). Also, as the concurrence in the Sixth
Circuit decision in Salinas suggests, having special treatment for § 881(a)(6) forfeiture
means that "double jeopardy protection will often depend on which theory the govern-
ment utilizes to justify the civil forfeiture." 65 F.3d at 554. Thus, characterizing the
property as "drug proceeds" instead of as 'the car used to carry narcotics" will enable the
government to avoid the double jeopardy bar. Id
489. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300 (quoting 1 WiLLiM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299).
But see McClain, supra note 119, at 980-82 (arguing that it is "simply not true that drug
offenders have no property rights in illegally obtained proceeds.").





had their "genesis" in illegality and were also not the fruit of
"honest labor."493 As such, in Kurth Ranch, the punitive drug tax
was directly tied to the possession of property to which the
owner had no legal entitlement to possess. Also inherent in the
Kurth Ranch Court's qualification that the unlawfulness of an
activity does not automatically prevent its taxation as prop-
erty4 94 is an awareness that illegality is not always a magic sta-
tus that instantly transforms the res blanketly into non-
property.495
While the Tilley. court saw the nexus between the property
and the illegality as a factor that made such forfeiture non-puni-
tive, the Kurth Ranch Court treated that same factor as some-
thing that contrarily renders the provision more punitive. The
Court in Kurth Ranch, in fact, stressed that the "so-called tax is
conditioned on the commission of a crime" and that that was the
very "unusual feature[]" which set the tax apart and divulged its
"penal and prohibitory intent."4 96 The Court even articulated
that a tax "imposed on criminals and no others" and on the
"possession" of property "that the taxpayer never lawfully pos-
sessed has an unmistakable punitive character."497 Such reason-
ing should have put the kibosh on the Tilley theory that it is the
snug connection between the civil penalty and the unlawful ac-
tivity that makes it unmistakably non-punitive.
While the Fifth Circuit's myth of non-punitive forfeiture
could not coexist with Austin and collided with the Supreme
Court's subsequent reasoning in Kurth Ranch, it also effectually
thwarted crucial policies behind the double jeopardy doctrine. In
basing its decision on the supposed liaison between the property
and the criminal offense, the court in Tilley put its imprimatur
on the prosecutorial strategy of going after the same defendant
in separate but staggered proceedings predicated on the same
criminal offense. That is, under the aegis of Tilley and in the
guise, of a non-punitive forfeiture exemption, the government
could unduly oppress an accused by making him or her leap
through multiple blazing hoops. 498
493. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. 767, 773 (1994)
(describing Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act).
494. Id. at 778.
495. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has recognized this. See Wood v. United States, 863
F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging concession "that the gains from illegal ac-
tivities are just as taxable as gains from legal activities" and rejecting argument that
the IRS could not tax drug proceeds that were already forfeited to the government).
496. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781 (emphasis added).
497. Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
498. See discussion of policies behind the Double Jeopardy Clause, supra Part IA
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IV. A POTENTIAL MYTHLESS FORFEITURE
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, joined by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, came closest to accepting a mythless civil in rem forfeiture
with double jeopardy protection. As explored below, true
mythlessness entails the rejection of the government's efforts to
portray the civil forfeiture and criminal conviction as different
offenses.
A. The Always Separate and Always Punitive Approach
1. The Ninth Circuit Decision in United States v.
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency. In $405,089.23 US. Currency, the
government accused Charles Arlt, James Wren and others of
conducting a large-scale methamphetamine manufacturing oper-
ation.49 Apparently, through a series of front operations, the in-
dividual defendants tried to make it seem as if they were in-
volved in a legitimate gold mining enterprise.
The government instituted a civil forfeiture action five days
after the grand jury issued a superseding indictment in the par-
allel criminal case. 00 The forfeiture complaint described several
thousand dollars worth of property, all of which the government
argued were connected to the offenses that were the subject of
the criminal case.50 ' Specifically, the government claimed that
the property should be forfeited as proceeds of illegal narcotics
transactions and as property "involved in" money laundering.0 2
Arlt, Wren and one of the "front corporations" filed claims to the
res. 503 Then, after a stipulation between the parties, the district
court stayed the civil forfeiture action pending completion of the
parallel criminal case.504
Over eight months after Arlt, Wren and their codefendants
were convicted of various counts of conspiracy and money laun-
dering in the criminal case, the government filed a motion for
499. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opin-
ion amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom.,
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
500. Id.
501. Id. The complaint listed the following- $405,089.23 in a Security Pacific Bank
account; $8,929.93 in three Bank of America accounts; $123,000 in cash and 138 silver
bars seized at Mayhill Bail Bonds; one Bell 47 G-2 helicopter; one shrimp boat; a Piper 6
Cherokee airplane; and eleven automobiles and one boat purchased at an auction. Id.
502. Id. The government was relying on 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (1994) respectively.





summary judgment in the forfeiture action. 5°5 In support of the
motion, the government submitted the criminal conviction, a
declaration of an I.R.S. Special Agent and various pieces of doc-
umentary evidence.50 6 The government, asserting that their es-
tablishment of probable cause shifted the burden of proof to the
claimants, argued that the claimants failed to demonstrate that
the property was not subject to forfeiture.507
The district court granted the government's motion and or-
dered that the entire res be forfeited to the United States.508 In
an order which essentially adopted the government's proposed
statement of uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law, the
district court determined that "[t]he convictions of Arlt, Wren
and Hill of conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture of
methamphetamine, conspiracy to launder monetary instru-
ments, and money laundering are sufficient for probable cause
by themselves."50 9 The court also noted, among other things, that
"$123,000 is an extremely large amount of cash, that Arlt, Wren
and Hill had signature authority over several of the bank ac-
counts, and that the vehicles were purchased with cash and
placed in the name of Arlt's business ... ,510 Further, the dis-
trict court concluded that the government had established prob-
able cause under both the "narcotics proceeds" and "money laun-
dering" theories.511
After Arlt, Wren and the front company, Payback Mines,
appealed pro se, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the govern-
ment had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by obtaining the
criminal convictions and then pursuing the forfeiture action.512
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit began with what it isolated as
"[t]he most basic element of the Double Jeopardy Clause"--
namely, its protection "against efforts to impose punishment for
the same offense in two or more separate proceedings."513 The
Ninth Circuit even harked back to the core of such Fifth
Amendment protection, "'that an accused shall not have to mar-
shal the resources and energies necessary for his defense more






510. Id. at 1215.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 1219.
513. Id. at 1215.
514. Id. (quoting Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959)).
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First, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of "whether the
civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution
constituted separate 'proceedings.'".515 In answering this question
affirmatively, the Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the
Second and Eleventh Circuits, which in its view "contradict[]
controlling Supreme Court precedent as well as common
sense"5 16 and elaborated:
We fail to see how two separate actions, one civil and one criminal, insti-
tuted at different times, tried at different times before different
factfinders, presided over by different judges, and resolved by separate
judgments, constitute the same 'proceeding.' In ordinary legal parlance,
such actions are often characterized as 'parallel proceedings,' but not as
the 'same proceeding.' 
17
The Ninth Circuit explained that the government could
have included the forfeiture count in the same indictment as the
other criminal counts and then tried all such counts in one pro-
ceeding.518 If this had been the government's modus operandi,
the forfeiture case and the criminal prosecution would have
comprised the "same proceeding."51 9
The government, however, chose to avail itself of two "sepa-
rate parallel proceedings," which gave it a distinct advantage. 520
Specifically, success in the criminal case would almost automati-
cally ensure a forfeiture summary judgment in the government's
favor. That is, the conviction and the existence of probable cause
at the time the government instituted the forfeiture action
would facilitate a summary civil victory.52' If, however, the gov-
ernment lost the criminal case, it could still pursue forfeiture by
relying on the more lenient standards in civil proceedings. The
Ninth Circuit expressed its view that "such a coordinated, ma-
nipulative prosecution strategy heightens, rather than dimin-
ishes, the concern that the government is forcing an individual
to 'run the gauntlet' more than once."522
The court analogized the separate parallel actions before it
515. Id. at 1216.
516. Id.
517. Id. The Ninth Circuit has also rejected the argument that "[c]lose coordination
between state and federal authorities ...does not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause." United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 1995).
518. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216-17.
519. Id. Accord United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1487-88 (10th
Cir. 1996).
520. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217.
521. Id.
522. Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 US. 184, 190 (1957)).
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to the situation in Jeffers v. United States,523 in which the Court
found that the double jeopardy clause would apply when the
government initiated parallel actions against the same defend-
ant based on the same conduct by bringing two separate indict-
ments on the same day.524 The Ninth Circuit, finding that the
reasoning in Jeffers would bear on the case before it,525 said that
it could "discern no reason why two proceedings should be
deemed one when one of the proceedings involves a criminal
prosecution and the other a civil forfeiture action." 26
In dealing with the second issue of whether the forfeiture
amounted to punishment, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Halper
decision and its language that congressional labels such as
"civil" and "criminal," are not the determinative factors.5 27 As
the Ninth Circuit reiterated, under Halper, "'a civil sanction
that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to under-
stand the term.' "52
Noting its earlier decision in United States v. McCaslin 29 in
which it declined to apply Halper to a civil forfeiture action, the
Ninth Circuit conceded that the Supreme Court really obliter-
ated that analysis by subsequently concluding in Austin that
"Congress understood ... [certain forfeiture] . . . provisions as
serving to deter and to punish ... ."53o In the Ninth Circuit's
view, although Austin involved the Eighth Amendment's Exces-
523. 432 US. 137 (1977).
524. Id. at 140. One indictment charged Jeffers with a conspiracy to distribute her-
oin and cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Id. The other charged him with
conducting a continuing criminal enterprise to violate 21 US.C. § 848. Id. at 141. When
Jeffers opposed the government's motion to join the offenses for trial, the district court
disallowed the joinder. Id. at 142-43.
After the first jury convicted Jeffers of conspiracy, the defendant sought dismissal of
the continuing criminal enterprise case on the basis of double jeopardy. Id. at 143. The
district court, determining that the two cases involved separate offenses, denied Jeffers'
motion and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 144-46. Although the Supreme Court
also affirmed, it explicitly rejected the double jeopardy analysis below. Id. at 151. The
Jeffers Court had determined that the conspiracy to distribute offense was a lesser in-
cluded offense of the continuing criminal enterprise charge and thus, constituted the
"same offense" under the Blockburger test. Id. at 147-58. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
525. In Jeffers, however, the plurality of four justices determined that because Jef-
fers had opposed the government's motion for joinder, he had waived an objection to the
two separate proceedings. 432 U.S. at 152.
526. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1218.
527. Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)).
528. Id. at 1219 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
529. 959 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1992).
530. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219.
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sive Fines Clause, it had to actually have "resolve[d] the 'pun-
ishment' issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause as well....f531
In addition, the Ninth Circuit addressed what appeared to
be the government's position that courts must decide "in each
case whether the particular forfeiture is so excessive in relation
to any remedial goal that it must be denominated as 'punish-
ment." 532 Interpreting the Austin decision as an explicit refusal
to adopt such an ad hoc method, the Ninth Circuit felt obliged
instead to view the forfeiture statute as a whole and to track
the principles that the Austin Court worked into the' punish-
ment analysis.
The Ninth Circuit essentially framed the discussion with
the "strong presumption that any forfeiture statute does not
serve solely a remedial purpose."533 Also, because such statutes
hinge on the property owner's culpability and exempt the inno-
cent, they aim to deter and punish the guilty. Further, Congress'
connection of forfeiture to the commission of specific offenses
suggests that a reasonable construction is that forfeiture, at
least in part, serves to deter and punish. Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's employment of the Austin considerations warranted a con-
clusion that the statutes before it "operate[d] at least in part to
punish and deter."534
Further, the Ninth Circuit explained why it was rejecting
the position that the government had advanced, that because
"the forfeiture statutes involved are limited to the forfeiture of
illegal proceeds, . . . they therefore do not impose 'punish-
ment.' "535 The Ninth Circuit, opining that "the government [had]
misrepresent[ed] the sweep of the forfeiture statutes," deter-
mined that the enactments were not limited to the proceeds of
illegal activity.536 As the Ninth Circuit saw it, the narcotics pro-
ceeds forfeiture statute did not just refer to "money that has
been furnished in exchange for drugs," but applied to "nearly
any money that is involved in a narcotics transaction in some
fashion."5 37 In particular, the statute makes forfeitable "money
that someone intends to use to purchase drugs, or even money
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1220.
533. Id. at 1221 (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993)).
534. Id. Accord United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1484-87 (10th
Cir. 1996).
535. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1220.
536. Id. at 1221.
537. Id. See also supra notes 487-91 and accompanying text.
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that someone intends to use to purchase a car or boat in order
to facilitate an illegal narcotics transaction."538
The Ninth Circuit believed that the money laundering stat-
ute was similarly broad because it rendered forfeitable "any
property 'involved in' an illegal money laundering transac-
tion. 53 9 In fact, the government itself had substantiated that in-
terpretation by arguing in the trial court that the forfeitable
property exceeded the money that the defendants had actually
laundered.
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit actually outlined the prac-
tical ramifications which would force the government to either
include a criminal forfeiture count in the indictment or to pur-
sue only the civil forfeiture action.5 40 The former option would
entail the government's relinquishment of the favorable burdens
it would have in the civil forfeiture proceeding and the latter
would mean giving up the criminal prosecution. The court em-
phasized that such a choice was "entirely reasonable."541
2. The Seventh Circuit Decision in United States v. Torres.
In Torres, Renato Torres and a companion were about to pay
$60,000 for three kilograms of cocaine. 42 It turned out, however,
to be a trap-the sellers were really federal agents.54 The gov-
ernment commenced separate administrative and criminal pro-
ceedings, one seeking forfeiture and the other imprisonment and
a fine.54
Torres pleaded guilty to the drug offenses and received a
prison sentence.54 In the forfeiture proceeding, however, Torres
did not make a claim.546 On appeal, Torres argued that under
the double jeopardy clause, the forfeiture of the money barred
the sentence of imprisonment.5 47
The Seventh Circuit, relying on Austin and Halper, said
that forfeiture and civil fines can be penalties for crime.548 It
538. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1221. See also supra notes 487-91 and
accompanying text.
539. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1221 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)
(1994)).
540. Id. at 1222.
541. Id.




546. Id. at 1464-65.
547. Id. at 1464.
548. Id.
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also said that under Halper and Kurth Ranch, a financial exac-
tion can count as a separate jeopardy.549 In the Seventh Circuit's
view, the Supreme Court trilogy meant that the government
should seek imprisonment, fines and forfeiture in a unitary pro-
ceeding.550 The court, however, recognized that in the in rem for-
feiture proceeding, third persons could have claims to the res
and that the government could not really resolve all such claims
in the criminal proceedings which were lodged against particu-
lar defendants.551 The court thus suggested that the government
should seek in the criminal indictment to forfeit the defendant's
interest, if any, in the property and then clean up the other
claims through the administrative proceedings.
55 2
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit said point blank that
"[c]ivil and criminal proceedings are not only docketed sepa-
rately but tried separately, and under the double jeopardy
clause separate trials are an anathema."553 The court further
speculated that where the forfeiture proceeding ends first, the
accused in the criminal trial can assert the former conviction or
acquittal as a bar.554
The Torres court emphasized that the Constitution does not
prohibit "cumulative punishments imposed at the end of a single
trial."555 The problem, however, was that "[s]eparate administra-
tive and criminal proceedings can lead to two trials, each of
which produces a punishment for the same offense."556 The court
also said that even if the two trials are close in time, they still
present a double jeopardy problem.557 The Seventh Circuit found
support for this in Kurth Ranch, in which the tax proceeding
and the criminal proceeding began and were pending at the
same time.558
Although the Seventh Circuit said that the Torres case
could have triggered the double jeopardy bar, such a challenge
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 1464 n.1.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 1465.
554. Id.
555. Id. The Torres Court, relying on Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), Missouri
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) and Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), elabo-
rated that "the double jeopardy clause does not bar cumulative punishments imposed in
a single proceeding-whether these punishments be the ordinary combination of prison
plus a fine, or consecutive terms in prison, or prison plus a forfeiture." Torres, 28 F.3d at
1464. See also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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was unavailable to Torres because he did not become a party to
the forfeiture action.55 9 Despite Torres' receipt of notice inviting
him to make a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding, he de-
clined to do so.-6° Because the money was forfeited without oppo-
sition, jeopardy simply did not attach. 61
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id. The court stated that " a]s a non-party, Torres was not at risk in the forfei-
ture proceeding, and 'without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach,
and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.'" Id. (quoting
Serfass v. United States, 420 US. 377, 391-92 (1975)).
The Seventh Circuit has followed Torres on numerous occasions and has determined
that an individual's failure to contest the forfeiture in the forfeiture proceedings pre-
cludes the application of double jeopardy principles. See, eg., United States v. Vega, 72
F.3d 507, 514 (7th Cir 1995) (a petition for remission and mitigation does not serve to
contest the forfeiture and is, therefore, insufficient to trigger the Double Jeopardy
Clause); United States v. Ruth, 65 F3d 599, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1995).
Other Circuits have similarly precluded individuals from claiming double jeopardy
protection where they have either failed to contest forfeiture or where arguably jeopardy
did not attach. See, e.g., United States v. McDermott, 64 E3d 1448, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995)
("[T]he mere filing of an administrative claim [is not] sufficient to trigger jeopardy, at
least where that act converts the proceeding to a judicial one with opportunity for a
hearing"); United States v. Washington, 69 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cin 1995) (no double jeop-
ardy claim because "Washington failed to contest the propriety of the seizure judicially
by filing a claim of ownership and posting a bond, or administratively by filing a petition
for remission or mitigation!); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 784
(9th Cir. 1985) (Although "Sanchez made some showing of opposing the civil forfeiture
when, at the time of his arrest, he filled out the Petition for Remission or Mitigation of
Forfeiture and Penalties Incurred form and checked off the appropriate box on the re-
lated Election of Proceedings form[,] ... there was no finality to the civil administrative
forfeiture proceeding" and thus "the subsequent criminal prosecution was not barred.");
United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1995) (The petition for remission or
mitigation is "a preliminary administrative step, which precedes the filing of a civil for-
feiture complaint and formal jeopardy proceedings, [and] does not create jeopardy.");
United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 310 (9th Cir. 1995) (An administrative forfeiture
of unclaimed property does not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause); United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Iun a civil
forfeiture proceeding, [eopardy] attaches no earlier than the date on which the defend-
ant filed an answer to the forfeiture complaint."); United States v. Sykes, 73 F.3d 772,
773-74 (8th Cir. 1996) (defendant was not a party to the completed administrative for-
feitures because he did not contest them; with respect to the pending forfeitures, al-
though he intervened in the proceedings and asserted ownership of the property, the
government's stay of the proceedings prevented the attachment of jeopardy); United
States v. Clark, 67 F3d 1154, 1163 (5th Cir. 1995) (There is no double jeopardy where
property was administratively forfeited prior to sentencing); United States v.
Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhe double jeopardy argument is mer-
itless... [because] the [money] was not seized through a court proceeding, but rather
administratively by the DEA."); United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d
1160, 1167 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[Claimant's] filing of a motion to set aside the default judg-
ment..., some four years after the judgment had been entered" means that he did not
participate in the proceeding and was not placed in jeopardy).
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B. Mythlessness and Mandatory Joinder
The Ninth Circuit decision and the Seventh Circuit dicta
comprise a nidus for a concept of forfeiture without myths to de-
prive such claimants of double jeopardy protection.562
In 405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the parallel civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecu-
tions are always separate and that civil forfeiture is always pu-
nitive.563 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit put itself at odds with
the Second,564 Fifth,565 Sixth566 and Eleventh567 Circuits and ad-
hered to the Supreme Court decisions in Halper, Austin and
Kurth Ranch.
The Ninth Circuit aptly criticized the Second and Eleventh
Circuits' characterization of the parallel civil and criminal cases
as a "single, coordinated prosecution" and said that those courts
have "contradict[ed] controlling Supreme Court precedent."568 As
discussed above, the district court in Halper granted summary
judgment against Halper under the civil False Claims Act after
Halper was convicted, sentenced and fined.569 Implicit in the Su-
preme Court's decision that such a statutory civil penalty, as ap-
plied to Halper, could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause was
the view of the parallel criminal and civil proceedings as
separate.
Also, as discussed above, the Kurth Ranch Court's descrip-
tion of the raid on the farm as giving rise to "four separate ...
proceedings," one of which is the civil forfeiture action, sug-
In the amended order on rehearing, the Ninth Circuit dissenters asserted that the
Court let stand a decision that "could free hundreds of drug dealers across the Western
United States." United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 56 F.3d 41, 42 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Why a Major Drug Suspect May Go Free, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1995, at
Al. So many decisions, however, finding the failure of the attachment of jeopardy should
really prevent such a conjectured fear from becoming a reality.
562. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the
Tenth Circuit aligned itself with the Ninth. United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d
1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
563. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), opin-
ion amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom.,
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
564. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
565. United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994).
566. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996).
567. United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994). Because later
the Eighth Circuit aligned itself with the Second Circuit in United States v. Smith, 75
F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996), the Ninth and Eighth Circuit decisions also conflicted.
568. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216.
569. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 438 (1989).
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gested that the Court saw such a civil proceeding as separate
from the criminal prosecution. 570 Further, that Court's treatment
of Montana's tax collection proceeding as "the functional
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the
Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offence,'- 5 71
should have foreclosed the notion that the separate civil and
criminal cases can be treated as consolidated.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit correctly under-
stood that the Austin Court "resolve[d] the 'punishment' issue
with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.. ." by rejecting a "case-by-case approach to deter-
mining whether forfeiture constitutes 'punishment.'- 572 In fact,
the Ninth Circuit, by sifting through the principles underlying
Austin, soundly repudiated the theory that Austin somehow
warranted anomalous treatment of drug proceeds forfeiture. As
the Ninth Circuit saw it, Austin's core, which was "'the histori-
cal understanding of forfeiture as punishment,'" comprehended
both money laundering and drug proceeds forfeiture.573
In addition, the Ninth Circuit illuminated the fact that both
of the statutes before it, like the provisions at issue in Austin,
contain "innocent owner" defenses, which have a distinctly puni-
tive flavor.574 Further, the Ninth Circuit, in contrast to the Fifth,
found that under Austin a tight ligature between the forfeiture
and the commission of a specified offense should actually
strengthen the presumption that such forfeiture provisions are
punitive.575
The Seventh Circuit dicta in Torres similarly abided by the
Supreme Court trilogy. The Seventh Circuit, like the Ninth, re-
jected the Second and Eleventh Circuits' treatment of the paral-
lel civil and criminal proceedings as single and pointed out that
the Millan and 18755 N. Bay Rd. decisions can no longer be
considered good law after Kurth Ranch.576 Also, what was im-
570. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 771-72
(1994) (emphasis added).
571. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
572. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219-20.
573. Id. at 1220 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602, 619 (1993)).
574. Id. at 1221. Accord Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 944, 1000 (1996) (statutory
innocent owner defense is "additional evidence that the statute itself is 'punitive' in
motive.").
575. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1221 ("[W]here Congress has tied forfei-
ture directly to the commission of specified offenses, it is reasonable to presume that the
forfeiture is at least partially intended as an additional deterrent to or punishment for
those violations of law.").
576. United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S.
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plicit in the Seventh Circuit opinion was the understanding that
after Austin, forfeiture is always punitive. In discussing "cumu-
.lative punishment," the Torres court enumerated that such
"punishments [can] be the ordinary combination of prison plus a
fine, or consecutive terms in prison, or prison plus a forfei-
ture."577 After describing the impact of a criminal trial in the
wake of a narcotics forfeiture proceeding, the Seventh Circuit
condemned that as "lead[ing] to two trials, each of which pro-
duces a punishment for a single offense."578
What the Ninth and Seventh Circuits appeared to share is
an understanding that the law after Halper, Austin and Kurth
Ranch mandates joinder if the government wishes to pursue a
criminal prosecution and a forfeiture action based on the same
offense. In fact, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on the Austin deci-
sion's effect on the government's election of strategy:
[Tihe government will often be forced to chose whether to include a crim-
inal forfeiture count in the indictment (and thus forego the favorable
burdens it would face in the civil forfeiture proceeding) or to pursue only
the civil forfeiture action (and thus forego the opportunity to prosecute
the claimants criminay).57 9
For the government seeking both forfeiture and other forms of
criminal punishment, what the Ninth Circuit recognized was
that such a mandatory joinder rule would, of course, promote
greater reliance on criminal forfeiture. 580
The Seventh Circuit similarly suggested that the only way
the government can avoid the double jeopardy impasse is for it
to seek the forfeiture and the criminal punishment in a single
indictment. The Seventh Circuit analysis, however, appeared
somewhat more enlightened than that of the Ninth Circuit. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit recognized that Austin's effect is to en-
courage mandatory joinder and greater reliance on criminal for-
Ct. 669 (1994). See also United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1487-88
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting and approving Judge Easterbrook's dicta in Torres). Contra
United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996).
577. Tortes, 28 F.3d at 1464 (emphasis added).
578. Id. at 1465 (emphasis added).
579. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1222. Accord 9844 S. Titan Court, 75
F.3d at 1487-88.
580. Congress has indicated that the main purpose of providing for criminal forfei-
ture was to enable the government to have all claims resolved at once. S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.&AN. 3182, 3379 ("[tlhe prob-
lem with civil forfeiture is that even if the same facts that are at issue in a criminal
trial are also dispositive of the forfeiture issue, it is still necessary for the government in
addition to the criminal case, to file a separate civil suit.").
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feiture, it still perpetuated the myth that the double jeopardy
problem before it is separately one of governmental exaction of
successive punishments. The Torres language, however, indi-
cated that the Seventh Circuit intuited that the problem was
not really just one of successive punishments, but of successive
prosecutions.
The Seventh Circuit's real perspective surfaced in its exam-
ple of civil forfeiture that gets to trial first. In this respect, the
Seventh Circuit explained that the result will be that the trier
of fact either "forfeits the property or concludes that the claim-
ant didn't do it or has some statutory defense."58 ' From there,
the Seventh Circuit posited that either result can bar a subse-
quent criminal trial. What the Torres court explained was that
"the accused can plead former jeopardy-former conviction (and
punishment) on the one hand, former acquittal on the other."58 2
Thus, the Torres court apparently grasped what the Kurth
Ranch Court was hinting at when it said that a civil proceeding
that results in punishment is "the functional equivalent of a
successive criminal prosecution" that can place the accused in
jeopardy a second time for the same offense.8 3 Apparently, the
Torres court tapped into Justice Scalia's concern in the Kurth
Ranch dissent, that "the Double Jeopardy Clause's ban on suc-
cessive criminal prosecutions... make[s] surplusage of any dis-
tinct protection against additional punishment imposed in a suc-
cessive prosecution, since the prosecution itself would be
barred" 58
In short, while both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits pro-
posed a mandatory joinder rule for the government wishing to
obtain both forfeiture and criminal punishment, the Seventh
Circuit appeared to most directly proclaim that what the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars are successive punitive ordeals.
C. Mythlessness and Resisting the Seductive Blockburger
Escape Hatch
After Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, the government
tried to defeat double jeopardy protection by arguing that the
criminal conviction and the civil forfeiture are not based on the
same offenses.58 The governing test here is, of course, the one in
581. Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465.
582. Id.
583. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 784.
584. Id. at 801.
585. See, eg., United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1488 (10th Cir.
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Blockburger v. United States,586 which the Supreme Court re-
vived in United States v. Dixon.58 7 Under Blockburger, if "each
offense contains an element not contained in the other," they
are not the same and thus, double jeopardy does not apply.588 In
1996) (rejecting government's argument that "even if the instant forfeiture is punish-
ment, the civil proceeding that imposed it was not a jeopardy for the same offense.");
United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1171 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Under
the BlockburgerlDixon test, the violations underlying the forfeitures and those for which
[defendant] was convicted also do not constitute the 'same offenses' . . . [where
clonviction ... required proof that [defendant) participated in a conspiracy... [and] for-
feiture required proof of a sale or exchange, and proof that the specific property was pro-
ceeds of, or traceable to, a sale or exchange:); United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449,
1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Rhodes cannot overcome the stubborn fact that the administra-
tive forfeiture proceeding and the criminal forfeiture count were predicated on factually
distinct offenses."); United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 1995) (-[Clounts
contained in the superseding indictment were based on distinctly different offenses from
the offense which underlies the civil forfeiture."); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568,
573 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting government's argument "that the civil forfeiture and crimi-
nal conviction ... do not constitute punishment for the same offense.. .), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2135 (1996); United States v. $292,888.04 In US. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 568 (9th
Cir. 1995) ("Because .. . prior criminal conviction was for conspiracy to import mari-
juana and hashish and related drug offenses, not currency transaction violations, double
jeopardy is not implicated... .); United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37
F.3d 489, 495 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Unless the civil forfeiture... can be predicated upon
some offense other than those for which [the defendant] has already been tried, the civil
forfeiture is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 3d 1210, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting government's argument that
civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution did not punish the same offense); United States
v. Rural Route 9, 900 F. Supp. 1032 (C.D. IlM. 1995) (rejecting government's argument
that the civil forfeitures and criminal convictions were not based on the same offense);
United States v. Shorb, 876 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Or. 1995) (concluding that convictions and
forfeiture proceedings each required proof of different elements), affd in part, vacated in
part 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 1995); Crowder v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 700 (M.D.N.C.
1994) (prosecution for money laundering conspiracy did not involve same offense or con-
duct as administrative forfeiture proceeding), aff'd 69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 1995); Oakes v.
United States, 872 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (rejecting government's argument
that criminal prosecution for manufacturing marijuana and civil forfeiture proceeding
were not based on the same offense). See also Dallet, supra note 9, at 254-56 (discussing
different offense arguments); McClain, supra note 119, at 965-74; Zimiles, supra note
414 at 203-04.
586. 284 US. 299 (1932).
587. 509 US. 688 (1993). Dixon, a 5-4 decision, overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495 US.
508 (1990), in which the Supreme Court had held that "if, to establish an essential ele-
ment of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted," then double
jeopardy operates as a bar. Id. at 510.
588. Dixon, 509 US. at 696. See George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Ap-
proach to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL L REV. 1027 (1995) (Be-
cause the Supreme Court has failed to set forth a clear definition of "same offense," the
author posits that legislatures conceive of blameworthiness in terms of distinct blame-
worthy acts).
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the civil forfeiture context, the Blockburger word formula mo-
mentarily foreboded as another potential myth that would serve
to keep the Constitution at bay.
One argument that the government advanced was that "the
criminal prosecution requires proof that a person, the defendant,
committed the crime, while the forfeiture requires proof that the
property subject to the forfeiture has been involved in the com-
mission of a criminal violation."58 9 Such a position, resting upon
the fictive participation of the property in the offense, really
c6nstitutes a transparent rekindling of the personification taint.
That is, the argument, once distilled, relies on the archaic liter-
alism than an in rem forfeiture proceeding targets an inanimate
defendant. The problem is that the Austin decision knocked the
props out from such notions.
In Austin, the Court, examining the theory that "the prop-
erty itself is 'guilty' of the offense," stripped it to its marrow-
that forfeiture punishes not a thing, but a person.590 In fact, as
the Court saw it, "[i]f forfeiture had been understood not to pun-
ish the owner, there would have been no reason to reserve the
case of a truly innocent owner."591 As such, finessing a Block-
burger depiction of the property as a separate element oppugned
what were the Austin Court's basic accomplishments. 92
Also, the Austin Court's broad proclamation that property
forfeiture is punishment, taken in its most unconcocted sense,
equates the property with the punishment-not the offense.
Language in the more recent decision, Libretti v. United
589. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir 1995), rev'd 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996); See also 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1490 (rejecting the same argument); Ru-
ral Route 9, 900 F. Supp. at 1032 (rejecting the same argument); Shorb, 876 F. Supp. at
1187 (rejecting the same argument); Oakes, 872 E Supp. at 824 (rejecting the same ar-
gument). But see $184,505.01 In US. Currency, 72 E3d at 1170 (3d Cir. 1995) (The three
forfeitures among themselves do not satisf the "same elements" test because each "re-
quires proof of an element that the others do not require, i.e., that the particular piece
of property seized constituted illegal proceeds or was acquired with illegal proceeds.").
590. Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602, 615 (1993). But see Bennis v. Michigan,
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), in which the Court, relying on guilty property cases, held that an
owner's interest in property may be forfeited even though the owner did not know that
the property would be used to violate the law.
591. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617. But see Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998, where the Court os-
tensibly retracted its "observation" that it had reserved the case of a truly innocent
owner.
592. See generally Rural Route 9, 900 F. Supp. at 1037 (C.D. Ill. 1995) ("[The dis-
tinction that the Government tries to make between an offense against a person and one
against property does not hold up under the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence [in
Austin].").
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States, 593 in which the Supreme Court found that the criminal
rule requiring an inquiry into the factual basis of a guilty plea
did not apply to forfeiture provisions in the plea agreement, ac-
tually reinforced the Austin punitive concept surrounding the
property. In elaborating on "the fundamental nature of criminal
forfeiture,"5 94 the Libretti Court said:
The fact that the Rules attach heightened protections to imposition of
criminal forfeiture as punishment for certain types of criminal conduct
cannot alter the simple fact that forfeiture is precisely that: punishment.
The Advisory Committee's 'assumption' that 'the amount of the interest
or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to
be alleged and proved,' Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 31, 18 U.S.C. App. p. 786, does not persuade us otherwise. The
Committee's assumption runs counter to the weighty authority discussed
above, all of which indicates that criminal forfeiture is an element of the
sentence imposed for a violation of certain drug and racketeering laws.595
The fact that the Libretti Court was talking about crimi-
nal-not civil-forfeiture did not estrange its perspective from
this discussion because the criminal forfeiture, like civil forfei-
ture, requires proof of the property's involvement in the commis-
sion of the criminal violation.596 Also, although the Court was
not engaging in the Blockburger "same elements" test, its ex-
pressed weddedness to what "weighty authority" 97 had rati-
fied-that forfeiture is not an element of the offense but of the
sentence-should transcend the contours of Libretti and infil-
trate the double jeopardy sphere. Consequently, Austin in con-
junction with Libretti suggested that the forfeiture is the pun-
ishment and the property is simply an element of that
punishment.
593. 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995).
594. Id. at 364.
595. Id. (emphasis added).
596. In United States v. Soccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 783-84 (1st Cir. 1995), the court con-
cluded that because "criminal forfeiture is a punishment, not a separate offense ... a
defendant may be subjected to a forfeiture order even if extradition was not specifically
granted in respect to the forfeiture allegations." In so concluding, the Soccoccia Court de-
scribed "modern criminal forfeiture" as "born out of the mating of two historically dis-
tinct traditions." Id. at 783. As the court saw it, "[olne parent is civil forfeiture" and the
other is "old-hat criminal forfeiture, which traditionally operated as an incident of a fel-
ony conviction in personam against a convicted defendant, requiring him to forfeit his
property to the Crown." Id. As the court viewed it, forfeiture provisions, like those in
RICO, "combine both traditions because they act in personam against the defendant, yet
require a nexus between the forfeited property and the crime." Id.
597. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 364.
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In 9844 South Titan Court, the Tenth Circuit found the gov-
ernment's Blockburger argument to be problematic because it
"presupposes that § 881 defines an offense as well as a punish-
ment.. ."59s and explained:
[In general, a statute may very well create a punishment without defin-
ing a separate offense. In Kurth Ranch, for instance, the Court did not
find itself obliged to consider whether Montana's drug tax statute de-
fined a separate offense; it was enough for double jeopardy purposes that
the statute imposed a second punishment for offenses defined elsewhere.
Similarly, 21 U.S.C. § 853, the criminal forfeiture statute for drug of-
fenses, merely prescribes a punishment not a separate offense.69
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit accurately perceived that a
Blockburger analysis in this particular context was akin to a red
herring because the Austin Court itself determined that § 881
"defines a punishment, but not a separate offense."60°
Another putative Blockburger argument that the govern-
ment advanced was that the "criminal charges differ[] from the
forfeiture allegations in that they require[] proof of scienter."601
Basically, the building blocks for this position would be the
Calero-Toledo Court's reference to forfeiture as a "penalty for
carelessness" 602 and the Austin Court's discussion of forfeiture as
punishment for negligence. 6 3 This, of course, ostensibly suggests
a standard different from the criminal mens rea of the predicate
offenses. While surely having some superficial appeal, that ve-
neer displays its cracks under bright lights.
One problem with the mens rea theory is its questionable
coexistence with Kurth Ranch. In Kurth Ranch, one defendant
was adjudged guilty of the offense of possession of drugs with
the intent to sell and the other five pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to possess drugs with the intent to sell, violations which, of
598. United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1489 (10th Cir. 1996).
599. Id. (citing Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 364).
600. Id- at 1489.
601. United States v. Shorb, 876 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Or. 1995). See also 9844 S.
Titan Court, 75 E3d at 1490. See generally McClain, supra note 119, at 966-67 (discuss-
ing the 'justification that has been offered for finding that criminal narcotics offenses
are not lesser included offense of civil forfeiture" which "is that the criminal statutes re-
quire mens rea.7).
602. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 US. 663, 681 (1974). See also
McClain, supra note 119, at 966-67 ("[Clourts have read [Calero-Toledo] to mean that
the mens rea for civil forfeiture is 'negligence,' punishing property owners for not 'ex-
ercis(ing) greater care' ").
603. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993) ("Like the guilty-property fic-
tion, [the] theory of vicarious liability is premised on the idea that the owner has been
negligent.").
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course, required proof of criminal mens rea. According, however,
to the Supreme Court of Montana, the Montana Drug Tax Act,
under which the tax was imposed on the Kurth Ranch defend-
ants, did not require any finding of scienter.60 4 Although the
Kurth Ranch Court neither addressed the scienter or Block-
burger issue, it did deem double jeopardy to bar that successive
tax assessment. Implicit thus in the decision that the Kurths
were being "placed ... in jeopardy a second time 'for the same
offence[,]'- 605 was the rejection of the degree of scienter as a ger-
mane factor that can make the civil and criminal offenses
different.60 6
The Government's scienter argument not only failed to
square with the actual situation in Kurth Ranch, it also of-
fended the Kurth Ranch reasoning. According to the Kurth
Ranch Court, one disturbing feature of the tax was that it was
"condition[ed] on the commission of a "crime."607 The Court im-
plicitly viewed the criminal and tax proceedings as sharing an
offense. This suggests that the conduct triggering the tax liabil-
ity imbibes the crime and thus, likewise sweeps into the crimi-
nal mens r ea. The language in Austin, reminiscent of Kurth
Ranch thought, branded civil forfeiture as punitive for the very
reason that it is "tie[d]... directly to the commission of drug of-
fenses." 6 8 Where the Kurth Ranch and Austin reasoning thus co-
incided was the basic ascribing of the sameness of offense to the
fact that the criminal violation has set up residence within the
supposed civil case.
Another way of describing it is to say that the drug crimes
are lesser included offenses of § 881 forfeiture and thus, are the
same under Blockburger.6 9 In fact, such an approach would be
responsive to both of the government's attempts to distinguish
the offenses on the basis of forfeiture's unique involvement of
tainted property and on the differing mens rea. In fact, reason-
604. Sorensen v. Montana Dep't of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29, 32 (Mont. 1992) ("[T]he
tax is based on possession and storage of dangerous drugs. Where possession gives rise
to the tax, we conclude that the Act does not involve a finding of scienter).
605. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994).
606. As the Tenth Circuit suggested, the Kurth Ranch Court's failure to engage in a
Blockburger analysis may be due to the fact that the Supreme Court viewed 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 as defining not an offense, but a punishment. United States v. 9844 S. Titan
Court, 75 F.3d at 1489. See supra notes 598-602 and accompanying text.
607. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781.
608. Austin, 509 US. at 620.
609. See McClain, supra note 119, at 967 ("[lit can be argued that the various sub-
stantive drug offenses are lesser included offenses of forfeiture because they are incorpo-
rated within the provisions of section 881.").
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ing in the Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions tackled the
Blockburger matter in such a way.
In Ursery, the Sixth Circuit, concluding that "the forfeiture
necessarily requires proof of the criminal offense," looked di-
rectly at the statute applying "forfeiture . . .to '[aill real prop-
erty... which is used.., to commit or to facilitate... a viola-
tion of this subchapter."61 What mattered to the Ursery Court
was not the difference in the standard of proof, but what
amounted to basic horse sense-that the government could not
confiscate the Ursery home without the proof that he was com-
mitting the crime-that is, growing the marijuana.611
In the $405,089.23 US. Currency decision, the Ninth Circuit
relied on Jeffers v. United States612 as an analogue. 613 In Jeffers,
the Supreme Court found that the charge of conspiracy to dis-
tribute heroin and cocaine was the lesser included offense of the
charge of conducting a criminal enterprise to violate the drug
laws and that they were the "same offense" under Block-
burger.614 After summarizing Jeffers, the Ninth Circuit described
the issue before it as one of a "civil forfeiture action which is
brought and tried separately from a criminal prosecution and is
based on the same offense."615
In 9844 South Titan Court, the Tenth Circuit pointed out
that if a Blockburger analysis even applies, "[a]ll drug violations
610. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1994), rev'd 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
611. The Ursery Court stated, (ft]he criminal offense is in essence subsumed by the
forfeiture statute and thus does not require an element of proof that is not required by
the forfeiture action." Id. See also United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir.
1994) ("[Ilf the prior civil forfeiture proceeding, which was predicated on the same drug
trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment, constituted a 'punishment,' the Double
Jeopardy Clause will bar the pending criminal trial."); United States v. Rural Route 9,
900 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (C.D. IMI. 1995) ('The criminal offense is in essence subsumed by
the forfeiture statute... .); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 824 (E.D. Wash.
1994) ("M[T]he forfeiture statute subsumes all of section 841(a)(1) and, therefore, renders
the criminal conviction, and the civil forfeiture the 'same offense' as defined by
Blockburger.").
612. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
613. United States v. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (9th Cir.
1994), opinion amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted
sub nom., United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 762 (1996), rev'd 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
614. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 147-51.
615. $405,089.23 US. Currency, 33 E3d at 1218 (emphasis added). In United States
u. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit, with-
out much analysis, cited Blockburger and Dixon and stated, 'unless the civil forfeiture
under § 881(a)(4) can be predicated upon some offense other than those for which [the
claimant] has already been tried, the civil forfeiture is barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause." Id. at 495.
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... and a fortiori their underlying elements, would therefore be
contained within § 881(a) as lesser included offenses of the for-
feiture 'offense'" and thus, "such an offense may not be prose-
cuted once a jeopardy for the lesser included offense has oc-
curred."6 16 In 9844 South Titan Court, the government
contended that since theoretically "forfeiture . . . need not be
based on any particular past offense by a particular claimant,"
it did not punish the "'same offense' .... "617 The Tenth Circuit,
however, finding such thinking to be flawed, pointed out that
Blockburger neither condones ignoring the actual facts on which
prosecutions are based nor excuses the "particular case . . .
based squarely on ... a past offense."618
According to the Tenth Circuit, the statute and the reality
have to cooperate in a Blockburger analysis. The court thus for-
mulated the rule to be that "where commission of one of a cer-
tain class of offenses is a necessary element of another offense,
and where the identical conduct or unit of prosecution is the fac-
tual basis of both, each offense within the class is a 'species of
lesser included offense' in relation to the greater offense."6 19
Only the Tenth Circuit dealt with Brown v. Ohio,6 20 which
was indeed a "fair analogue."621 In Brown, the Supreme Court
found that joyriding was a lesser included offense of auto theft
and thus, both offenses were the same under a Blockburger
analysis. The Brown Court explained that "[tihe prosecutor who
has established joyriding need only prove the requisite intent in
616. United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1490 (10th Cir. 1996).
617. Id.
618. Id. See generally James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzela, The Lesser In-
cluded Offense Doctrine and the Constitution: The Development of Due Process and
Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (1995) (discussing the three basic
approaches to the lesser included offense determination: the statutory elements ap-
proach, the pleadings approach and the evidence approach). According to Shellenberger
and Strazzela, under the "evidence approach.., the examination is not simply of ab-
stract statutory elements or even crimes suggested by the pleadings, but the crimes that
the trial evidence tends to prove." Id. at 12.
619. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1490 (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421
(1980)). The Tenth Circuit also relied on Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977), in
which the Court held that the felony murder conviction barred prosection for the under-
lying felony of robbery, and Whalen v. United States, 445 US. 684, 694 n.8 (1980), in
which the Court held that Blockburger statute made rape a lesser included bffense
within felony murder. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1490.
620. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
621. United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1490. See also Dallet, supra
note 9, at 255 who points out that "a drug law violation required by § 881 can be likened
to a 'lesser included offense' within § 881 and would constitute the same offense under
Blockburger" and applies Brown.
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order to establish auto theft."622 Similarly, in the § 881 forfeiture
context, once the government obtains the conviction for the
predicate drug offense, it need only show that the property was
used or intended to be used in the violation.6 23 As such, the dif-
ferent degrees of scienter and forfeiture's implication of the
property in the crime, like the different requisite intent in
Brown, does not make the criminal violation into something
other than a lesser included offense.
Stephen McClain, one of the few commentators to seriously
grapple with the Blockburger test in this context, has concluded
that "summarily assuming § 881 punishes for the same offenses
as, or is a greater offense of, the criminal drug statutes is un-
wise."6 24 McClain advocates giving the "government ... the op-
portunity to prove that it is predicating the forfeiture claim on a
claim 'separate' and different from any charges being criminally
prosecuted."625 The issue that McClain raises becomes essen-
tially its own tempest in a tea pot or something that simply per-
colates into an unremarkable epithet that where there is no
double jeopardy, there is no double jeopardy. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit decision in United States v. Chick 62 6 illustrates this.
In Chick, the government sought forfeiture of seized equip-
ment under 18 U.S.C. § 2513 because it was allegedly used to in-
tercept electronic communications in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511.627 Also, a grand jury indicted Chick and his sister for en-
gaging in a "conspiracy to 'assemble, possess and sell' satellite
descrambler modules that allowed the descrambling of certain
622. 432 US. at 167. See also Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 US. 682, (1977) (per curiam)
(holding that a defendant could not be tried for felony murder after he was convicted of
the lesser included offense of robbery).
623. See Dallet, supra note 9, at 255 ("Just as the prosecutor who had established
joyriding need only to prove mens rea to establish auto theft in Brown, the prosecutor
who established a violation of the drug laws through a conviction need only establish the
property was used or intended to be used in the violation of the drug laws for forfeiture
under § 881.").
624. McClain, supra note 119, at 972. McClain points out that "the government
need not prove a violation of the controlled substance statutes to obtain forfeiture in
every case." Id. at 968 (footnote omitted). As an example, McClain gives the forfeiture of
property "intended" to be used to commit or facilitate an offense. Id. In such cases, "the
government could obtain forfeiture without proving an actual criminal violation.. . ." Id.
Also, McClain points out that forfeiture may be predicated on the acts of a party other
than the defendant. Id. at 971. Under such circumstances, however, the same individual
is not in jeopardy more than once.
625. Id. at 972-73.
626. 61 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 1995).
627. Id. at 684.
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television programming without payment of subscription fees."628
Chick himself was charged in an initial and superseding indict-
ment with selling illegal descrambler units.629 Chick sought a
dismissal of the criminal charges, arguing that the prior civil
forfeiture barred the criminal prosecution.630
In agreeing with the district court that the civil forfeiture
and the impending prosecution were not based on the same of-
fenses, the Ninth Circuit elaborated:
The civil forfeiture proceeding only required proof that the seized elec-
tronic equipment was used to intercept electronic communications in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511. The civil forfeiture proceeding did not require
proof that Chick conspired to assemble, possess or sell satellite descram-
bler modules or that Chick sold illegally modified satellite
descramblers.61
In Chick, not only were the indictment counts "distinctly
different"632 from the predicate forfeiture offense, but also the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Felix633 trumped
Chick's double jeopardy challenge. The Ninth Circuit recited the
language in Felix that "prosecution of a defendant for conspir-
acy, where certain of the overt acts relied upon by the Govern-
ment are based on substantive offenses for which the defendant
has been previously convicted, does not violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause."634 The Ninth Circuit thus felt that Felix authorized
the forfeiture of Chick's equipment as well as a later prosecution





631. Id. at 687.
632. Id.
633. 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
634. Chick, 61 E3d at 688 (quoting Felix, 503 U.S. at 380-81).
635. Id. See also United States v. $184,505.01 In U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1171
(3d Cir. 1995) (While "[clonviction on the criminal charges required proof... [of] par-
ticipat[ion] in a conspiracy or that he possessed a controlled substance[,] . . . forfeiture
under § 881(a)(6) did not require proof of either of these elements."); Crowder v. United
States, 874 F. Supp. 700, 703 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (although "it is possible that the conspir-
acy mentioned in Count Two with respect to money laundering may have had some con-
nection with the money which was forfeited [,]... as the government points out, peti-
tioner was convicted of conspiracy, not the actual money laundering."), affd 69 F.3d 534
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Shorb, 876 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Or. 1995) (The gov-
ernment makes a more compelling point with its argument that the convictions and the
forfeitures pertain to different offenses because the prosecutions involved charges of con-
spiracy and money laundering, while the forfeiture cases did not."), affid in part, vacated
in part 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Although the Chick decision could be perceived, almost as a
matter of reflex, as somewhat alarming because it seemingly
eroded what the Ninth Circuit built in $405,089.23 US. Cur-
rency, that was not really the case. In Chick, unlike the more
typical § 881 forfeiture, the government did not predicate the
confiscation of the property on the identical offenses in the in-
dictment.6 6 In fact, as a matter of speculation, it was perhaps
that lack of sameness that belied the government's failure to
pursue its more routine ploy of first obtaining the conviction for
use in obtaining a subsequent summary forfeiture judgment.
The message of Chick thus really is that when offenses are not
the same, there is no double jeopardy impasse. This, like the
proposition in Torres that there is no double jeopardy where the
defendant was not ever a party to the separate civil forfeiture
proceeding,637 might be considered unearthshakingly apodictic.
In short, the best rule here is one purged of myths. Put
quite simply, double jeopardy should apply when the civil forfei-
ture punishes the same individual for the same offense as, or for
the lesser included offense of, the charged violation in the paral-
lel criminal case.
V. THE SUPREME CoURT's DESTRUCTIVE APOTHEOSIS OF THE
ARcHAIc FORFEITuRE MYTHS AND DEROGATION OF THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE
One of the things that is disturbing about the Supreme
Court's consolidated decision in Ursery and $405,089.23 United
States Currency6 38 is that it recklessly undoes the advancements
that the Court made in Halper639, Austinr ° and Kurth Ranch641.
Even more troubling, however, is the Court's dogged adherence
to mere labels and its resurrection and ultimate apotheosis of
the archaic forfeiture myths. The ultimate effect is not merely
636. See also United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F3d 1470, 1488 (10th Cir.
1996) ("we agree that basing forfeiture on previous conduct for which Mr. May was never
indicted cannot constitute double jeopardy."); United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449,
1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (forfeiture proceeding punished Rhodes for the sale of drugs other
than those that were the subject of the criminal case); United States v. $292,888.04 In
US. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (forfeiture of funds under currency re-
porting statute was different from the claimant's criminal convictions, which were based
on drug importation).
637. See discussion of Torres supra Part IV.A.2.
638. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
639. 490 US. 435 (1989).
640. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
641. 511 US. 767 (1994).
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the derogation of stare decisis but the enfeebling of a crucial
Constitutional protection.
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Ursery
and United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency
In Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined.642 In
concluding that civil forfeitures generally do not constitute pun-
ishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Court took four steps in what can only be described as "puta-
tive" reasoning.
First, the Court looked back to "the earliest years of this
Nation" and found that there has always been congressional ap-
proval of parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal
prosecutions based upon the same underlying events.64 In the
course of this backward glance, the Court returned to that "long
line of cases" in which it had deemed the Double Jeopardy
Clause to be inapplicable to such forfeiture actions.64
In this regard, the Ursery Court's real fixation was Various
Items of Personal Property v. United States,645 in which the
Court hinged its conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was inapplicable to the forfeiture of a distillery, warehouse and
denaturing plant on the "sharp distinction" between in rem and
in personam penalties. 64 Essentially the Various Items Court
blanketly determined that only those penalties labeled "in per-
sonam" could be punitive in nature.6v7
The Court in Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency went
beyond merely rubber stamping Various Items, but in an osten-
sible hyperbole, explained that had the Court in Various Items
reached any other result it would have been "quite remarka-
ble."64 According to the present Court, what the Various Items
Court acknowledged was that "'[a]t common law, in many cases,
the right of forfeiture did not attach until the offending person
had been convicted and the record of conviction produced.'"649
Thus, the prior conviction did not trigger a double jeopardy
642. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
643. Id. at 2140.
644. Id.
645. 282 US. 577 (1931). See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
646. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141.
647. Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581.
648. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141.
649. Id. (quoting Various Items, 282 US. at 580).
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problem, but conversely became the very prerequisite to the civil
forfeiture. According to the Court, the fact that forfeiture is a
statutory creation which renders the common-law rule inapplica-
ble does not mean that "the Constitution prohibit[s] for statu-
tory civil forfeiture what was required for common-law civil
forfeiture. 650
Second, the Court dwelled on the "two-part analytical con-
struct" it used in One Assortment of 89 Firearms65 1 to determine
that a prior criminal proceeding did not bar the forfeiture ac-
tion.652 In so doing, the Court extracted what it described as a
"remarkably consistent theme"--namely, that "in rem civil for-
feiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially pu-
nitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not
constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause."653
Third, the Court considered the Halper, Austin and Kurth
Ranch trilogy and whether it constituted an abandonment of Va-
rious Items and One Assortment Of 89 Firearms. Through an ex-
cessive narrowing of all three cases, the Court disposed of
Halper by reciting that it did not deal with a civil forfeiture-
but instead with just a civil penalty.6 4 According to the Court,
the Halper focus was not on any ligature between civil forfeiture
and civil penalties, but rather on the supposed historically
drawn demarcation between the two.655 The distinction, accord-
ing to the Court, basically boiled down to forfeiture having an
"in rem" label and a civil penalty having an "in personam"
label.656
Specifically, the Court explained that the Halper approach,
which is the "case-by-case balancing test" where courts must
"compare the harm suffered by the Government against the size
of the penalty imposed," can not fit civil forfeiture.657 According
to the court, civil forfeiture has a unique quantification problem:
while it is literally possible to quantify the value of the forfeited
property, it is not possible to even approximate "the nonpunitive
purposes served by a particular civil forfeiture."6 8 In fact, the
Court saw Kurth Ranch as an analogous recognition of the
quantification problem when it proclaimed that "Halper's
650. Id.
651. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
652. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2141-42.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 2144.
655. Id.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 2145.
658. Id.
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method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or
punitive simply does not work [outside of a fixed civil penalty
context or] in the case of a tax statute."659
In truth, the Court pushed Kurth Ranch aside simply be-
cause it was called a tax proceeding and not an in rem forfei-
ture. Similarly, the Court relegated Austin to the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and declined to extend
it to a double jeopardy context. Because of that distinction, the
Court specifically rejected the interpretation of the circuit courts
below that concluded that Austin supplanted the Halper ad hoc
approach.
Also, as the Court saw it, in an Excessive Fines Clause
analysis, the second tier of inquiry is whether the sanction is so
large as to be considered "excessive."660 As the Court reasoned,
that second tier would needlessly duplicate the preliminary
Halper question of "whether the civil sanction imposed in that
particular case is totally inconsistent with any remedial goal."661
Consequently, the Austin Court's rejection of the Halper test did
not mean that forfeiture is punitive per se, only that the Halper
test would be redundant and thus, unworkable in an Eighth
Amendment context.
Fourth, the Court, treating Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch
as essentially non-existent, dove right into the good old One As-
sortment Of 89 Firearms' analysis662 and initially found that
"Congress intended these forfeitures to be civil .... " 663 Then the
Court, importing the Ward test, found "little evidence ... sug-
gesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
and (a)(7), and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in form
and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to
the contrary."664 In fact, the Court found such forfeiture statutes
to be virtually indistinguishable from those in Various Items,
Emerald Cut Stones and One Assortment Of 89 Firearms.665
The heart of this fourth step was the Court's apparent fasci-
nation with what it called the "important nonpunitive goals" of
the forfeiture provisions at issue.666 As the Court elaborated, the
confiscation of Ursery's realty served to compel property owners
659. Id. at 2146.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
663. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.





to be prudent in the management of their property and ensured
that such owners do not let their property be used for illegal-
ity.667 The forfeiture of the Arlt and Wren property had the ad-
ded benefit of preventing persons from profiting from their un-
lawful acts.668 Such benefits, according to the Court, supplanted
the punitive aspects of the forfeiture provisions at issue.
In its summation, the Court paid homage to the "long tradi-
tion of federal statutes providing for a forfeiture proceeding fol-
lowing a criminal prosecution."669 It also stressed that in forfei-
ture proceedings, the Government does not have to establish
scienter and it can confiscate property even if no party claims it
and even if there is no demonstrated nexus between the prop-
erty and a particular person.670 Moreover, the innocent owner
provision, according to the court, was simply not relevant to
whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.671 Further, the deterrent purpose of the statutes and the
fact that they are tied to criminal activity make them neither
criminal nor punitive.672
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Kennedy and Scalia authored separate concurring
opinions. Justice Kennedy strained to extricate the decision in
Ursery and $405,089.23 US. Currency from language in the Aus-
tin and Libretti decisions. He acknowledged that in Austin the
Court "described the civil in rem forfeiture provision ... at is-
sue . . . as punitive."673 He also acknowledged that in Libretti,
which involved an "almost identical" criminal forfeiture statute,
the Court deemed the "'fundamental nature of criminal forfei-
ture'" to be punishment.674
According to Justice Kennedy, however, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause protects a person and because civil in rem forfei-
ture is indeed in rem, it does not punish a person.676 Conse-
quently, according to Kennedy it is the in rem and in personam
nomenclature that eliminates what he believed was merely a su-
667. Id.
668. Id.
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perficial contradiction between the present decision and the Aus-
tin-Libretti precedent.
Despite his self-professed blind faith in the in rem fiction,
Justice Kennedy sporadically pressed what is essentially the
contrary view-that "[florfeiture ... punishes an owner by tak-
ing property involved in a crime and it may happen that the
owner is also the wrongdoer charged with a criminal offense 676
Justice Kennedy putatively reasoned, however, that it does not
follow from this concession that "forfeiture is . . . a second in
personam punishment for the offense.. ." because "[c]ivil in rem
forfeiture has long been understood as independent of criminal
punishments."677
As explained below, it is quite telling that Justice Kennedy
insistently denied that the Court was reviving the guilty prop-
erty fiction. Also, in criticizing Justice Stevens' reliance on a
"misfit,"68 the same-elements test of Blockburger, Justice Ken-
nedy, summoning up the notion of guilty property, added that
"[t]he forfeiture cause of action is not charging a second offense
of the person; it is a proceeding against the property in which
proof of a criminal violation by any person will suffice, provided
that some knowledge of or consent to the crime on the part of
the property owner is also established."679
Justice Kennedy also questioned the real utility of the two-
party inquiry in One Assortment Of 89 Firearms because it did
not "add[] much to the clear rule of Various Items that civil in
rem forfeiture of property involved in a crime is not punishment
subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause." °0 To him, the answers
are unremarkably concrete and rest on labels: namely, in rem
proceedings are synonymous with civil proceedings and the for-
feiture of property used in a crime is always remedial.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, briefly
concurred to reiterate the germ of his Kurth Ranch dissent, that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution,
not successive punishment."681 In dealing with this, however, he
took it nowhere by stating that such civil forfeiture proceedings
do not constitute criminal prosecutions.68 2
676. Id. at 2150 (emphasis added).
677. Id.
678. Id. at 2151.
679. Id.
680. Id.




C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's disposition of
$405,089.23 US. Currency because the forfeited property consti-
tuted proceeds from the unlawful activity. According to Stevens,
proceeds' forfeiture is different because the property is not
something the owners have any right to retain.68 3 He also
agreed with the Court's explanation of why the forfeiture of con-
traband does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.6M
In dissenting, however, Justice Stevens faulted the Court
for "show[ing] a stunning disregard not only for modern prece-
dents but for our older ones as well."68 The first of many things
that irked Justice Stevens was the Court's reliance on Various
Items.68 6 As Stevens pointed out, Various Items vanished almost
as swiftly as it came: "[the Court] cited that case in only two de-
cisions over the next seven years, and never again in nearly six
decades."68 7 In fact, the two cases that purportedly "affirmed"
Various Items-One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Assort-
ment of 89 Firearms-never even mentioned Various Items.
Further, Stevens declined to read the putative Various
Items' progeny as espousing a "categorical rule that civil forfeit-
ures never give rise to double jeopardy rights."88 As he saw
those cases, they were indeed more ad hoc, with each "carefully
consider[ing] the nature of the particular forfeiture at issue,
classifying it as either 'punitive' or 'remedial', before deciding
whether it implicated double jeopardy."689
Second, Stevens was disturbed by the Court's failure to rec-
ognize the real ramifications of Boyd v. United States,6 90 a deci-
sion in which the Court applied other constitutional protections
to forfeitures that had a punitive element. In Boyd, the Court
deemed the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's
Self-Incrimination Clause to forbid the compulsory production of
an individual's private papers for use in a proceeding to forfeit
his property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws.691 Be-
cause the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Self-Incrimination
683. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
684. Id.
685. Id. at 2153.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 2154.
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
691. Id. at 633.
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Clause are housed in the same amendment, they should be in-
terpreted "in pari materia.'6 92 Moreover, as Justice Stevens
pointed out, the Double Jeopardy Clause should have the
broader application because it refers to "jeopardy" and unlike
the Self-Incrimination Clause, does not expressly confine itself
to a "criminal case. 693
Third, Justice Stevens accused the majority of "mis-
read[ing]" Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch through excessive
narrowing and the persistent failure to see them as collectively.
having an impact on the law.694 According to Stevens, the cases
comprised a trilogy "devoted to the common enterprise of giving
meaning to the idea of 'punishment,' a concept that plays a cen-
tral role in the jurisprudence of both the Excessive Fines Clause
and the Double Jeopardy Clause 6 95
In particular, in Steven's view, Austin can not be dismissed
as a mere excessive fines case because Austin reaches further
and logically congeals with Halper.696 In Austin, "[tihere [was]
no need to determine whether a statute that is punitive by de-
sign has a punitive effect when applied in the individual
case."697 The reason the approach in Halper was different was
because the sanction in Halper was not always punitive in char-
acter but could nevertheless have some nonpunitive applica-
tions. In fact, in Kurth Ranch the Court took the same approach
that it had taken in Austin, reasoning that the tax had an "'un-
mistakable punitive character' that rendered it punishment in
all of its applications."698
Justice Stevens' main gripe, however, with the Court's
treatment of Austin was basically its flagrant disregard for its
own precedent:
Remarkably, the Court today stands Austin on its head-a decision ren-
dered only three years ago, with unanimity on the pertinent points-and
concludes that § 881(a)(7) is remedial rather than punitive in character.
Every reason Austin gave for treating § 881(a)(7) as punitive-the Court
rejects or ignores. Every reason the Court provides for treating
§ 881(a)(7) as remedial-Austin rebuffed. The Court claims that its con-
clusion is consistent with decisions reviewing statutes 'indistinguishable'
'in most significant respects' from § 881(a)(7) . . . but ignores the fact
692. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2155.
693. Id. at 2155 n.3.
694. Id. at 2156.
695. Id.
696. Id. at 2157.
697. Id.
698. Id. (emphasis added).
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that Austin reached the opposite conclusion as to the identical statute
under review.6 9
For Stevens, there was no basis for distinguishing between
the forfeiture of the house in the present case and the forfeiture
res in the Austin case in which the Court rejected the contention
that the mobile home and body shop were "instruments" of drug
trafficking.700 Stevens also could not square the majority's
description of the statutes as deterrent with the Halper, Austin
and Kurth Ranch premise that "a civil sanction that cannot
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment."7 1
In addition, Stevens pointed out the inconsistency between
the Court's depiction of the statute as having no scienter re-
quirement and the reasoning in Austin. With respect to property
that no one claims, it is simply deemed abandoned and of course
the government can forfeit it. As Justice Stevens pointed out, in
such a situation scienter is simply not an issue.7 0 2 But if the
government is seeking to confiscate property that someone does
claim, it has to establish culpability because of the "innocent
owner" exemption.7 0 3 What Justice Stevens emphasized was that
the innocent owner provision was in fact pivotal to the Austin
Court's determination that such forfeiture is punitive in na-
ture.7 0 4 Similarly, in Stevens' view, the Court's announcement
that the statutory tie to criminal activity is not enough to make
it punitive conflicted with the completely contrary assessment in
Austin.705
Fifth, Justice Stevens was disturbed with the "recurrent
theme of the Court's opinion ... that there is some mystical dif-
ference between in rem and in personam proceedings." 7 6 For
him, that collided with the Court's repeated rejection of the no-
tion that mere labels or the nature of the court's jurisdiction de-
termines what constitutional protections apply.707 As Justice Ste-
vens saw it, what belied that "recurrent theme" was the Court's
699. Id. at 2158.
700. Id. at 2158-59.






707. Id. at 2159-60.
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adherence to the "notorious" guilty property fiction.708
Finally, Justice Stevens reached out and dealt with the gov-
ernment's other arguments. With respect to the Blockburger
test, it barred the Ursery conviction "because the elements that
the Government was required to allege and prove to sustain the
forfeiture of Ursery's home under § 881(a)(7) included each of
the elements of the offense for which he was later convicted" 70 9
Further, Stevens found the government's argument that the for-
feiture and criminal conviction occurred in the same proceeding
to be "unpersuasive because it is simply inaccurate to describe
two separate proceedings as one."710 For Justice Stevens, the
Double Jeopardy Clause requires "a single judgment encompass-
ing the entire punishment for the defendant's offense."711
D. The Destructive Apotheosis
The decision in Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency dis-
mantled the cumulative advancement of Halper, Austin and
Kurth Ranch. Specifically, the main thrust of Halper is that the
legislative labels of "civil" and "criminal" are not "of paramount
importance."712 In fact, it is the Halper Court's toppling of such
labels that underlies its decision to deal with reality by individ-
ually assessing the actual impact a civil sanction has on an indi-
vidual who has already been criminally punished for the same
offense.
In Ursery and $405,089.23 US. Currency, the Court leaped
right back to the inquiry in One Assortment of 89 Firearms and
Ward as if the Halper test had never been born. It, in fact,
chanted the old dirge, which initially involves deference to Con-
gress' decision to name a mechanism as a "remedial civil sanc-
tion."713 After that preliminary inquiry, the Court deemed the
second question to be whether the challenger can "establish by
the 'clearest proof that Congress [had] provided a sanction so
punitive as to 'transform what was clearly intended as a civil
remedy into a criminal penalty.' "714
708. Id. at 2160.
709. Id. at 2162. See discussion supra Part I.C.
710. Id. at 2162.
711. Id.
712. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) ("It is commonly understood
that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely,
that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties.").
713. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2137.




The problem is that any chance that a forfeiture provision
can get beyond that second "clearest proof" hurdle dies in the
Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency decision. Basically the
Court indicated that an individual assessment of the punitive
effect of a forfeiture penalty is not necessary because there is a
forgone conclusion that such a penalty is a "separate civil sanc-
tion" and that it is "remedial in nature."715 In essence, the Court,
paying mere lip service to the supposed second tier of analysis,
actually empowered the first tier with ability to completely im-
bibe the latter. That is, in forfeiture proceedings Congress
named the mechanism "civil" and "remedial" and thus, there can
never be that "clearest proof" that forfeiture is anything other
than "civil" and "remedial." All this reasoning really winds back
to the reactionary proclamation that the Congressional name is
once again the sole despot.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that despot appar-
ently did not preside over the reasoning in Boyd, in which the
Court applied constitutional protections to such a forfeiture pro-
ceeding. In fact, the Boyd case involved the Self-Incrimination
Clause which has an explicitly "criminal" label, yet the Court let
that Clause reach into the civil domain. Justice Stevens, in re-
vealing the Court's illogic, explained that if anything, the
Double Jeopardy Clause, which covers "any type of jeopardy"
should embrace an even "larger class of situations."716 What the
Ursery and 405,089.23 US. Currency decision shows is that the
Court will revert to label worship when it conveniently provides
it with the desired escape hatch.
Another aspect of the Court's deification of mere labels is
the way it chose to distinguish the Halper, Austin and Kurth
Ranch decisions. For the Court, the meaningful distinction be-
tween Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch and the case sub judice
goes back to names. Specifically, the Court stressed that the
problem in Halper was different because it was not something
called "forfeiture" but instead was something that had "a civil
penalty" name.717 In Austin, the crucial difference was its in-
volvement of a constitutional protection in the name of "Exces-
sive Fines" punishment not "Double Jeopardy" punishment.718
Similarly, the Court relegated Kurth Ranch to near oblivion be-
cause the penalty in that case was named a "tax" and not a "for-
715. Id.
716. Id. at 2155 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
717. Id. at 2144.
718. Id. at 2146.
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feiture." 19 The "approach in this regard is vaguely reminiscent of
the somewhat puerile law student quip that distinguishes two
clone cases on the ground that the respective defendants have
different names.
The superficial silliness of this name game, however, is not
the real problem here. The true devastation issues from the
Court's basic shunning of reality or disregard for the real effect
a sanction or confiscation of property has on the individual tar-
get. As the Halper Court pointed out, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is sacred because it protects "humane interests," which
are "intrinsically personal."7 20 Any double jeopardy test which
hinges solely on Congress' choice of which name to slap on a
provision can not tap into what really matters-the real exac-
tion of something "intrinsically" and perhaps inhumanely per-
sonal-that is, redundant pain.
Further, in Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the
Court pulverized the Austin decision. As discussed above, the
bottom line proposition of Austin could not be more unequivocal:
it states that all forfeiture is punishment. Contrary to the
Court's insistence in Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the
per se rule did not ensue from some exclusive Excessive Fine
Clause context, but rather from the Court's historical analysis of
the punitive character of civil in rem forfeiture and its interpre-
tation of the specific punitive forfeiture provisions before it. It is
thus not the Eighth Amendment that makes forfeiture punitive
but something about forfeiture itself that simply is punitive.721
In fact, the Court's attempt to deny the existence of any
bridge between the Halper and Austin decisions negates the real
substance of Austin. As discussed above, what the Halper Court
constructed was a case-by-case double jeopardy analysis, one
that ensures that a potentially punitive civil judgment imposed
on an already criminally punished defendant is rationally re-
lated to the goal of making the government whole. According to
the Court in Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, its failure to
track the Halper approach in Austin was not due to the Austin
Court's understanding that the test does not work when the pro-
vision is per se punitive.722 Instead, the reason the Austin Court
did not use the "case-by-case approach of Halper" was because
"a preliminary-stage inquiry that focused on the disproportional-
ity of a particular sanction would be duplicative of the exces-
719. Id. at 2147.
720. United States v. Halper, 490 US. 435, 447 (1989).
721. See supra Part fI.B.2.
722. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146.
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siveness analysis that would follow." 723 What is blatant here in
such rationalizing is the missing chunk.
The missing chunk is not something peripheral, but pre-
cisely what the Austin Court isolated as the seminal question-
whether forfeiture constituted punishment. In rejecting the gov-
ernment's contentions in Austin, the Court stressed that the ba-
sic purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to limit the govern-
ment's power to punish and reiterated the Halper language that
"[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts
across the division between the civil and the criminal law."24
Consequently, the real crux of Austin was not some excessive-
ness analysis that would conceivably duplicate the "preliminary-
stage" disproportionality inquiry of Halper, but was the very is-
sue in Halper-punishment.
The Austin Court, recognizing that punishment is not inher-
ently homogeneous, stressed that "forfeiture statutes historically
have been understood as serving not simply remedial goals but
also those of punishment and deterrence." 25 In so doing, the
Court described forfeiture as a mottled mechanism, a remedial,
deterrent and punitive amalgam which nevertheless-under the
reasoning in both Halper and Austin-amounts to punishment.
In Ursery and $405,089.23 US. Currency, the Court dwelled
on what it depicted as the "non-punitive purposes" of the forfei-
ture provisions and posited that because such things defied
quantification, the Halper disproportionality test was unwork-
able.7 26 As Justice Stevens aptly pointed out, however, there is
no way that that line of reasoning can coexist with the procla-
mation in Halper that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be ex-
plained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes,
is punishment [within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause]."72 7 Stated otherwise, if anything with a smattering of
the nonpunitive can be exempt from undergoing the Halper pun-
ishment test, then basically any punishment can be deemed
nonpunishment. This is, in truth, the Court's cavalier eradica-
tion of the Halper test or more disturbingly, the erasure of its
own precedent.
723. Id.
724. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (quoting Halper, 490 US. at
447-48).
725. Id. at 622 n.14.
726. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145.
727. Id. at 2156 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)).
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As discussed above, another progressive feature of Austin
was its extirpation of the guilty property myth.7 28 The Austin
Court, like the outspoken child who shouted that the King was
naked, revealed forfeiture for what it really is-the punishment
of a culpable property owner. Justice Stevens correctly diag-
nosed the Court's "pedantic distinction between in rem and in
personam actions" as a "cover" for what was the Court's real re-
liance on the "notorious fiction."729
This guilty property fiction is more than the hub of the
Court's "recurrent theme": it, in fact, obsessively infiltrates
every facet of the Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency deci-
sion. In offering its supposed monolith of support, the Court
used Various Items as its foundation and recited the Various
Items' language that the property is the defendant "as though it
were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient."730 In distin-
guishing Halper, the Court underscored the historical distinction
between civil penalties imposed on people and the in rem pro-
ceedings in which property is "held guilty and condemned."731 In
ascertaining Congressional intent, the Court explained that
"Congress specifically structured these forfeitures to be imper-
sonal by targeting the property itself."
732
While in his concurrence Justice Kennedy purported to re-
fute Justice Stevens' accusation that revival of the guilty prop-
erty fiction belied the Court's distinction between in rem and in
personam punishments, wrongdoing objects drift in and out of
Justice Kennedy's reasoning as well. That is, Justice Kennedy
similarly asserted that "civil in rem forfeiture is not punishment
of the wrongdoer for his criminal offense" and re-echoed the
platitudinous guilty property language in Various Items.7
33
Even Justice Kennedy's acknowledgment that "[ilt is the
owner who feels the pain and receives the stigma of the forfei-
ture . . ." is filled with a "doth protest too much" tone, which ul-
timately culminates in his clinging to the notion of guilty prop-
erty 734 Specifically, when trying to brush aside Justice Stevens'
Blockburger analysis as a "misfit," Justice Kennedy resorted to
the explanation that the forfeiture defendant is the property
728. See supra Part H.B.2.
729. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
730. Id. at 2149 (quoting Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282
US. 577, 581 (1931)).
731. Id. at 2140 (quoting Various Items, 282 US. at 580-81).
732. Id. at 2147.
733. Id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
734. Id. at 2151.
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and "[t]he forfeiture cause of action is not charging a second of-
fense of the person."73 5
In Ursery and $405,089.23 US. Currency, the Court did not
just revitalize and deify the old forfeiture myths that tradition-
ally kept double jeopardy protection at bay, it made matters
worse by effectually putting the Circuit Courts' replacement
myths on hold. As discussed above, after Halper, Austin and
Kurth Ranch, the federal appellate courts hatched some surro-
gate myths to fend off constitutional protection.7 6 Specifically,
certain courts concocted a way to get around double jeopardy
protection by mythically portraying the separate civil and crimi-
nal proceedings as not necessarily separate.737 In expressly de-
clining to address or invalidate that theory, the Court in Ursery
and $405,089.23 US. Currency, in effect, kept the myth alive in
the deep freeze-in abeyance so to speak.
Also as discussed above, after Halper, Austin and Kurth
Ranch, the government tried to defeat the double jeopardy im-
passe by arguing that the criminal conviction and the civil for-
feiture were not the same offense.738 As explained above, one of
the government's putative Blockburger contentions was that
criminal charges were different from in rem forfeiture proceed-
ings because criminal convictions required proof of scienter.739
While the Court expressly declined to deal with the Blockburger
issue, it did discuss the scienter element in in rem forfeiture
and opine that such an element distinguishes in rem forfeiture
from a punitive in personam conviction.740 Such reasoning can
be construed as the potential demise of a same offense argu-
ment. That is, the discussion of the different scienter element
could conceivably be transplanted to Blockburger turf and bloom
into the determinatively different Blockburger element.
In addition, Justice Kennedy indicated in his concurrence
that he bought into the argument that the government ad-
vanced in Ursery-that "the criminal prosecution requires proof
that a person, the defendant committed a crime, while the for-
feiture requires proof that the property subject to the forfeiture
has been involved in the commission of the criminal violation."741
735. Id. (emphasis added).
736. See supra Part m.
737. See supra Part HI.A.
738. See supra Part I.C.
739. See supra text accompanying notes 601-06.
740. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2150 (1996).
741. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995). See Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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In this respect, the Blockburger word formula is not merely in
abeyance. As formulated by Justice Kennedy, the government's
Blockburger argument, swallowing the guilty property myth, has
now gained an advocate.
While Justice Stevens alone properly used the Blockburger
test to refute the government's "same offense" argument and
also to deflate that new myth of non-separation, even he did not
go far enough. In putting his imprimatur on the myth that not
all civil forfeiture is punishment, Justice Stevens did what he
accused the majority of doing-that is, disregarding precedent.
As explained above, the Austin Court determined that § 881
conveyance and real estate forfeitures are by their very nature
punitive.742 All of the reasons behind Austin fit § 881(a)(6) forfei-
ture to a tee.
Specifically, one of the things that particularly piqued Jus-
tice Stevens was that the majority practically ignored the "inno-
cent owner" defense, which was one of the big reasons that the
Austin Court concluded that civil forfeiture imposed punish-
ment.74 In giving § 881(a)(6) special clout as the nonpunitive
provision, however, Justice Stevens himself did not deal with
the "innocent owner" loophole that aligns such forfeiture with
the punitive conveyance and realty provisions. 74
In rather tersely explaining that proceeds are not "property
that [the owners] have a right to retain," Justice Stevens failed
to grapple with the reach of the actual language in
§ 881(a)(6). 74 Because it permits forfeiture of "things of value"
not just furnished," but "intended to be furnished . . . in ex-
change for a controlled substance" and of "moneys, negotiable
instruments and securities," not just "used" but "intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of [the] subchapter,"74 the provi-
sion contemplates confiscation of even embryonically tainted
property. That is, the provision potentially sweeps in property
before the crime is even born, property that the owners have not
yet lost a right to retain. Thus, by statutory definition, Justice
Stevens' simile does not work because the property is not neces-
sarily like "money stolen from the bank,"747 but more attenuat-
742. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993).
743. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
744. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994); see also supra Part IH.B.2.
745. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
746. See supra Part H.B.2.




edly like money "intended to be" stolen from the bank.748
The lone dissenter, however, is the only one that acknowl-
edged the real thrust of the Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch de-
cisions that the double jeopardy problem can be resolved by
mandatory joinder:
I... cannot agree with the Government's view that there is any proce-
dural obstacle to including a punitive forfeiture in the final judgment en-
tered in a criminal case. The sentencing proceeding does not commence
until after the defendant has been found guilty, and I do not see why
that proceeding should not encompass all of the punitive sanctions that
are warranted by the conviction ... If, as we have already determined,
the 'civil' forfeitures pursuant to § 881(a)(7) are in fact punitive, a single
judgment encompassing the entire punishment for the defendant's of-
fense is precisely what the Double Jeopardy Clause requires.74 9
The shortcoming here is that Justice Stevens still appears
to be viewing the double jeopardy issue as one of separate mul-
tiple punishments. He did not, at least expressly, tap into what
the Torres court implicitly grasped and what the Kurth Ranch
Court intimated-that a civil proceeding that ends in punish-
ment constitutes "the functional equivalent of a successive crim-
inal prosecution" that can place the accused in jeopardy a sec-
ond time.750 In the Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency
decision, Justice Stevens honed in on the "jeopardy" language in
the Clause itselF5' and deemed it significant and paid homage
to the Clause's "protection against governmental overreach-
ing. 752 Despite that, in his discussion of joinder he did not elab-
orate on whether he saw double jeopardy as precluding the gov-
ernment from putting the accused through multiple ordeals.
Also, while Justice Scalia's concurrence repeats his view that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution,
not successive punishment,"753 he declined to take that crucial
second step and equate such forfeiture proceedings with a crimi-
nal prosecution.
In essence, the decision in Ursery and $405,089.23 US. Cur-
rency is not just the derogation of precedent or the undoing of
the Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch salutary accomplishments.
748. See supra Part III.B.2.
749. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2163 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
750. Department of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994) (emphasis
added).
751. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2155 n.3.
752. Id. at 2163.
753. Id. at 2152 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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It is, in truth, the worst judicial wielding of myths, one that dis-
mantles a sacred constitutional protection. The tragedy is en-
hanced by the fact that the destruction of the sacred protection
occurs just when and where it is most critical.
CONCLUSION: MYTmLESS FORFEITURE AND A MYTHLESS DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE
The decisions in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch effectually
eradicated the traditional myths that made certain constitu-
tional protections unavailable to the civil in rem forfeiture
claimant. The Halper Court essentially overthrew the tyrannical
legislative labels of "civil" and "remedial" and acknowledged that
"[tihe notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts
across the division between the civil and the criminal law...
."754 Under Halper, however, courts must conduct a case-by-case
inquiry to ensure that the particular civil penalty imposed on a
defendant that has already been punished is permissible. The
question in each case is thus whether that penalty is rationally
related to the goal of making the government whole.
The Austin Court went even further. It eliminated the ad
hoc Halper approach with respect to civil in rem forfeiture and
replaced it with the foregone conclusion that forfeiture is always
punishment.755 In so doing, the Austin Court solidified what the
Halper Court inducted-the defeat of the once controlling "civil"
and "remedial" labels that made the constitutional safeguards
inaccessible to individuals subject to property forfeiture.756 Sig-
nificantly, in Austin, the Court also effectually disposed of the
guilty property personification as a putative basis for treating
the Double Jeopardy Clause as inapplicable to forfeiture.
Both the language in and procedural posture of Kurth
Ranch should have had the effect of discouraging an attempt on
the part of the government and the courts to avoid the double
jeopardy prohibition by portraying the parallel criminal proceed-
ings and civil in rem forfeiture actions, which both arise out of
the same criminal offense, as a "single, coordinated prosecu-
tion ! 7 57 Even more crucial, however, is the Kurth Ranch Court's
incipient departure from the view of Halper that there is a sepa-
754. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989). See generally discussion
supra Part 1142.
755. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.2.
756. See supra text accompanying notes 125-40.




rate successive punishments bar built into the Double Jeopardy
Clause. That is, although the Kurth Ranch Court recited that
the "Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense,"758 it ostensibly acknowledged what
Justice Scalia harped on in his dissent-that the Clause's prohi-
bition of a second prosecution logically subsumes the successive
punishments' taboo.759
Although in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, the Supreme
Court effectually expunged the traditional myths that made con-
stitutional provisions unavailable to civil in rem forfeiture
claimants, several federal appellate courts nevertheless conjured
up new ways to thwart forfeiture claimants' constitutional
challenges.
According to some Circuits, the separate civil in rem forfei-
ture and criminal proceedings were not necessarily separate.7 0
What makes this non-separation canard quite mythic is that it
demands that courts buy into the fiction that two separate ac-
tions, each with its own docket number and each resulting in
separate punishment, are somehow fused. Also, it is a fiction
that can not peacefully coexist with the Halper and Kurth
Ranch cases, which treated parallel criminal and civil cases as
unequivocally separate.
According to the other circuits, all civil in rem forfeiture is
not necessarily punitive.761 The Tilley court's effort to lift drug
proceeds forfeiture out of the Austin holding was similarly
mythic. Although the Austin Court dealt with § 881 conveyance
and real estate forfeitures, the Austin reasoning attached
equally to the drug proceeds forfeiture provision at issue in Til-
ley. Also, because the drug proceeds forfeiture provision broadly
sweeps in property "intended to be furnished ... in exchange
for a controlled substance" or "intended to be used to facilitate
758. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. 767, 769 n.3
(1994).
759. Id. at 798-808 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
760. See generally supra Part IIIA_ (focusing primarily on the Second, Sixth and
Eleventh Circuit decisions in Millan, 2 F.3d at 17, United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568
(6th Cir. 1995), and United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
The Eighth Circuit, however, has aligned itself with this approach. See United States v.
Smith, 75 F.3d. 382 (8th Cir 1996).
761. See generally supra Part iI.B (focusing primarily on the Fifth Circuit decision
in United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994)). The Third, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have aligned themselves with this approach. United States v. $184,505.01 In
U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551 (6th
Cir. 1995); and Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1996).
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[a violation of the law]" 762 and because Congress intended that
provision to be punitive, the Tilley decision was just plain
wrong.
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, later joined by the Tenth
Circuit, were the federal appellate courts that appeared to most
accept a mythless concept of civil in rem forfeiture. In
405,089.23 US. Currency, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
parallel civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions are al-
ways separate and that civil forfeiture is always punitive.763 In
so doing, the Ninth Circuit decision abided by the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch. 64 Simi-
larly, the Seventh Circuit rejected the mythic non-separate and
non-punitive myths and even expressed that after Kurth Ranch,
the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit decisions can not be
good law.765
What the Ninth and Seventh and Tenth Circuits also ap-
peared to share is an awareness that the effect of Halper, Austin
and Kurth Ranch was to require the government to seek forfei-
ture and the criminal punishment in a single indictment if it
wishes to pursue both penalties. 766 Although the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the effect of Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch
was to mandate such joinder and thus encourage greater reli-
ance on criminal forfeiture, it still adhered to the belief that the
double jeopardy problem is distinctly one of successive punish-
ments. The Seventh Circuit, however, more openly indicated
that it actually viewed the double jeopardy impasse as one of
successive prosecutions. Specifically, the Torres Court appar-
ently discerned the real implications of the Kurth Ranch Court's
language, which equated a civil proceeding that results in a sec-
ond punishment with a "successive criminal prosecution 76 7
The real disappointment is that in Ursery and $405,089.23
U.S. Currency,7 6 the Court refused to endorse what it already
initiated in Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch-that is, a
mythless concept of civil in rem forfeiture with true double jeop-
ardy protection. The Court should have recognized that civil in
762. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994). See also $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at
1221, and discussion supra Part HLI.B.2.
763. 33 F.3d at 1210. Accord United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470
(10th Cir 1996). See also discussion supra Part IVA.1. & IV.B.
764. See supra discussion Part IV.B.
765. Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465.
766. See generally discussion supra Part V.B.
767. The term goes back to Justice Scalia's dissent in Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 798.
See also Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 and discussion supra Part L.A and IV.B.
768. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
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rem forfeiture is always punishment and that it is indeed im-
posed on a human being. Likewise, it should have expressly ac-
knowledged that parallel civil and criminal proceedings are al-
ways separate. The Court should also have dealt with and
obliterated the fledgling efforts to torture the Blockburger analy-
sis into a limitation on double jeopardy protection. 769 Instead,
the Court reincarnated the old forfeiture myths and reinstated
the despotic reign of Congressional labels while it put the new
myths on hold.
Further, the Supreme Court should have set forth a
mandatory joinder rule, one which requires the government to
seek both the forfeiture and criminal punishments in the same
indictment. In fact, the Court needed to revisit some of the
myths surrounding the Double Jeopardy Clause itself. As Justice
Scalia suggested in his Kurth Ranch dissent, the Court should
have questioned whether there even exists a separate prohibi-
tion of multiple punishments.770
The Ursery and $405,089.23 US. Currency case was a per-
fect opportunity to move forward-to explore one of the real
double jeopardy problems, which is not just the sort of tautology
that Justice Scalia described when he said that "the Double
Jeopardy Clause's ban on successive criminal prosecutions ...
make[s] surplusage of any distinct protection against additional
punishment imposed in a successive prosecution, since the prose-
cution itself would be barred."771 The more insidious problem
that the Court should have confronted is that a distinct succes-
sive punishments' bar can actually detriment the interests be-
hind the Double Jeopardy Clause-the sacred finality guarantee
and the implemented buffer between the accused and potentially
oppressive government. 772
It is, after all, not just the Court's refusal to extend double
jeopardy protection to the civil in rem forfeiture claimant ex-
posed to multiple ordeals, but also its persistence in the notion
that the Double Jeopardy Clause has a distinct successive pun-
ishments bar that enfeebles such a sacred constitutional protec-
tion. That is, if the double jeopardy violation is purely a succes-
sive separate punishments bar and the government omits to
seek both punishments in the same indictment, then it logically
follows that the government is not technically precluded from
nevertheless attempting to punish an accused who has already
769. See generally discussion supra Part IV.C.
770. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 798-803 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
771. Id. at 801.
772. See generally discussion supra Part I.A
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been acquitted of the same offense.773 That, of course, makes an
outright mockery of the whole concept of double jeopardy. In
theory, such a pure successive punishments' "take" on the prob-
lem permits-and perhaps even invites-duplicative ordeals as
long as they do not literally wind up with multiple separate
penalties.
Any interpretation of the Clause that tolerates consecutive
punitive ordeals furnishes the government with a mechanism
for trampling upon the accused's right to finality and in so do-
ing, gives the government a way to oppressively badger an in-
nately vulnerable target. In fact, such a distinct successive pun-
ishments prohibition, one which permits successive ordeals, is
especially toxic when one such ordeal involves the harsh and po-
tent forfeiture mechanism.774
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause aims to equalize "the
adversary capabilities of grossly unequal litigants,"77 5 its safe-
guards are not just helpful or even just necessary-but abso-
lutely critical-in a proceeding which, by its very nature, dimin-
ishes the accused and magnifies the seeming leviathan of
government. The Court in Ursery and $405,089.23 U.S. Currency
should have taken that opportunity to make real peace with the
salutary principles behind double jeopardy protection and ac-
knowledge that a proceeding, such as forfeiture, imposes punish-
ment and is a prosecution. Further, the Court should have ac-
knowledged that the Double Jeopardy Clause has the effect of
barring successive punishments because it directly bars succes-
sive prosecutions.
Further, mythlessness should really entail a re-examination
of what has become a well-embedded incantation, that the Con-
stitution permits the imposition of multiple punishments in a
single proceeding as long as "the legislature actually authorized
the cumulative punishment."7 6 First, while multiple punish-
ments in single proceedings may not present what the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits-the redundant ordeal-that alone,
does not mean that the Constitution automatically condones
multiple punishments in a single proceeding. As Justice Scalia
indicated, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Excessive Fines Clause restrict multiple punishment "insofar as
773. See generally discussion supra Part MA.2.
774. See generally discussion supra Part I.B.
775. Notes and Comments, supra note 49, at 278. See also discussion supra Part
IA
776. Halper, 490 US. at 451 n.10. See also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying
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its nature... [and] cumulative extent is concerned."777
Also, mythlessness should entail the Court taking a hard
and critical look at what Justice Scalia suggested, that the Due
Process Clause "require[s] that the cumulative punishments be
in accord with the law of the land, i.e., authorized by the legisla-
ture."778 The Court should skeptically re-examine what Justice
Scalia attributed to a cumulative punishment analysis under
the Due Process Clause-namely, that well-accepted age-old def-
erence to the legislature. In essence, the Court needs to seri-
ously consider what Justice Stevens said in Ursery and $405,089
US. Currency, that "Congress' decision to create novel and addi-
tional penalties should not be permitted to eviscerate the protec-
tion against governmental overreaching . . . ,,79 In fact, the
Court should heed that admonition when pursuing all such con-
stitutional inquiries.
All of this interpellation is not happening, but it indeed
makes good sense. It is, after all, the fear of governmental tyr-
anny that pervades the whole Constitution. Because Congress is
a branch of government and even one that some scholars have
denominated "the most dangerous,"780 the legislature should not
be exempt from any constitutional constraints on the exercise of
power.781 In fact, the abrogation of legislative deference in the
multiple punishments' area would be entirely in harmony with
the reasoning in both Halper and Austin.
In Halper, the government asserted that punishment can
ensue only in a "criminal" proceeding and that statutory nomen-
clature is what decides whether proceedings are criminal or
Civil.78 2 Although the Supreme Court admitted that "recourse to
statutory language, structure and intent is appropriate in iden-
tifying the inherent nature of a proceeding," it concluded that
courts can identify the constitutional violation only by analyzing
the sanctions imposed on the actual individuals.78 3 Also, the
Halper Court stressed that the legislative label of "civil" did not
necessarily transform a penalty into a non-penalty.
In Halper, the sum of the government's actual loss was
$585 plus its costs in investigating and prosecuting Halper's
777. Kurth Ranch, 511 US. at 805.
778. Id.
779. 116 S. Ct. at 2163 (1996).
780. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 68, at 1156.
781. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
782. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
783. Id. at 447.
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false claims.78 The district court concluded that "the authorized
recovery of more than $130,000 bore no 'rational relation' to the
government's [costs]." 785 The Supreme Court, in fact, recognized
that the disparity between the government's costs and Halper's
legislatively authorized liability was indeed disproportionate and
thus, could be deemed constitutionally infirm.
Although what directly concerned the Halper Court was
that the sanction could be a second punishment in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is quite conceivable that the pen-
alty, which was more than 220 times greater than the govern-
ment's measurable loss, would also be impermissibly excessive-
even if that penalty had been imposed in the same proceeding
as the criminal sentence. This hypothetical, of course, is quite
comparable to what the Court addressed in Austin-namely, a
situation where a forfeiture, which although legislatively au-
thorized, could be arguably "excessive" and thus, constitutionally
proscribed.7 6 As such, Halper and Austin afforded the Court a
basis for chipping away at what now seems even more inveter-
ately entrenched-the permissibility of legislatively authorized
multiple punishments imposed in a single proceeding.
This article began with Shelley's Prometheus, who lamented
his revenant agony 8 7 What I there suggested was that Shelley
had poetically crystallized what the Greeks equated with the
quintessence of severe punishment-namely, redundant pain. In
fact, it is precisely such an equation that inhabits our Double
Jeopardy Clause.
What I now suggest in closing is that the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to and should have welcomed a "Prome-
theus Unbound."78 What this entailed was not just the demoli-
tion of the shackling forfeiture myths, but also the slaying of the
784. Id. at 439.
785. Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
786. Austin, 509 U.S. 602. See generally discussion supra Part I.B.1.
787. See supra text accompanying note 2.
788. According to myth, Hercules killed the vulture that daily devoured Prome-
theus' liver and set Prometheus free:
The bird was killed by shapely Alcmene's heroic son Heracles, who delivered
the son of Iapetus from his evil plight and released him from his sufferings,
with the consent of Olympian Zeus the heavenly king, who wanted to raise
even higher than before the fame of Theban-born Heracles over all the popu-
lous earth. This was his purpose; he exalted his son with honor, and angry
though he was he laid aside his former feud with Prometheus.
See HESIOD, supra note 1, at 68.
Shelley based his Prometheus Unbound on Aeschylus' lost sequel, in which Prome-
theus made peace with his oppressor, but Shelley's poem was an allegory about the elim-
ination of evil. See generally SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 981-83.
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mythic vultures that have historically gyred the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause itself. The Court, of course, should have held that if
the government wishes to seek both forfeiture and criminal pun-
ishment for the same offense, it must do so in the single pro-
ceeding. The Court should, however, have gone further and abol-
ished that successive punishments bar as a distinct double
jeopardy problem. Also, the Court should have emphasized that
even legislatively authorized multiple punishments imposed in a
single proceeding can be excessive and disproportionate and
thus, be constitutionally proscribed.
In sum, only through ushering in a truly mythless era for
both civil in rem forfeiture and double jeopardy protection could
the Supreme Court enjoin the seemingly deific prosecution from
subjecting the accused to a perceived eternity of reprosecution
and pain. Lamentably, after the decision in Ursery and
$405,089.23 US. Currency, there can be no Promethean relief or
vindication.
